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This study investigates how traditional media of television struggles to retain hegemony in the 
online public sphere, where other players such as ordinary citizens co-produce content- initially a 
preserve of traditional media. The study is anchored in the theory of the public sphere as 
espoused by Jurgen Habermas (1989), as well as the agenda setting theory of McCombs and 
Shaw (1972). The context of the study is the 2016 elections in Uganda, part of which period 
social media was shut down in the country, to prevent what government described as an intention 
to use the platform for spreading lies. This effectively integrates the state in the struggle for 
hegemony on social media. The study therefore presents an interpretation of how each of these 
three entities: ordinary citizens, herein referred to as followers, the media and the state struggle to 
retain control of the Facebook communicative space. This study applies a combination of 
netnography and in-depth interviews to bring to empirical scrutiny the use of Facebook in 
Uganda. It concludes with the argument that traditional media‘s agenda setting role is in conflict 
with the discursive nature of Facebook as a public sphere. The study further draws a connection 
to the clamped down radio talk shows in Uganda, commonly known as ebimeeza, to argue that 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the study 
 
Introduction 
This study analyses traditional media of television and its struggles for power and control in the 
digital age, where followers of online platforms are at liberty to co-create and distribute content. 
In this thesis, the aforementioned struggle is presented as existing between Facebook followers 
and Television over content. Another dimension of the struggle is seen when the State joins the 
online sphere to introduce laws that control usage, including shutting down social media at the 
height of the 2016 elections. This action of shutting down social media, as will be expounded on 
in subsequent chapters, is reminiscent of the power struggles that the media has gone through 
from the time of inception in Uganda. 
The growth of the media in Uganda has been gradual, starting with direct control under British 
colonial rule. During the period of colonial administration, the media was largely used as a tool to 
exert and extend British influence(Mutibwa, 2016). This direct control of the media was 
continued by the native government at the time of Uganda‘s independence in 1962.The gradual 
shift therefore from having media entirely under government control to the current pluralism in 
Uganda has been and continues to be met with occasional incidences of stifling press freedoms 
and consequently that of the reading/viewing public (Nassanga, 2008).Whereas previous studies 
have analysed struggles for media freedom in Uganda and its implication on the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression (see Tabaire, 2007; Nassanga, 2008; Sekeba, 2017) this study 
takes the analysis to social media. The analysis presents a power struggle, since social media is 
available to all and can therefore be used by ordinary citizens, the state and traditional media, 
each at their own discretion.  
The affordances of social media have therefore brought an entirely new dimension to this conflict 
of hegemony over media control. Social media such as Facebook, which will be the focus of this 
study, allows individuals to produce and consume media content at their convenience, thereby 
bypassing the traditional government controls. Followers are drawn to Facebook partly because 
the platform is believed to be an important tool in allowing people to exercise democracy 
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(Zuckerberg, 2010), especially in relation to freedom of speech and expression. Such freedom 
holds for as long as ruling governments do not disrupt the platform, for example by way of 
shutting down the Internet, blocking the site or levying taxation among others.  
The social media site, Facebook, currently commands a following of approximately 2.5 billion 
active users on a monthly basis, making the platform a leading network site the world over
1
.Such 
users engage on the platform for various reasons including political communication, marketing, 
connecting with friends and keeping abreast with news and other current affairs. These users 
include individuals, corporate entities, interest groups and governments. Of interest to this study 
is how different individuals engaged the Facebook platform of NTV (Nation Television)for 
political communication, and therefore what this engagement meant for the aforementioned 
power struggle. NTV is one of the media houses operating in Uganda whose programming 
integrates use of social media particularly Facebook. Uganda‘s Facebook users are approximated 
at 13 million (ACME 2016), a number that continues to grow.  
By analysing the political discourse on the Facebook page of a Television station, this study 
explains how followers of the page resist power and control by both the media house (NTV) and 
the state. The followers exercise the aforementioned freedom of expression inherent on 
Facebook. This thesis argues in subsequent chapters that Facebook is Uganda‘s public sphere, 
allowing for the free expression of views by all followers engaged on it. From the pivot of the 
country‘s 2016 presidential elections, Facebook is in this thesis presented as a battleground of 
three forces; the media, the state and the Facebook followers–each of them trying to exert control 
of the conversation towards what each considers as the appropriate way of using the platform. 
The scene of this battle is the Facebook page of NTV at the time of elections. These elections, 
and consequently the entire electioneering process, were intensively reported on social media in a 
manner not witnessed in Uganda before (Rugambwa and Messerschmidt, 2015: 2).  




This thesis commences by presenting a problem statement, which is key to the initiation of the 
study. The principle research objectives and critical research questions are highlighted. In 
addition, any gaps in relevant literature and theoretical framework are highlighted, with a 
discussion on how the study attempts to fill them. The chapter further lays out the motivation, 
purpose, significance and limitations of the study. It concludes with an overview of the layout of 
the thesis.  
Location of the study 
The study is conducted both online and in the physical. The online section of the study is the 
Facebook page of NTV
2
, a screenshot of which is shown below. Whereas this page was 
populated with text, videos, images and other graphics during the 2016 presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Uganda, this research is limited to only the text on the page. The 
limitation is to allow for a discourse analysis of the conversation among followers of the page, in 
reaction to the posted news content.  




Figure 1: A screenshot of the NTV-Uganda Facebook page showing some of the posted 
content during the 2016 elections 
 
The physical aspect of the study is Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, and seat of the country‘s 
political base. The Kampala Capital City Strategic plan 2014/15- 2018/19 describes Kampala as a 
city originally built on seven hills of Kasubi-Mengo, Kibuli, Namirembe, Lubaga, Nakasero, 
Nsambya and Kampala hill (old Kampala). The city has expanded over the years to encompass 
surrounding communities, making it the largest urban centre in Uganda, covering 189 square 
kilometres. The estimated population is 1.75 million residents and a day workforce of 4.5 million 
people. On average, the standard of living is considered low. Kampala city commands 80% of the 
country‘s commercial activities, contributing 65% of the Gross Domestic Product.  
NTV is one of the many media companies in Kampala. It is a subsidiary of Nation Media Group- 
a conglomerate operating in the East and Central Africa region. NTV started operating in Uganda 
in 2006.  Ipsos Connect, a research firm in Uganda, considers this television station as the most 
watched English station in the country, commanding 23% viewership. Its follower, Nile 
Broadcasting Television, has a viewership of 8% (Ipsos Connect Audience Research Quarter 4, 
2017: 37). The audience research further indicates that Uganda has over 80 television stations, 
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most of which are privately owned. This influx of privately owned television stations is partly 
fuelled by the absence of an indigenous national language and by digital migration, all of which 
have left the media landscape fragmented.  
Background to the study 
Uganda’s political history: Implications for the current political leadership 
The early years of Uganda‘s political history before colonial rule, saw some communities 
organised under Kingdoms, while others were not. In this period, the present-day Uganda had not 
yet formed. The absence of a structured mode of communication in pre-colonial Uganda meant 
that the kingdoms and communities seldom interacted with each other. Interactions were 
therefore limited to incidences of occasional barter trade, in which inhabitants needed to access 
commodities scarce in their locality but available in a distant community, for example salt 
(Karugire, 1980: 17, 26). The period of imperialism in the 19
th
 century during which European 
powers partitioned Africa explains how Uganda came under colonial rule by the British. The 
British first established their dominion in Buganda kingdom and from here extended to the rest of 
present-day Uganda, in the period 1900-1919. At the time of declaring Uganda a British 
protectorate in 1894 therefore, the declaration was only in reference to this kingdom (Mutibwa, 
2016). Buganda, located in the current central region of the country, was one of the largest and 
arguably better organised amongst the existing kingdoms. The kingdom had a system of a king 
who held all authority in the land and whose word was final. Several chiefs managed the affairs 
of their respective jurisdiction on his behalf. The kingdom was largely agrarian (Karugire, 1980).  
The year 1962 therefore remains historic for it is then that Uganda attained independence from 
Britain. As noted by Jim Ocitti (2005: 27), several countries in the developing world attained 
independence during this period. And for the case of Uganda, self-governance came with the 
expectation that the country would progress faster. This hope was premised on the fact that the 
exploitation of Uganda‘s resources, which had affected the rate of development in the country, 
would be no more. This thesis argues that the need to resist oppression carried on from the 
successes of demanding independence from British rule to contesting the authoritarianism 
exhibited in subsequent regimes. As of the writing of this thesis and as will be expounded on 
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later, this resistance has carried on to contesting control over social media—Facebook in 
particular.  
To start off self-governance, the country‘s first government was formed through an alliance 
between UPC(Uganda People‘s Congress) and KY (Kabaka Yekka, translated as only the King) 
party of the Buganda royal monarchy (Bussey, 2005: 3). UPC was a political party initiated by 
the first Prime Minister, Milton Obote and is still in existence. Kabaka Yekka opted to call itself a 
movement and not a political party and as noted by Karugire (1980: 186-88), this choice of name 
was emotionally endearing to a substantial number of Baganda. A 1962 election to determine 
which political party was to take the country‘s top seat had seen the UPC garner more votes 
against DP (Democratic Party). To Karugire (1980), the coalition between UPC and KY was a 
collection of individuals brought together for the sole purpose of getting into power. It is less 
surprising therefore that although Uganda‘s independence was celebrated by the nationals as an 
end to British colonial rule, the political turmoil that followed makes it debatable whether the 
country was ready for self-governance. The political instability, as seen through successive 
military coups, is arguably a reflection of a combination of inexperience at self-governance, a 
greed for power by subsequent regimes and a demonstration by the citizenry of the power in their 
hands to resist tyranny. Each of these regimes had hoped that their approach at governance would 
be better than that of their predecessor, which may not have been the case for many of them.  
This political instability after independence started in 1971, when the then head of the army, Idi 
Amin Dada, overthrew President Milton Obote in a military coup. President Obote is said to have 
been away attending a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Singapore 
when he was overthrown back home (Alina, 2006: 16). But eight years later in 1979, UNLA 
(Uganda National Liberation Army) teamed up with Tanzanian troops to overthrow President 
Amin in a military coup (Kasfir, 2005: 278). With this coup came the reinstatement of President 
Obote for a second term in office.  
Important to note for this thesis is that UNLA comprised of two Ugandan contingents. One of 
these was KM (Kikosi Maalum) of deposed President Milton Obote and the second was 
FRONASA (Front for the National Salvation of Uganda). The latter was founded by Yoweri 
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Kaguta Museveni, who was to become the president of Uganda later and is still president as of 
this writing. Despite the resounding military victory, as seen in the overthrow of President Idi 
Amin Dada, Uganda still witnessed political instability under three successive and interim 
governments of Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, and Paulo Muwanga (Kasfir, 2005).  
History of elections in Uganda 
In the year 1980, Uganda had its first presidential elections that maintained Milton Obote in 
power. Although this election was allegedly free and fair, the results were contested. The DP, 
which came second in the elections, believed the electoral process was gerrymandered (Kasfir, 
2005). William Pike (2019: 71) writes that prior to announcing President Obote as winner of the 
polls, a directive was given by the then chairman of the Military Commission, Muwanga, 
requiring returning officers to stop declaring results or sending them to the Electoral 
Commission. He directed that the results be sent to him instead. But by the time this directive was 
given, some of the results that had come in had already indicated victory to the DP. Nonetheless, 
the returning officers complied and stopped announcing any further results, lest they face 
punishment. Important to note here is that the directive was announced on Radio Uganda, the 
only existent radio station at the time and whose ownership and control was in the hands of 
government. The low level of media freedom at that time could not have allowed for a debate or 
contestation of this directive on the airwaves. Pike (2019) notes further that this particular poll 
was extended for one more day, owing to a delay in dispatching electoral material to some 
regions.  
It is less surprising that Obote was announced winner of the 1980 polls, for it can be argued that 
his team ‗cast‘ the votes, counted them and declared the distribution among the contestants. This 
manoeuvring with the votes is said to have been done at Nile Mansions, a popular hotel in 
Kampala. Even then, a news story by The Times (London) on the contrary reported DP‘s win 
(Pike, 2019: 72). Considering that Uganda was still an infant state and unfamiliar with elections 
and democracy, the electoral participants had little trust in one another, argue Eric Bjornlund, 
Michael Bratton and Clark Gibson (1992: 406). This distrust, they argue further, was as a result 
of weak and untested systems and rules to guide the entire electoral process. These were rules 
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relating to transparency of voting, voter confidence and expert knowledge about the process. In 
addition, was the absence of an independent media that could not be compromised by state 
machineries in probing the electoral process.  
In third place at that election was UPM (Uganda Patriotic Movement) of Yoweri Museveni, who 
too was dissatisfied with the electoral outcome. He resorted to lodging a guerrilla war to unseat 
President Obote. This decision was, according to Joe Oloka-Onyango (2017: 107), a fulfilment of 
Museveni‘s promise. Museveni had made a public declaration of the intention to contest the 
result through use of armed force. He consequently justified the bush war as necessary and that it 
was a popular struggle (Kasfir, 2005).  
In the meantime, President Milton Obote continued to lead the country until 1985, when he was 
deposed by Tito Okello, the army commander. Once again, the subsequent announcements of 
Tito Okello‘s takeover came through Radio Uganda as communicated by the 2
nd
 Lt. Walter 
Ochora:  
Fellow Ugandans, special announcement. Fellow Ugandans we are glad to announce a 
total coup in Uganda today. It was the total end of Obote‘s tribalistic rule. It was a 
bloodless coup. Civilians can join us at City Square any time from now. When you see 
soldiers patrolling around, you should not make any scaring issue. Thank you very much. 
Wait for more announcements (Pike, 2019: 111) 
An hour later: 
I am now going to close. I am called Chief Master Planner Okello Kolo. We have already 
captured Uganda which is Kampala now under us. For God and my Country, thank you 
(Pike, 2019: 111). 
But Tito Okello‘s reign was short-lived. Yoweri Museveni‘s war was a success and in1986, he 
overthrew the Tito Okello government. Part of the success of Museveni in this coup is attributed 
to earlier exposure to the Mozambican liberation war by FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de 
Mocambique) against Portugal. The exposure, according to Kasfir (2005: 276-277), happened 
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during Museveni‘s time as a student at the University of Dar es Salaam in the 1970s, where 
FRELIMO was then headquartered. In this period, he shared ideas with Eduardo Mondlane, the 
president of FRELIMO, on how to fight an organised government. In addition, he learnt how to 
mobilise the involvement of rural villagers.  
Museveni‘s victory was celebrated by a substantial section of Ugandans, partly because he 
promised to govern as guided by principles of democratic rule (Bussey, 2005: 3). Nonetheless, 
the activities of political parties were suspended. The NRM (National Resistance Movement) of 
President Museveni was the only active political party. To Oloka-Onyango (2017: 107), NRM 
did not want to be blamed by law for turning Uganda into a one-party state. Therefore, the 
disguise of temporarily suspending the political parties and declaring that the country would run 
under the Movement system, was the preferred option. But in essence, the absence of political 
pluralism at this critical time of self-governance was detrimental to democracy (Oloka-Onyango 
and Ahikire, 2017). The country‘s opposition nonetheless continued to advocate for political 
pluralism, as was the case elsewhere in the region and the continent at large.  
In 2006, Uganda held its first multi-party elections in response to political pressure on the need 
for allowing alternative political dispensations. Prior to these elections, Sabiiti Makara, Lise 
Rakner & Lars Svasand (2009: 188) note that in 2001, the NRM set up a committee to analyse 
the country‘s political system, the Movement, and give guidance on the best route for the future. 
The committee was to consider if Uganda was ready to re-embrace political pluralism by way of 
allowing the active operations of political parties, or continue largely under NRM. This 
committee recommended that the activities of political parties be allowed, which was a good 
gesture for democracy. However, these parties were to exist alongside the Movement system of 
governance, the largest political grouping at the time. 
Nonetheless and as argued by Makara et al. (2009), the permission for political pluralism was not 
a stand-alone. It had a proposal that the constitutional cap of a two-term period for the president 
be lifted. These two terms are constitutionally five years each. The proposal was that Uganda 
adopts an open-ended term. A national referendum held to this effect came out with more votes in 
support of the aforementioned open-ended term. It is however debatable whether the citizens who 
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voted for the open-ended term were more in favour of this arrangement, or were eager to have 
political pluralism actively back into the country. The position meant that President Museveni 
was eligible to contest for subsequent elections until the constitutional age limit of 75. But as will 
be discussed later, this age limit has since been revisited. The next elections were then held in 
2011 and again in 2016, with President Yoweri Museveni retaining presidency throughout. 
Statistics from Uganda‘s electoral commission indicate that President Museveni won the 2016 
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(Kayunga 2017: 81-82). TICC was comprised of 25 independent presidential aspirants while 
TDA brought together aspirants from political parties. In addition to parties in the TDA was a 
newly formed Go-Forward Movement of former premier, John Patrick Amama Mbabazi. His 
involvement in the race came as a shock to many, since he had diligently served in Museveni‘s 
government for many years and in different positions. Kayunga (2017) further notes that the 
much-anticipated intention by TDA to front a joint presidential candidate failed a few months 
after the initiation of this united force. In addition, Kayunga (2016: 93) argues that elections were 
far from being capable of resulting in regime change. This is because the NRM‘s hybrid nature 
made it appear to have democratic credentials, yet it retained institutional frameworks that could 
not allow for such change.  
Another strategy by the opposition was the continued call for what they termed as a level playing 
field through electoral reforms. As part of these reforms, the opposition demanded that powers be 
given to the Judicial Service Commission to appoint officials of the Electoral Commission 
(Abrahamsen and Bareebe, 2016: 752). The opposition had repeatedly indicated that the 
country‘s Electoral Commission was partisan. As argued by Said Adejumobi (2000: 62), it is 
critical that elections are conducted by a competent and impartial electoral body, an impartial 
judiciary, a non-partisan police force and a viable and free press. Although overtime the calls for 
electoral reforms were replicated by several entities including civil society, the Inter-Religious 
Council of Uganda and the donor community, they were largely ignored by government. Further 
frustration, especially for the opposition and independent candidates, related to incidences of 
intimidation and arbitrary arrests of opposition candidates (Abrahamsen and Bareebe, 2016). 
Irrespective of the aforementioned unfulfilled demands for electoral reforms, the alleged 
environment of intimidation of opposition candidates and a failed coalition, Uganda went to the 
polls on 18 and 19 February 2016. These polls were initially scheduled for only 18 February, but 
were extended owing to a delay in delivery of polling material to some stations. This delay was 
reminiscent of the 1980 polls, which as discussed above, were extended for another day for 
similar reasons. Allegations of vote rigging and ballot stuffing were brought up by the opposition 
in the 2016 polls, again similar to such allegations in the 1980 ones.  
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As explained by Tom Young (1993: 300), elections are important because they legitimise the 
government in power, thus allowing for both local and international recognition of a given state. 
In addition, they are a symbol of a nation‘s sovereignty. They succinctly define the relationship 
between the governors and the governed, although other theorists such as the Marxist ideology, 
view them as a means of reproducing dominant ideologies (Adejumobi, 2000: 60). Perhaps 
Staffan Lindberg (2006: 139) sums it well when he writes ―even a tight grip on the media by an 
autocratic ruler could be difficult to sustain in a situation of uninterrupted series of competitive 
elections.‖  
But to Kwame Ninsin (2006: 3), the high levels of impoverishment in many of the African states 
have meant that elections are more about economic and social rights than civil and political ones. 
Consequently, the ballot is used to secure such needs as food, healthcare and access to formal 
education. It is therefore based on the promise and ability to deliver these needs that a substantial 
section of the electorate will cast their vote. The 2016 elections in Uganda saw a manifestation of 
this argument. As noted by Phiona Muhwezi-Mpanga (2017:123) that while on the campaign 
trail, the incumbent often explained that a particular area did not have basic social services 
because they had a member from the opposition as their representative to parliament. This was 
followed by a ridicule that such residents had not ―voted wisely.‖ This ridicule was arguably a 
direct call for members to vote candidates from the NRM at all levels. Gerald Bareebe (2016: 
751) observes that since the incumbent was not expected to lose the election, which was therefore 
not expected to be free and fair, the 2016 election was on this premise a ‗foregone conclusion.‘ 
Bareebe further asserts that most African elections serve to recycle political elites. 
With incumbent Museveni declared winner of the 2016 presidential elections, Oloka-Onyango 
(2017: 118) rightly predicted that this was to be followed by lifting of the constitutional age-limit. 
With the term limit already out of the way as discussed above, the presidential age-limit was the 
only remaining obstacle for the incumbent to contest in subsequent elections. In December 2018, 
Oloka-Onyango‘s prediction came to pass. During a contested and chaotic parliamentary session, 
members of the opposition tried to disrupt the proceedings in the hope that they would succeed in 
blocking the tabling of a motion that was to lift the presidential age-limit. Nonetheless, 317 
(77%) members of Uganda‘s parliament out of the 410 for the day, agreed to the lifting of the 
 14 
controversial age limit and passed the bill (Ndyasiima, 2018). It is important to note that the 
ruling NRM has the majority representation in parliament. The bill sought to remove the 
constitutional age limit of 75 for presidency. By 2021 when Uganda is expected to go to the polls 
again, President Museveni will be 77 years old and therefore not eligible to stand, minus 
changing this constitutional provision. The bill was widely perceived to have been crafted for the 
benefit of President Museveni, who was now set to run for life presidency. President Museveni 
hailed those who passed this bill and referred to them as the ‗new breed of party historicals‘. 
Ndyasiima (2018) further notes that the president described all those against the age limit 
amendment as ―uninformed evil schemers who do not want Uganda and Africa to succeed‖.  
Uganda’s media history and public participation in political debate 
Picking up from the tumultuous political history discussed above especially up until the NRM 
captured power in 1986, it is hardly surprising that the country‘s media history is equally 
turbulent. A discussion on Uganda‘s media history would therefore be insufficient without 
highlighting how the media and its development was either affected or enabled by the successive 
historical periods. This section discusses some of the crucial times in the country‘s media history, 
relating them to whether the readers or the audience was gradually able to participate in political 
debate or not.  
The press under Christianity 
It is said that one of the Kings of Buganda, Kabaka Mutesa 1, wrote a letter requesting for 
Christian missionaries to come to his Kingdom and preach Christianity. But this assertion is 
contested with the argument that the letter could have been initiated by Henry Morton Stanley, a 
British explorer, and that therefore a substantial section of its content was his (Karugire, 1980: 
51). This argument is anchored in the vested interests that the British had in establishing colonial 
rule in Uganda, as was the case elsewhere on the African continent.  
Consequently, Alexander Mackay a missionary with the Church Missionary Society came to 
Uganda in 1878. He carried with him a printing press. With this printing press, Mackay printed 
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simple words in one of the local languages, Luganda, to introduce literacy and help people learn 
how to read and write. He would later use the same equipment to translate the prayer book 
(Sekeba, 2017: 27-28). Literacy started taking shape. The Church Missionary Society, coming 
from Britain, started a mimeograph English language quarterly in 1897, which Jacob Matovu 
(1990:342) describes as a precursor to the country‘s print media. Understandably, the first 
publications were oriented towards the Christian faith, which the missionaries came to advance.   
In 1900, the monthly English publications titled Mengo Notes were published by the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS), and according to Gariyo (1992:6-7) marked the first newsletters in 
Uganda. Mengo Notes was published in English. Sekeba (2017:29) agrees and adds that this 
newspaper‘s content focused on giving details about the activities of the Church Missionary 
Society in the country. Additional content related to major events happening in Uganda at the 
time, to help the missionaries in England keep abreast. In 1902, this publication‘s name was 
revised to Uganda Notes. This change in name was more reflective of the entire country as 
opposed to its previous name, which is of a kingdom in the central region.  
But it was not until almost 30 years later in 1930 that Africans were allowed the chance to have 
their opinions published in this newspaper. This, as further noted by Sekeba (2017:31-32) 
constituted a breakthrough for many who had longed to use this medium for such a purpose. The 
published opinions were of a general nature, discussing topics such as ‗The ideal Uganda,‘ ‗How 
I would help my people if I were a Chief,‘ and ‗Why I am a Christian.‘ Although these opinions 
were not of a political nature, they arguably made the local population realise that the media 
could be used as platform for voicing views on key issues. This was important for the country‘s 
struggle for self-governance and a free press in subsequent years.   
In 1907, Ebifa mu Buganda, the first Luganda newspaper was started. It had an initial circulation 
of 400 copies, which had grown to 1,300 by 1915 (Sekeba, 2017:32, 34). Gariyo (1992) notes 
that this publication became Ebifa mu Uganda in 1934. And in the late 1950s, it further 
transformed into an English publication, New Day. Sekeba (2017: 39-40) observes that unlike 
previous publications, New Day got involved in writing about political news and issues, to the 
disapproval of the Church authorities. When the editor of the newspaper failed to comply with 
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the need for eliminating these controversial issues, the paper was closed down in 1971. It would 
take another six years (1976) for a monthly English tabloid, New Century, to be launched. It can 
be argued that the aforementioned action of closing down the newspaper set precedent that 
authorities can exercise maximum power and control over the press in Uganda, at the expense of 
freedom of speech and expression. This trend was to be replicated in several years to come. 
Alongside the activities and publications of the Church Missionary Society were those of the 
Roman Catholic White Fathers. This group arrived in Uganda in 1879 and started a Luganda 
monthly religious newsletter known as Munno in 1911 (Gariyo, 1992). This publication later 
became a daily, circulating 6,000 copies. Other publications by the Roman Catholic White 
Fathers included Enyonyozi Yaitu which was in the Runyooro/Rutooro languages, Musizi in 
Luganda and Leadership in English (Sekeba, 2017: 45).The decision to translate these Christian 
teachings into the local languages was to ensure that the content is clearly understood. The 
acceptance of Christian teachings prepared the population for colonialism (Chibita and Fourie, 
2007:4). But it was not long before a vibrant local press owned by Ugandans joined the scene. 
With this press, more voices and narratives from the local population were accommodated.  
Onset of the black press: The voice of citizens comes to life 
The lethal events of the First World War were partly responsible for the vibrant emergence of an 
African press in Uganda. One year after this war, the first political publication, known as 
Sekanyolya, was started. Several other titles, such as Matalisi of 1923, and Gambuze in 1927 
followed in succession (Sekeba, 2017:62). In the local press, citizens questioned the logic of 
colonialism. Some of their inquiry was partly helped by exposure through education, travel and 
interaction with other African people (Gariyo 1992). In the 1940s, more titles of the local press, 
such as Buganda Nyaffe, Mugobansonga, Munyonyozi and Uganda Star came on board. Gariyo 
further notes that these publications questioned the logic of British rule and the concept of 
colonial administration. Nonetheless a few of them were focused on advocating for the business 
interests of their owners, which Gariyo (1992) describes as being narrow in scope. Expectedly, 
under colonial rule, the press was controlled through legislation which was restrictive in nature. 
Some of the laws included the newspaper surety ordinance of 1910 and the Press World War I 
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censorship ordinance of 1915. These laws provided for financial penalties to those who defaulted. 
In addition, the option of imprisonment especially for publishing about British troops or for 
failure to pay bond before publishing was another option for punishment (Gariyo, 1993: 4). 
Whereas the black press had not yet fully matured in 1910, the colonial administration found it 
necessary to have such legislation in place to control the publication of anti-war propaganda 
(Gariyo 1993: 5). 
In 1953, the Kabaka (King) of Buganda among other things demanded for Uganda‘s 
independence. With this demand came the insistence that the issues concerning his kingdom, 
Buganda, be handled by the colonial office and not the Foreign office, and that there should be no 
East African federation. Chibita and Fourie (2007:11) describe some of these demands, such as 
the rejection of the formation of an East African Federation, as a demonstration of Buganda‘s 
fear to lose autonomy. In response, on 30 November 1953, Sir Andrew Cohen, the colonial 
governor, deposed Kabaka Edward Muteesa into exile in Britain (Gariyo, 1992: 40- 41). But the 
decision had an unexpected outcome of enhancing the call for independence from the British. The 
voice of the local population in the black press through editorials and commentaries was evident. 
Uganda Post, Uganda Empya, and Uganda Eyogera condemned the exile and treated it as a 
national issue. The locals engaged in violent protests and negotiations for the Kabaka‘s return. In 
addition, Buganda refused to participate in discussions about independence until the demand for 
the return of the Kabaka was met (Chibita and Fourie, 2007:11). In October 1955, the Kabaka 
was returned from exile. This was arguably a sign of victory on the part of the masses, as 
partially enabled through the press.  
The action of the masses speaking out and contesting government decisions through the press 
was to be replicated for several years to come including to-date, as is argued in this thesis. But 
such freedom of expression did not go unabated. Repressive laws such as the press censorship 
and correction ordinance No. 13 of 1948, and sections 48 and 53 of the Penal Code on sedition 
and seditious publications were applied to censor the press. This censorship was at its height 
during the second World War. It targeted the opinions and commentary from a growing breed of 
nationalist leaders. Some of these leaders had been exposed to the outside world and repeatedly 
opposed the indiscriminate recruitment of Africans to fight in the war. By the time of Uganda‘s 
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independence in 1962, a few newspapers such as Uganda Eyogera and Munno were still in 
circulation (Gariyo, 1992: 70). Other newspaper titles had been closed down and their critical 
staff, such as journalists, detained. This detention was partly because some of these journalists 
were allegedly nationalist politicians and as such, their reporting was inclined towards the call for 
independence (Ocitti, 2005: 27). 
The press at Independence 
The first years after independence are said to have been of great press freedom in Uganda. This is 
because of the increase in newspaper circulation to 76,900 for both dailies and non-dailies, a 
figure that made Uganda arguably one of the biggest print media consumers in the region by 
1966 (Ocitti 1980:39). As observed by Tettey (2001: 9-11), the emergence of private media 
makes it possible for citizens to challenge and criticise authoritarian rule since voices that are 
initially unheard on state-owned media can now come to the fore.  He argues further that it is 
mainly through the ability to talk-back on private media that the population is able to measure the 
actions of politicians against what they promised to do, and then decide if such persons need to 
be allowed to continue holding public office. Consequently, the possibility of being exposed 
makes government officials circumspect in both their actions and promises. 
But for the case of Uganda, it was not long that the press began to be dominated by content about 
activities of the head of state and other government officials in what Chibita and Fourie (2007:14) 
describe as a guise of national consolidation that further weakened private media. The country 
was under Milton Obote as Prime Minister. He was to later replaced the office of the prime 
minister with that of president, with him as its first head of state (Ocitti 2005:36). Tabaire 
(2007:194) agrees with Chibita and Fourie (2007), and observes that under President Milton 
Obote 1, Uganda witnessed real struggles for press freedom. This was despite the fact that his 
government was considered one of liberal attitudes toward the press.  
But perhaps Ocitti (2005:28-31) analyses this situation better with the explanation that 
government perceived the role of the press as one of a development approach. In this approach, 
the press was expected to assist the government in its development agenda towards national 
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cohesion. On the contrary however, the press took on a libertarian model. Such a model allowed 
for alternative views minus state interference. These two approaches were therefore bound to be 
antagonistic as government used its machinery to try and make the press comply. Ocitti (2005:32-
33) further observes that with time, President Milton Obote opted to have his own press that 
would report affairs in the interest of the state. He consequently increased the government 
newspapers circulated in local languages and allowed for more local language programming on 
radio. In addition, he had a special press- the Uganda Press, set up to report on the activities of 
his political party, the UPC.  
Nonetheless, Pike (2019:158) observes that under President Obote, the government newspaper 
known as Uganda Times collapsed gradually as readers chose to keep off the propaganda that 
filled its pages. Some of such content misrepresented the crisis that was happening in the country 
at the time and presented it all as a stable situation. The reaction by President Obote was to invest 
more funds in an attempt to redeem the plummeting sales, as opposed to addressing the issue of 
lopsided content and an unpopular newspaper. For example, 1.9 million dollars worth of printing 
machinery was procured from the Soviet Union in 1985, only to be dumped and waste away in 
the elephant grass at President Obote‘s compound in Apac district.  
Upon President Obote‘s deposition by President Idi Amin Dada, the press still faced restrictions. 
The Newspapers and Publications Decree of 1972 in a way meant that the press resorted to what 
Chibita and Fourie (2007:18) term as doing public relations for the state. The decree further gave 
the government information minister powers to prohibit the publication of a newspaper for an 
unspecified period. Consequently, most media became inactive or closed business. In an analysis 
of this period, Tabaire (2007:194) observes that the government of President Idi Amin killed 
journalists and nationalised newspapers. This limited the role that the media could play in the 
country‘s political life. Tabaire further observes that this situation did not improve when 
President Obote II returned to power. Journalists were detained and critical newspapers banned. 
He concludes that the press was expected to offer constructive criticism, although the description 
of such criticism was not availed Tabaire (2007:195). 
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Radio and Television broadcasting in Uganda 
In 1954, radio broadcasting was introduced in Uganda mainly to serve as an extension of 
advanced colonial administration. With the above heightened anti-government propaganda in the 
print media, radio was a preserve of government propaganda, which included replicating what 
was aired on the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) radio (Gariyo, 1993:42-43). Gariyo 
further notes that some of the privileges availed to natives working with the radio station, blinded 
them from questioning the absence of local programming. At this point in Uganda‘s media 
history therefore, the voice of citizens through local broadcasts was still far from being realised.  
Almost a decade later, on 8 October 1963, the country established UTV (Uganda Television), 
with a focus on expanding national development. This was under President Milton Obote. The 
television‘s programming included drama, documentary, sports, talk shows and daily news both 
in English and local languages (Ocitti, 2005:32). Consequently, more than half of the time on 
television was devoted to educational programmes as determined by government. The country 
had over 9,000 television sets by 1968. Transmitter stations had been activated in different parts 
of the country such as Mbale, Soroti, Lira, Masaka and Mbarara, consequently expanding the 
television audience and consequently improved local programming (Ocitti, 2005:39). 
But it was not until 1971, under President Amin, that the impact of television was felt more by a 
bigger section of the population. This was due to the larger volumes of investment towards 
developing the television industry and the shift from black and white to colour telecasting 
(Matovu, 1990:354). Expectedly, television, just like radio, was still under state control. The 
ordinary person was seen to participate in politically neutral programmes such as music and 
agriculture (Chibita and Fourie, 2007:18). Radio Uganda and Uganda Television remained the 
only players in the broadcast sector, and it was a criminal offence to be found listening to a 
foreign radio station such as the BBC. Consequently, in the period 1971-1986, the ability of 
Ugandans to participate in public debate on their governance was eroded (Chibita and Fourie, 
2007).   
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The modern era of Radio in Uganda 
In 1993, Uganda‘s mediascape changed when the airwaves were liberalised. This saw the first 
privately owned radio station, Sanyu FM, join the airwaves (Chibita and Kibombo, 2013:1) of 
what continues to be a growing media scape that has attracted media conglomerates such as the 
Vision Group and the Nation Media Group. The country now has 250 registered radio stations 
and over 30 television stations, which have been critical in the broadening of space for political 
debate (Sekeba, 2017:198). Most of these stations broadcast in indigenous languages (Ipsos 
Connect Audience Research, 2017).  
With the liberalisation of airwaves came an unprecedented proliferation of radio talk shows in 
Uganda (Benderana et al., 2010: 13). This genre, commonly known as ebimeeza, meaning ‗table-
talks,‘ in one of the local dialects – Luganda -became a meeting point for ordinary people to 
exchange views on various issues, especially on the country‘s political discourse. The ebimeeza 
were in a way now the public sphere, allowing for free expression of views and various forms of 
participation. As noted by Nassanga (2008:654), the phone-in talk shows on ebimeeza allowed 
the public to actively participate in agenda setting. Prior to the ebimeeza the ‗Capital Gang‘ was 
Uganda‘s first participatory political talk show (Chibita, 2010:8). The show had a host with four 
regular guests known as the ‗gangsters.‘ Listeners were free to call in to contribute to the on-
going discussion. It was not long before other radio stations initiated similar programmes. The 
popularity of such shows gained momentum, with some stations having them daily. Chibita 
(2010) adds that it is the introduction of ebimeeza that took the genre of radio talk shows a notch 
higher in Uganda. These shows were a rallying point for diversity in opinion on the pressing 
socio-political issues in the country. In addition, the participants abided to certain ground rules 
and guidelines of engagement to minimise personal attacks and likely incidences of libel against 
the media house.  
The ebimeeza were at their peak between 2001-2009 (Brisset-Foucault, 2013:228-229) and were 
arguably a cherished public sphere. They mainly took place over the weekend and were held in 
places accessible to all, such as public houses, public gardens or open courtyards scattered around 
the city. These talks were also broadcast live on private radio stations. Most of them lasted 
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between one to two hours, with the big ones attracting an audience of about 600 to 800 people 
onsite and the smaller ones a gathering of 20 to 30 persons. Brisset-Foucault adds that the format 
of these ebimeeza was similar. The speakers identified to contribute to the debate were voluntary 
and registered on a list prepared before the broadcast debate. A chairperson, appointed by the 
radio station, would then call on each of the speakers to give their views on a salient issue of the 
day. Chibita (2010:8) further observes that a significant section of the public that had initially 
been closed out on engaging in talk shows mainly because such shows were broadcast in the 
English language, were now able to take part. The fact that the ebimeeza were now held in a 
variety of indigenous languages not only allowed for more participation of the local audience but 
arguably meant that issues could be better understood. 
Then in a dramatic turn of events in 2009, the government of Uganda clamped down on the 
ebimeeza radio talk shows, arguing that they were inciting violence (Benderana et al., 2010:14). 
Radio stations were consequently threatened with non-renewal of their broadcasting licenses if 
they dared carry on with the talk shows that were allegedly inciting the public. The radio stations 
had to abide and this consequently affected the hitherto vibrant public sphere. With the ebimeeza 
talk shows now abolished, gaps in public discourse in relation to feedback and free debate were 
evident. The public was now left with expressing their views mainly through the ‗letters to the 
editor‘ section and commentary in newspapers, a few talk shows on television stations or phone 
calls and messaging for broadcasts (Benderana et al., 2010:15). To Nassanga (2008:657), the 
government of Uganda is yet to fully accept media as a public sphere and therefore allow it to 
operate with fewer restrictions. This non-acceptance, Nassanga argues further, is reminiscent of 
the fact that government had full control over the media before the era of media pluralism and is 
therefore arguably still operating in that mode. And as such, the ebimeeza were largely viewed by 
government as a platform for creating public disaffection, promoting tribalism and creating 
confusion among the public. As noted by Wandera (2016), several media houses in Uganda 
remain oppressed by the state and this limits their role of independently informing the public. The 
ebimeeza remain banned to date and, as will be argued in this thesis, the stifling of Uganda‘s 
public sphere has now been extended to social media.   
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For the broadcast media, the audience is mainly left with television talk shows, most of which 
take place in a studio setting, where one or two moderators discusses a topical issue with 
panellists or experts invited to the show. The audience is allowed to participate by way of phone 
calls or by the more recent engagement on social media. The show host can only take a few 
phone calls within the specified period of the talk show. Panellists are then asked to respond to 
some of the inquiries or the input from the audience. The majority of these talk shows are in 
English, with only a few in the local languages, specifically Luganda. Some of the current ones, 
as of this writing, include On the spot and Fourth Estate on NTV (English), Frontline and One 
on one with Tamale Mirundi on NBS (English), The Eagle also on NBS but in Luganda. Another 
is Amaaso ku Ggwanga on BBS Television (Luganda). Although most of these are held in a 
studio setting, television stations are beginning to turn to open spaces for audience talk shows, 
arguably to allow more physical participation of the citizens. In this category are shows such as 
‗Perspectives with Josephine Karungi‘ on NTV. It is a new development in Uganda for television 
talk shows to be held in open spaces, as was the case for the defunct radio talks. It should be 
noted however that the current open-space-based television talk shows are not political in nature, 
but rather address social concerns.  
Whereas the radio talk shows were live on air and  therefore limited in terms of time allocation, 
they had the additional component of a live audience. This audience would cheer or react in 
various ways in support of or against what a particular speaker submitted. This live audience 
arguably made the radio talks shows more engaging and added to their popularity. Perhaps this 
explains the fact that the physical venues in which these radio talk shows were held attracted a 
high turn-up to the extent of being oversubscribed. The narrow studio-set up of most radio 
stations could not have accommodated such big audiences, therefore necessitating radio 
managers to find alternative space. 
The press under President Museveni and the NRM 
The mistreatment of the press before the NRM took over power in Uganda made this party‘s 
initial policy towards the press distinctively different and arguably better in comparison to 
previous regimes. Sekeba (2017:197-198) observes that the NRM was more tolerant to the press 
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and allowed criticism of the government even within the state‘s own newspaper, The New Vision. 
A few years later however, the government realised the need to regulate the press and came up 
with several policies towards this (Sekeba, 2017:199). Some of these include the Press and 
Journalist Statute, the Uganda Communications Commission Act, and the Interception of 
Communications Act, all of which have had the effect of self-censorship towards the press. 
Tabaire (2007:194) agrees with Sekeba that the press in Uganda has been forced to self-censor. 
This has been achieved through several strategies designed to intimidate journalists and the press. 
Synonymous with previous regimes, the press has attempted to challenge some of these 
instruments or the provisions therein.  
A major success for the press in Uganda in this struggle against repressive laws was the final 
court ruling of 2004 that nullified a provision about publication of false news (Tabaire, 
2007:193). This provision that was initially contained in Section 50 of the Ugandan Penal Code 
(Cap. 120) had outlawed the publication of content that could be interpreted as false news. The 
provision sought to criminalise publication of false statements, rumours or reports that were 
interpreted to carry the likelihood of causing fear and alarm to the public. The penalty for 
offenders was imprisonment for periods of up to two years. Tabaire (2007) notes further that a 
team of journalists who had been arraigned before court under this provision successfully 
challenged its intentions. The court ruled that this particular provision was subject to 
misinterpretation and abuse on political grounds. Other strategies to stifle the press have included 
policies denying it advertisements from government, as was the case with The Daily Monitor 
newspaper in 1993. This newspaper, viewed by government as an opposition newspaper, lost 
70% of its advertising revenue as a result of this policy, which was not reversed until four years 
later in 1997 (Tabaire, 2007:194). 
A more recent government directive issued in May 2019, targeting the broadcast media in 
Uganda, came from UCC (Uganda Communications Commission). It required several television 
and radio stations to dismiss their staff. In the directive, UCC ordered the immediate suspension 
of 39 persons including producers, heads of programming and heads of news. These media 
personnel were spread across 13 media houses. The affected television stations included NTV, 
NBS TV, BBS TV, Bukedde TV, Kingdom TV and Salt TV.  The affected radio stations included 
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Akaboozi, Beat FM, Capital FM, Pearl FM, Sapientia FM and Radio Simba. The country‘s 
communications authority alleged that these media houses and subsequently the aforementioned 
personnel had violated the ‗minimum broadcasting standards.‘ This was in relation to the 
coverage of Police‘s violent arrest of an opposition member of Parliament, Hon. Robert 
Kyagulanyi. The directive, which coincided with celebrations of the World Press Freedom Day, 
was condemned by members of parliament and other media bodies. It was described as a 
demonstration of Uganda‘s return to application of draconian laws in limiting press freedoms and 
a continued shrinking of media space (Kahungu, 2019).
4
 In response, the government‘s minister 
of state in charge of urban development advised the affected persons to have this matter resolved 
in the courts of law, arguing that UCC ought to be allowed to carry out its mandate (Sekanjako, 
2019).  As observed and rightly predicted by Tabaire (2007: 205), for the most part that President 
Museveni has been in power, cases of harassment of the media continue to be reported.  
Social media in Uganda 
Uganda‘s Internet history dates to 1991 when Makerere University was linked to universities in 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe through Fidonet technology (McKonnell, 1998:152). 
The country currently has a number of Internet service providers targeting different markets, but 
as noted by Ndiwalana and Tusubira (2012:13), the major mobile telephone operators, such as 
MTN, Airtel and Africell, have now focused on Internet and data services as a way of luring 
additional customers. A 2016 report by ACME (African Centre for Media Excellence that 
monitored the media coverage of the 2016 elections approximates the number of Internet users in 
Uganda to be 13 million (ACME, 2016: 27-28). Ugandans use the Internet for several reasons, 
including engaging on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The onset of social 
media in Uganda brings another dimension to the discussion of free debate in the public sphere, 
with Lim (2009:69) hailing it as a new form of the public sphere.  






Ugandans use social media as a tool for the free expression of views on the country‘s political 
discourse. Kanyoro (2015) observes that Ugandans use social media to practice citizen journalism 
and this consequently lessens the need for updates from mainstream media. Nonetheless, the 
ordinary people have sometimes used social media in Uganda to circulate falsehoods. 
Consequently, some of the trusted and leading social media accounts in the country are those 
belonging to traditional media houses although this maintains the framing of the dominant 
narrative, that social media is otherwise meant to challenge (Kalinaki, 2016). On the other hand, 
Uganda‘s mainstream media have not been slow to adapt to and to adopt social media either, with 
many of them allowing for interactivity on their platforms through social media. The adoption of 
social media by media houses and other entities was more sharply seen during Uganda‘s 
February 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections (Rugambwa and Messerschmidt 2015:2). 
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the use of social media during elections was so 
heightened that it sparked off closure of these platforms, owing to the overwhelming comments 
against several government actions in relation to the elections. Social media has been used and 
continues to be used by traditional media as a source of information for stories, as well as 
platforms where feedback is solicited from the audience (Broersma and Graham, 2012: 407).  
Synthesis of engagement by citizens in Uganda 
This chapter has demonstrated that for the most part of Uganda‘s history, and even in the current 
times, both the press and citizens have had to struggle for their inherent freedom of speech and 
expression. During colonial rule, the African press presented successive popular grievances 
(Gariyo, 1992:7). These were directed at both the colonial government and the Buganda 
establishment. The successive governments that took over after independence have not been very 
tolerant of the press and have consequently stifled citizens‘ voices. The relationship between the 
state and the media has as a result been a tense one and continues to be tense. Government 
controls over the press have been in relation to what the press publishes or airs and the pre-
supposed anti-government reaction of such content on the audience. Citizens have also made use 
of the press to agitate for better governance. As earlier seen under the regime of Obote II, some 
newspapers were banned for not offering constructive criticism (Tabaire, 2007:195). The latest 
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attempt at controlling the press under President Museveni has seen the broadcast media accused 
of violating minimum broadcasting standards (Kahungu, 2019).  
Arguably the government in all these incidences intends that the press reflects a positive image of 
state actions even where these actions are contrary to basic observation of human rights or where 
they are against the ethical considerations of the press. In the past, for example under the 
Newspapers and Publications Decree of 1972 of President Amin, the government succeeded at 
achieving this and making the press resort to doing government‘s public relations (Chibita and 
Fourie, 2007:18). But as noted by Tabaire (2007:204) the approach of the press under President 
Museveni and the NRM has been one of countering and resisting such manipulation. This has 
been done partly through the courts of law in an attempt, sometimes successfully, to protect press 
freedoms. It can be concluded that in this exchange of communication between the press and 
government, the press has been both a victim of state control but also a source of power in 
relaying voices of citizens. It is with this hindsight that this study seeks to investigate the social 
media content of the press and how citizens reacted to this content in the period of the 2016 
elections.  
Research problem 
On 18 and 19 February 2016, Ugandans went to the polls to elect the next president who was to 
lead the country for a constitutional five years. In the build-up to the elections, the country 
witnessed an unprecedented increase in use of social media by media houses and citizens alike. 
Even the presidential candidates ran their own social media campaigns alongside other fora. 
Presidential candidate and former Prime Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi took the lead by 
declaring his presidential bid in a YouTube video in mid-June 2016 (Rugambwa and 
Messerschmidt, 2015; Oloka-Onyango, 2017). For the first time in the country‘s history, a 
televised debate streamed on the Facebook and Twitter pages of local television stations, and 
attracted full participation of all presidential candidates including the incumbent, Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni.  
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NTV, one of the top television stations in terms of viewership (Ipsos Connect Audience Research 
Quarter 4, 2017), maintained an active Facebook page with news updates of the election 
preparations and proceedings throughout the campaign period. Followers of the television station 
often posted their views on this page, in reaction to the news content shared about the 
approaching elections. In this milieu of activity, the stage was set for the 2016 polls, with social 
media pages of media houses and politicians bustling with activity. On polling day however, the 
government of Uganda, in a dramatic intervention, directed telecom companies to shut down all 
social media as well as the Internet in general. The reason cited by government was an apparent 
threat to public order and safety paused by social media platforms (Musisi, 2016). Although this 
clamp down was condemned by human rights activists as a blatant violation of fundamental 
rights to freedom of expression, the incumbent- Yoweri Museveni, explained that it was a 
necessary security measure to avert lies (Abrahamsen and Bareebe, 2016:755). This clampdown, 
according to Gumede (2016:416) meant that many Ugandans could neither use Facebook nor 
Twitter. By implication and in relation to this study, the clampdown meant that activity on the 
aforementioned NTV Facebook page was affected. This study sets out to examine the nature of 
engagement on the NTV Facebook page during elections, with a view of establishing whether 
this engagement posed a threat to public order and safety as alleged by the state. It should be 
noted that for the period of the shutdown, some citizens still managed to bypass the blockade 
through virtual private networks (Kalinaki, 2016). The government of Uganda has been in the 
habit of instituting both direct and indirect controls against the media during national elections. 
Such control, according to Mugumya (2017: 332), owes to the fact that the media has been 
known to have influence over the electoral decisions of voters. Mugumya argues further that it is 
for this influence that social media including Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter were shut down 
at the peak of the electoral season. The ban on social media was lifted after the elections.  
But prior to the clampdown on social media, the country had witnessed state-limitations to public 
gatherings in public spaces, especially where such gatherings were anticipated to be of a political 
nature (Kalinaki, 2016). Such spaces would otherwise have been used for mobilising protesters. 
To Kalinaki (2016), the fact that both physical space and online platforms were constrained 
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resulted in the inability for Ugandans to successfully mobilise and cause regime change, as was 
the case in other African countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. 
As observed by Velenzuela (2013: 920), Facebook, similar to other social media, can be used to 
cause collective action even beyond borders, through the exchange of information and news not 
available in other media. The implication of this, argues Gumede (2016: 414), is that social media 
and the Internet have given ordinary people in Africa greater a voice and direct engagement in 
civic matters. Expectedly, authoritarian governments and pseudo-democratic ones have reacted 
and continue to react by censoring such social media platforms.  
Motivation for the study 
This study comes at a time when the government of Uganda has chosen to tax social media, with 
the country‘s president describing the engagements on social media platforms as ‗olugambo‘ 
(gossip). The tax took effect on 1 July 2018, leaving many Ugandans unable to access social 
media platforms including WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Google Hangouts, YouTube and Skype 
(Kimuyu, 2018). The tax is enshrined in the new excise duty amendments passed by the country‘s 
parliament in June 2018 and requires users to pay a daily sum of UGX (Uganda shillings) 200 
before they can access social media platforms. Scholars have argued that social media have 
opened new possibilities for debate and interaction; have become coordinating tools for several 
political processes and could be harnessed. Nonetheless, governments increasingly attempt to 
limit access to social media (Newman, 2010; Clay Shirky, 2011; Gumede, 2016). Such 
limitations are sometimes effected through ensuring that state-owned companies are directly in 
charge of social media. Where such platforms are privately owned, non-compliance to state 
directives may result in revoking trading licences (Gumede, 2016: 415). From this argument, it is 
less surprising that telecommunication companies effected the shut down in Uganda as directed 
by government. Therefore, the researcher finds this topic timely in contributing to the growing 
body of knowledge in the context of social media regulation in Uganda and by extension, 
elsewhere on the continent.  
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Aim of the study 
The study aims at examining the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere, and its 
implications on media and power struggles in the digital age.  
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to ignite debate on social media regulation in Uganda vis-à-vis the 
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression. In addition to growing the body of 
knowledge on social media and its role in political activities, the study will contribute to 
theorising of the notion of the online public sphere from an African context. This will be 
achieved by analysing the diverse 2016-electoral-related conversation on the NTV Facebook 
page, which herein is regarded as a public sphere.   
By analysing how followers engage with content from mainstream television on social media, the 
study seeks an understanding of who is in control of the online conversation when citizens, the 
media and government converge on the same Facebook page.  
Research objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to analyse the political discourse on Facebook as a public 
sphere. The specific objectives can be broken down as: 
1. To determine how Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on the 
political discourse during Uganda‘s 2016 elections. 
2. To examine the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere. 
3. To establish the ways in which television media and institutions of government interfere 
with public participation on Facebook. 
Research questions 
The following are the main research questions to be tackled: 
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1. How did Nation Television use Facebook in engaging followers on the political discourse 
in Uganda during the 2016 presidential elections?  
2. What is the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere? 
3. In what ways do television media and institutions of government interfere with public 
participation on Facebook?  
Definition of terms 
Social media as applied in this study refers to a group of Internet-based applications that build on 
the ideological and technical foundations of web 2.0. They consequently allow for creation and 
exchange of user-generated content, as explained by Dijk and Bell (2013: 5), who add that 
Facebook is one of the common social networking sites.  
Followers, as applied in this study are the ordinary people who ‗subscribe‘ to the NTV Facebook 
page. Whereas other entities such as government and the media can also be referred to as 
followers if they subscribe to the page, the use of this terms is purposefully in reference to the 
ordinary people, particularly the citizens of Uganda. The ensuing discussion makes reference to 
followers, the media and the state. 
Engagement as applied in this study refers to: i) the action of posting content (text) on Facebook 
by the media house, and ii)the reaction to this content by way of text from Facebook followers. 
Engagement excludes the Facebook likes, shares, use of images, graphics or videos as explained 
in the study‘s scope.  
Structure of the dissertation 
This study contains eight chapters. Chapter one has introduced the study and placed it within the 
appropriate background of Uganda‘s media history to contemporary times. Chapter two surveys 
relevant literature around the study. This includes literature on the global, regional and national 
use of Facebook and other social media platforms in general. The application or use of such 
platforms is contextualised to the media, citizens/followers and other interest groups. The 
literature further explores the regulatory frameworks to control use of social media in Uganda 
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and the implications of this on the notion of free debate in the public sphere. Chapter three 
grounds the study in two theories: the theory of the public sphere and the agenda setting theory. It 
traces the origins of these theories to contemporary debates about them. It makes particular 
reference to the relevance of these theories to the study. The fourth chapter highlights the study‘s 
methodology. It situates use of social media in online ethnography or netnography, and combines 
this with in-depth interviews for data collection. The chapter premises on a constructivist 
research paradigm. Chapters five to seven present and discuss the research findings accruing to 
the study objectives. These are discussed as informed by both the literature review and theoretical 
framework. In Chapter eight, the study concludes with suggestions for further research. 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter brings forth the literature relevant to the study for purposes of proper 
contextualisation. It traces the idea of citizen participation in news by way of commenting on 
news content, and makes a connection to the current ability of such citizens to co-produce news 
and other content on social media. This ability consequently puts traditional media in a state of 
panic since they are no longer the sole custodians of information or news updates. The 
engagement of citizens on social media is further presented as a catalyst for these platforms to be 
used by politicians in several political processes including elections, to enable such politicians 
easily dialogue with the citizens or electorate. The chapter then delves into the use of Facebook in 
Uganda, where it is the most popular social media platform. 
Citizen engagement in news media 
The provision for citizens to engage with content published in the newspapers can be traced to 
early eighteenth-century Britain. Alfred Hermida (2011:13-14) narrates how in this century, 
citizens were allowed to provide feedback on published newspaper content. A space, dedicated to 
such feedback, was availed on the third page of newspapers interested in this engagement with 
their readers. In addition, such newspapers availed a blank fourth page for the paper to be folded 
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and addressed as any other ordinary letter. This trend later developed into the current published 
‗letter to the editor‘ in many of the contemporary newspapers.  
One hundred and fifty years later, as part of the dramatic changes in the twentieth century, the 
world witnessed the beginning of a new era of communication, namely, television broadcasting. 
Television picked up from the success of radio broadcasting, which in Britain and South America 
dates back to the 1920s. As noted by Cushion (2012: 38), the success of radio sales in the 1930s 
inspired companies in the United States and the United Kingdom to invest in the newly invented 
television, particularly in New York and London. But owing to the success and dominance of 
newspapers, television news did not have an easy start. Cox (1995:2) recalls that as part of this 
competition between television and newspapers, the newspaper industry put limitations on the 
use of airwaves for provision of news at particular times of the day. These were the times or 
hours that were deemed injurious to newspaper sales. In Britain, the BBC agreed to an 
arrangement not to broadcast news before 7 o‘clock in the evening. In addition, BBC was to 
solicit its news from established news agencies as opposed to filing its own sourced stories. 
Nonetheless, the start of World War II in 1939 removed this impediment for good as the BBC 
filed its own stories. Television news took centre stage and arguably remains the most viewed, 
valued and trusted source of information for several activities (Cushion, 2012:1- 4).  
Television journalism is said to connect more compellingly with audiences, perhaps due to the 
visual impact of the moving picture. In discussing television news, Cushion (2012) further argues 
that such news still tends to retain special significance even in incidences where the 
independence of news media has been interfered with. Television too engages citizens in current 
affairs programming. Such engagement has involved allowing audiences to participate in periodic 
debates and talk shows on social and political issues, with a consequence of contributing to 
dialogue in the public sphere (Bignell, 2004:19-20). Talk shows, for instance, allow for 
interaction with experts brought in to give specialist opinion, and usually have a studio audience 
in attendance allowed to comment, or a viewing audience to phone in and contribute to the 
discussion (Bignell, 2004:265-266). Nonetheless, Cushion (2012:2-5) cautions that whereas 
television has for long commanded the audiences, the onset of social media and its undeniably 
swelling numbers has brought a new dimension to this perspective, consequently necessitating a 
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change in the ‗narrative of the future‘. Dwyer (2010:2-3) had earlier noted that television 
audiences and subsequently advertising revenues were on a decline, a fact to possibly explain 
why traditional media have opted to expand into the online sphere.  
Consequently, the spotlight has been turned to media convergence, calling for what Dwyer 
(2010) describes as journalists with multimedia expertise. Such journalists are able to combine a 
host of skills in packaging news content and other current affairs. In this environment of digital 
storytelling, a combination of visual, audio, graphics, and web design make for a complete 
package, as new technologies combine or converge with traditional ones. Dwyer (2010) further 
argues that media owners prefer convergence since it arguably allows for expansion of output. 
Such owners hope to reap from the benefits of the economies of scale as they continuously 
acquire, co-opt or merge and improve ways of doing business. Dwyer (2010: 9, 14) further 
discusses levels of convergence as industrial convergence, which relates to industry consolidation 
and sector cross-ownership, and to the prevailing ideological and policy framings that underwrite 
it. Next is technological convergence as depicted by the multimedia nature of new media, whose 
delivery is via domestic television sets, laptop computers and the personal mobile phone screens. 
Finally, there is the regulatory convergence which has necessitated changes in the policies 
developed for media regulation to eliminate the regulation of each media as a separate entity. In 
this multimedia environment, Dwyer advocates for convergent regulatory services to oversee the 
broadcasting, telecommunications and radio communication industries.  
But whereas the industries have been accommodative of convergence, Cushion (2012: 28) points 
out that an analysis of such convergence ought to be cognisant of the impact on employees. For 
television newsrooms, convergence has meant the stretching of staff time and resources amidst 
the fact that these additional demands have not been matched with additional pay. To 
Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009:568) the entire concept of online news has increased the 
pressure on journalists, who are now required to combine news-gathering and story-telling 
techniques in different media formats. Looking at television, Cushion (2012: 27) observes that 
television journalism has integrated the salient features of the Internet and consequently become a 
more integrated online service through interactive websites or social media platforms such as 
Facebook. 
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From this integrative perspective, Cushion (2012) advocates for a co-adaptation of both television 
and the Internet, which he describes as progressive. This suggestion is arguably informed by the 
fact that not only are audiences increasingly going online for their information and socialising 
needs, but by what Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009: 573-574) argue is a ―dialogical 
journalism.‖ In the online or Internet space, news production is largely a collective endeavour 
between the media and citizens, each informing the other‘s processes. But Mitchelstein and 
Boczkowski further note that since contributions from the online audience are not necessarily 
guided by established editorial norms, some media houses remain hesitant to allow dialogical 
journalism.  
Ylva Rodny-Gumede (2017: 274) agrees with Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009)and notes that 
social media has become an influential communication and news-breaking tool. This news-
breaking has however unleashed onto the public the onslaught of fake news. It can be argued that 
the unprecedented circulation of fake news and the continuous sharing of information 
(substantiated or not) is a demonstration of social media ‗power‘ in the hands of citizens. Such 
fake news is sometimes quite carefully crafted and in sync with events happening in a given 
society at a specific time, that traditional media is compelled to carry the same and run 
corrections/apologies later. To counter this trend of fake news, Rodny-Gumede observes that 
journalists have been compelled to produce news at the same rate since audiences can access it 
through other sources, and so that they retain their place as reliable outlets of quality news 
(Rodny-Gumede, 2017: 281). The implication of this fast production of news on newsroom 
practices is that stories can no longer be kept for too long, awaiting the gathering of more facts. 
Another implication is that newsrooms now grapple with the question of how much latitude to 
allow journalists to engage on social media. Part of the concern, Rodny-Gumede (2017: 279) 
continues the argument, is that journalists may risk disclosing personal information or giving 
opinions as opposed to facts as they engage in the online space. 
In addition to the danger of circulating harmful information, Reid (2017: 214) decries the act of 
online bullying and presence of trolls, both of which usually target female users of social media. 
Reid equates these acts to online imposition of misogyny and patriarchy. Rodny-Gumede (2017: 
273, 277) nonetheless cautions that social media and social networks have not replaced 
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traditional media and should therefore be seen as complementary. Whereas the scholarly 
community remains divided on the actual impact that social media has had or continues to have 
on traditional media, Rodny-Gumede insists that mainstream media has to adapt to new 
technologies or risk extinction.  
The onset of social media 
Social media is defined by Miller et. al (2016:9) as the ―colonisation of the space between 
traditional broadcast and private communication.‖ The roots of social media are attributed to the 
success of Korea‘s Cyworld, a platform launched in 1999. Cyworld worked in categories of 
friendship. To be a Cy-ilchon to someone meant to be a very close friend or relation and it bound 
one to principles of reciprocity, similar to the Korean kinship system. This linkage to the Korean 
kinship system is said to have made Cyworld a popular platform but only in Korea because its 
ability to be replicated elsewhere was not forthcoming. Consequently, it has been replaced by the 
more-involving and thus far-reaching social media platforms (Miller et. al., 2016: 13). Lester 
(2014: 48) notes that slightly earlier in 1997, SixDegrees.com came up as a social network site 
that allowed users to connect to each other and as such, contributed to the upsurge of other social 
media sites.  
Social media further picks up from the foundations of web 2. 0, which allow for the creation and 
exchange of user-generated content (Dijk and Bell, 2013:5). According to Hinton and Hjorth 
(2013: 16-18), the term web 2.0 was first used by Darcy DiNucci in 1999 but is commonly 
associated to Tim O‘Reilly who popularised the concept. With the onset of web 2.0 came the 
ability for ordinary users or audiences to produce and distribute content online. It is this ability or 
power in the hands of citizens that is being used in Uganda today, and which saw the directive by 
the state to shut down social media. Web 2.0 was in contrast to another term, ‗Web 1.0,‘ which 
was largely perceived to be limiting of the audiences‘ ability to produce and widely share 
information in various formats. With the capabilities brought by Web 2.0, the proliferation of 
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and user-generated content sites such 
as YouTube and Flickr, seems to be on the rise and with them a growing number of users (Dijk 
and Bell, 2013:5).  
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Before the advancement of the web, the Internet (developed from the late 1960s) was denoted by 
a series of computers connected to each other and sharing a common data transfer protocol. The 
web emerged in the early 1990s, as a much-needed interface for people to access Internet 
resources (Hinton and Larissa, 2013:8). Consequently, several companies invested in the 
computer industry but became bankrupt, leading to the renowned dot.com crash of the year 2000 
(Fuchs, 2014:33). But as early as 1999, catalysts had hinted on the possibility of such a crash, 
owing to the state of the industry which was at that time oversubscribed. In addition, several 
companies were over-valued and operated with money from investors (Hinton and Hjorth, 
2013:15). Consequently, the market was denoted by low profits despite the massive investment. 
In the aftermath of this crisis, efforts were made to convince investors to consider new Internet 
start-ups. This was helped by the conviction that a new and better web 2.0, embedded with high 
economic and democratic potentials to the masses was worth further investment (Fuchs, 2014: 
33). 
Use of social media in political processes 
The onset of social media and its various platforms, implies that readers can now participate in 
more of the five news production processes of observation, selection, editing, distribution and 
interpretation. In addition, these platforms allow users to generate customised content(Hermida 
2011). Social media has undoubtedly opened more avenues for communication and participation 
within the political domain by enhancing the possibilities for more direct and interactive 
communication between parties, state institutions and citizens on one hand as well as citizens 
among themselves on the other.   
Social media has been used in political processes of several countries to bring about change 
especially starting off in Tunisia in 2011 and spreading across the Middle East. In Tunisia, the 
uprisings were sparked off by information shared on social media about the self-immolation of a 
college graduate, Mohammed Bouazizi (Seib, 2012: 15). This graduate had resorted to selling 
fruits and vegetables on the streets, after failing to find decent employment. On the fateful day, 
Bouazizi set himself ablaze consequently igniting the uprisings. Casilli and Tubaro (2012:6) had 
earlier observed that social media was continuously being used to cause political change. They 
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highlighted meetings between government officials and representatives from social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Such meetings among other things discussed the need 
for regulation of these platforms, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 civil unrest in the United 
Kingdom.  
In Egypt, it is widely believed that President Mubarak‘s regime was intolerant to alternative 
views and tortured or kidnapped political opponents (Gerbaudo, 2012: 51). Some Egyptians 
found solace in the ‗public sphere‘ of the several ‗ahwa‘ (coffee) shops in Cairo, Alexandria and 
other major cities.  Other citizens expressed their discontent on social media, especially on 
Facebook. It was not surprising therefore that Facebook was instrumental in the overthrow of 
President Hosni Mubarak. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was overthrown mainly because of 
mobilisation against him on social media, in what Gerbaudo (2012:49) refers to as the popular 
‗Facebook revolutions‘, ‗Twitter revolutions‘, or ‗wiki-revolutions.‘ This type of labelling is 
nonetheless contested by Seib (2012:15) who considers it an insult to the courage exhibited by 
those who risked their lives in demanding for change across the Middle East.  
The height of this dissent in Egypt was sparked off by the street killing of 28-year-old Khaled 
Said by police officers for allegedly posting online a video showing members of the police force 
involved in a drug deal (Gerbaudo, 2012:55). A Facebook page opened in his name and other 
Facebook pages turned out to be the rallying point to mobilise and overthrow the regime. 
Gerbaudo (2012) contends that only a limited number of people could have been mobilised 
through social media and therefore the role of traditional media and other channels used in 
mobilising the bigger population cannot be underestimated. To Seib (2012), the uprisings in 
several Arab states resulted from a long-held accumulation of discontent in relation to the 
economic and social welfare of the people. It was only a matter of time therefore, that these 
people would rise in protest. The ability to use social media to share these grievances heightened 
calls for collective action.  
A similar incident happened in 2001 in the Philippines when citizens were mobilised partly 
through text messages to turn up in large numbers at a court hearing. This was in relation to an 
impeachment trial of President Joseph Estrada (Shirky, 2011:28). The Filipinos received 
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information about a ploy to disregard some of the crucial evidence against the president in court. 
They then mobilised through a text message saying ―Go to EDSA. Wear blk.‖ The overwhelming 
crowds at court made the legislators reconsider their decision and allow that the aforementioned 
evidence be heard. Estrada lost the presidency. Shirky (2011) further refers to similar incidents in 
Spain in 2014 that led to the ouster of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. Another 
example was Moldova in 2009, when the Communist Party lost power through massive protests 
coordinated on Facebook, Twitter and text messages.  
Velenzuela (2013:925) chronicles the protests that marred Chile in the famous Chilean ‗winter of 
discontent,‘ that were fuelled by social media, especially following the announcement by 
government in 2011 that Facebook and Twitter conversations were to be monitored. Velenzuela 
notes that unlike protests elsewhere, the Chilean protest happened amidst strong economic 
performance. Chile protesters were concerned about social issues such as the state of 
environmental protection, the education policy and the pace of reconstruction after the 2010 
earthquake. This multi-faceted nature of contested issues drew interest from various groups, 
including high school students. 
Several examples can be drawn from Africa as well. Zimbabwe witnessed protests coordinated 
on the Internet and social media too, over what William Gumede (2016: 414) called the 
autocratic leadership, mismanagement and corruption of President Robert Mugabe‘s government. 
Hashtags such as #ThisFlag, #ZimbabweShutdown, #ShutDownZim on Facebook and Twitter, in 
addition to the social messaging service WhatsApp were key in mobilising protests. Nonetheless, 
Internet penetration remains low in Zimbabwe as noted by Mhiripiri and Mutsvairo (2013: 407), 
and it is mainly concentrated in the urban centres. In addition, the fear of apprehension has made 
users publish content under pseudonyms or use social media in a manner that is not for political 
engagement. The Zimbabwean government has instituted legislation including the Interception of 
Communication Act, to justify state interference into private communication.  
Meanwhile in Nigeria, during the 2011 Nigerian presidential polls, both print and electronic 
media were active on social media (Adelaja, 2013: 325-326). During these polls, social media 
was used both in verifying truths related to alleged vote rigging and in inciting violence, in which 
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an estimated 800 people were killed. It was also through a tweet that the alleged fabrication of 
results at a private residence by senatorial candidate Kema Chikwe was unveiled, consequently 
leading to his exposure and subsequent loss of the election to the opponent, Chris Anyawu.  
In the case of Uganda, Kalinaki (2016) observes that the leading social media platforms are those 
associated with media houses. This, he argues, has a disadvantage of maintaining the dominant 
narrative and framing of issues by the media. Kalinaki adds that social media are a new 
phenomenon in Uganda, an explanation for the insufficient literature on the subject. Several 
media houses in Uganda run social media accounts to generate feedback from the audience, 
especially on current affairs programmes.  
It is important to note though, that not all attempts to mobilise masses through social media are 
successful. As Shirky (2011) notes, sometimes these attempts fail as was the case in Belarus in 
2006 when online media protests against President Aleksandr Lukashenko‘s alleged vote rigging 
came to nothing. Then in 2009 in Iran, protests relating to the alleged miscount of votes for Mir 
Hossein Mousavi also produced nothing. Finally, there was the Red Shirt uprising in Thailand in 
2010, which led to the killing of dozens of protesters. 
In discussing the Facebook and Twitter revolutions, Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009: 575) 
observe that the inequality in access to online platforms gets in the way of these platforms‘ 
potential at civic engagement. Consequently, their potential to facilitate debate and diversity of 
opinion in the online public sphere is affected. In addition, they argue that participation and 
engagement on social media misses out on rational critical deliberation, in favour of light talk. 
Dijk (2012: 110) agrees and adds that the arguments made in support of these platforms tend to 
disregard the weak Internet connection or the absolute absence of Internet services in some 
countries. Taking the example of Egypt, Dijk (2012) notes that Internet was accessible to only 
5% of the population, adding that these platforms are powerful in mobilising the young and 
publicising government brutalities especially where press freedom is constrained. In conclusion, 
Dijk (2012: 109) asserts that Internet use ought to be discussed within the context of a given 
social and political setting. It cannot be generalised from one context to the other.  
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Use of Facebook and Twitter in presidential elections 
The use of Facebook and Twitter in presidential elections of other countries draws important 
correlations with how these platforms were used in Uganda‘s 2016 elections. This section brings 
forth of examples of how the platforms were used in various countries, below showing how the 
same were applied in Uganda. 
In 2008, during the presidential elections in the United States of America in which President 
Barack Obama was one of the contenders, the application of social media took precedence as a 
campaign tool (Samuel-Azran, Yarchi and Wolfsfeld, 2015:3). This was especially the case since 
President Barack Obama‘s campaign team prioritised social media in reaching the masses and 
communicating the message. Candidate Obama was the first African-American to contest for the 
office of the President in the United States of America. Samuel-Azran et al. (2013:1) observe that 
a social networking site, my.barackobama.com, was created and it is on this site that supporters 
were highly engaged. For instance, the site was used to mobilise funds from supporters and other 
well-wishers. A total of $265 million was raised to support the presidential bid through this 
initiative (Tapscott, 2009: 250-251). Several other presidential candidates and campaigns 
elsewhere in the world have equally taken their campaigns to social media platforms. By 
implication, activities and conversation on social media platforms have become one of the must-
have strategies in reaching both local and global audiences, including citizens living in the 
Diaspora. 
Citing the case of the 2010 elections in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Broersma and 
Graham (2012: 408) agree that social media, especially Twitter which became a source of 
political news, was crucial in mobilising support. This is based on a content analysis of eight 
newspapers (both broadsheet and tabloid), four in each of the above countries. The study 
discovered that Twitter was a convenient tool for journalists who used politicians‘ tweets to add 
quotations to their stories. This had the consequence of saving journalists the time that would 
have otherwise been spent on physical interaction with the candidates to get their opinion. 
According to this study, tweets triggered news stories more in the United Kingdom than in the 
Netherlands, with the trend of sourcing more humorous tweets more common. This observation 
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on humorous tweets corresponds to an earlier one by Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009) that 
participation and engagement on social media can mean to be devoid of rational critical 
deliberation. Still in relation to this study, the Netherlands newspapers used tweets mainly from 
politicians while the UK newspapers included both tweets from politicians and the voxpopuli. 
Broersma and Graham (2012: 410) further note that in incidences where journalists applied the 
quotes in their original form, the action indirectly gave politicians control over news discourse. 
This is because journalists did not probe further or engage the source more. 
In another study, Newman (2010: 11) analysed the UK‘s 2010 elections and discussed the extent 
of social media activity on Facebook, Twitter, blogs, news websites and YouTube. Newman 
interviewed journalists, political advisers and social media experts involved in the elections; 
carried out a content analysis and comparative analysis of online sites; and conducted an online 
audience survey of over 200 respondents. In his conclusion, Newman noted that Twitter was a 
source of real time information for journalists and politicians alike. He nonetheless points out that 
many mainstream organisations remain uncertain on how to manage the online interaction with 
audiences. This is especially the case where such interactions pose a potential damage to the 
brand, since the conversations are unmediated. In another analysis of 1.2 million tweets during 
the 2012 Dutch parliamentary elections, Hosch-Dayican et al. (2016: 135) conclude that citizens 
engaged in online electoral campaigning but in a manner different from that of politicians and 
journalists.  
In addition to electoral campaigns, Facebook has been used in elections too. In a study to analyse 
the 2013 Israeli elections, Samuel-Azran et al. (2013: 4) focused on how citizens engaged with 
the Facebook posts of the five leading candidates and concluded that Facebook ‗shares‘ 
demonstrated a higher level of engagement as opposed to ‗likes.‘ A similar study was conducted 
by Schwartz (2015:1), who used a qualitative content analysis to investigate the comments on 
Facebook pages of the eight top contenders in the 2011 Danish elections. This study concluded 
that the Facebook pages of politicians were critical in connecting citizens to politicians for 
feedback. The Facebook pages of the Danish candidates were used as platforms for the supporters 
and consequently people with divergent views were not regarded as genuine members of the 
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page. Schwartz (2015:9) concludes with a call for more analysis on whether Facebook is a 
potentially open platform for critical discussion or a campaign tool for politicians. 
The case was not any different during the 2011 elections in Benin as presidential candidates took 
to social media, especially Facebook. Some of these candidates, as noted by Kakpovi (2011:308-
309), had several Facebook profiles to their names, most of which were put up by 
supporters/sympathisers. Kakpovi observes that efforts to contact Facebook to have some of the 
profiles closed, for instance that of candidate Yayi Boni, were futile and left the campaign team 
fearing for how the post-election phase was to be handled in relation to the results. 
In analysing the role of social media during the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2008, Makinen 
and Kuira (2008: 329, 331) argue that citizens used social media as a way of getting involved. 
These scholars write after the violence that erupted in Kenya shortly after the 2008 elections, and 
further argue that citizens, dissatisfied with the limited possibilities in traditional media opted for 
social media as an alternative public sphere to give their account of events. They point out that 
social media served both as platform for promoting peace and justice, as well as a channel for 
tribal prejudices and hate speech. Still in reference to Kenya, Churchill, Otieno and Mukhongo 
(2012: 275) note that the 2008 presidential post-election violence and the consequent banning of 
live coverage of news saw the birth of the now famous website Ushahida meaning Witness. This 
platform allowed people to crowd source and share information from their respective locations 
and it has since been adopted for similar causes elsewhere in the world.  
The Uganda example 
Uganda‘s presidential candidates also run their campaign on social media alongside other fora. 
Presidential candidate and former Prime Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi took the lead 
when he posted a YouTube video of his presidential bid (Rugambwa and Messerschmidt 2015:2). 
The ACME (2016: 74) report puts emphasis on use of Twitter by the presidential candidates and 
observed that the incumbent president, Yoweri Museveni, sent out the highest number of tweets 
totalling 433, followed by Amama Mbabazi with 353 and Dr. Kizza Besigye at 175. The report 
further notes that all the presidential candidates were slow in answering questions to their twitter 
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handles. Museveni responded to none of the 3,410 questions raised, Amama Mbabazi responded 
to eight of the 2,148 questions and Dr. Kizza Besigye managed to answer two of the 1,789 sent to 
his handle (ACME 2016: 80).  
Outside elections, social media was used extensively to debate issues and mobilise opposition to 
the government in the period of the 2016 elections. Some of this included comparing pictures 
taken 30 years ago to the current situation in order to emphasise the need for change in 
presidency, just like all else had changed (Gumede, 2016: 415).  
In addition, the Internet has continued to be shut down in times of high political activity. A 
Freedom House report (2016: 55) in relation to freedom on the Internet puts Uganda as the worst 
performer of the 65 countries surveyed. The report classifies Uganda as partly free and concludes 
that internet freedom around the world has been on a decline for six consecutive years, with a 
third of the 34 countries that recorded a decline being African. As noted by Abrahamsen and 
Bareebe (2016: 755), Ugandans woke up on election day to no Internet access and an inability to 
use Twitter or Facebook. The government had ordered all telecommunication companies to shut 
down the Internet and consequently social media (see chapter seven for a detailed discussion of 
this shut down). The action was condemned by human rights groups as a violation of 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression, although the incumbent defended this ban as a 
security measure to avert lies. But Ryan (2016:95) recalls that candidate Kizza Besigye had in 
2011 warned that Uganda would experience an uprising similar to the Arab Spring. This, he 
argues, could have been part of the reason for the Internet shutdown in the hope of averting 
Besigye‘s threat. The shutdown was of concern to the international community. Ryan (2016) 
observes that organisations such as the European Union Observer Mission, and individuals 
including the United States of America secretary of state John Kerry, former Nigerian president 
Olusegun Obasanjo, and United States ambassador to Uganda Deborah Malac voiced concern 
over the Internet blackout.  
It should be noted that social media is sometimes used to circulate falsehoods and fake news. It 
can therefore be argued that perhaps Uganda‘s incumbent had this in mind when he ordered the 
2016 Internet shut down. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017: 221) emphasise that social media is 
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conducive for fake news, as partly explained by the fact that the costs of production of such 
content are low. Consequently, the possibility of manipulation of information during elections to 
cause harm in a rival camp cannot be ruled out. Such manipulation, as pointed out by Metaxas 
and Mustafaraj (2012: 472) may even include changing the projection of a candidate‘s number of 
followers to bias viewers about that candidate‘s popularity.  
However, Gumede (2016: 414), differs in opinion with the argument that African governments 
and leaders increasingly censure the Internet and social media because they are aware of its 
liberating power, which they are unable to contain. This argument is in line with an earlier one by 
Zuckerberg (2010:178) that in situations where individual freedom is limited, Facebook makes it 
possible to share information quickly and thus facilitates meaningful democratic change as a 
medium that is not moderated. This implies that many citizens are now in position to hold their 
leaders accountable as they continuously debate civic issues (Gumede, 2016: 414).  
Nonetheless, not all citizens on Facebook will debate freely for fear of state surveillance. Miller 
et. al. (2016: 142, 146), note that this inability to debate freely will compel many users to opt for 
silence on political issues, and in essence relegate Facebook to a platform for maintaining good 
relationships. Consequently, such users do not run the risk of clashing with those in their social 
circles who might hold divergent political views. 
The above literature suggests that research in the area of use of social media during elections is a 
growing body of knowledge that has mainly focused on social media, particularly Twitter more 
than Facebook, as sources of news leveraging on the high level of opportunities to participate 
availed to citizens, politicians and journalists to voice their opinions on a wide range of issues 
(Broersma and Graham, 2012; Makinen and Kuira, 2008; Schwartz, 2015). In addition, these 
studies have concentrated on defining the relationship between social media and media 
organisations, examining how the two enhanced each other‘s processes during elections, with not 
so much focus on analysing the content or comments from citizens (Hosch-Dayican et al., 2016). 
This study is designed to help fill this gap by analysing the content from citizens‘ participation on 
a television station‘s Facebook page. The study is conducted in a setting of growing social media 
use in Uganda amidst regulation of its use (Rugambwa and Messerschmidt, 2015; Kimuyu, 
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2018). Few studies in relation to electoral campaigning have been conducted to analyse the 
content of citizens‘ social media messages (Hosch-Dayican et al., 2016: 135). The research has 
been positioned to advance the filling of this gap by analysing the content of citizen‘s social 
media messages on Facebook, in relation to how television engages these citizens on news as a 
current affairs programme. 
Understanding social media as a public sphere 
In the theory of the public sphere, Habermas (1989:34) talks of a public sphere of salons and 
coffee houses where people congregated and deliberated on critical issues. Such debate was for 
instance inspired by works of literature, art, economic and political disputes of the day. The 
coffee houses were a preserve of the men, while women congregated in the salons. Nonetheless, 
the nature of debate was not dissimilar. Habermas notes that both in the coffee houses and salons, 
discussions were held among ordinary individuals and that in these public spaces, someone‘s 
status was not important. This was because the ground for debate was levelled, with people 
congregating as equals. In addition, the discussions allowed for the problematisation of areas that 
had initially not been questioned. This public was in principle inclusive, discussing issues that 
became general in both significance and accessibility; everyone had to be able to participate. The 
setting of the public sphere therefore meant that the discussions were open to all, with no one 
joining the discourse having an advantage over another, which further enhanced the rational 
debate (Holub, 1991:3). Silverstone (1994:66) notes that in this public sphere, individuals were 
able to analyse and debate the business and issues of the state. Silverstone observes further that 
the newspaper, originally a presenter of information, increasingly became a forum for the 
expression of opinion. This public sphere later disintegrated because of state interference (Holub, 
1991:6).  
The increased participation, interaction and convergence on social media has seen Lim (2009:69) 
interpret the entire Internet experience as a new form of the public sphere. Social media has 
gradually come to impact on the way people experience online media and according to Hinton 
and Hjorth (2013:2), it has since become an integral part of daily life. It has come with the 
opportunity for new avenues of dissemination and engagement.   
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Castells (2008:79) notes too that social media is indeed the new public sphere. To Castells, the 
current society organises its public sphere based on media communication networks, which he 
refers to as the ‗network society‘. This network society is seen by Dijk (2012:24) as a modern 
type of society whose social and media networks infrastructure characterise and link its mode of 
organisation. This linking happens at all levels, be them individual or societal. Dijk (2012: 46) 
further notes that this network society is less inclusive in comparison to the mass society. This 
exclusive nature of the network society therefore implies that one must fight for a particular place 
or risk getting isolated. 
Javuru (2013: 371) juxtaposes Habermas‘ original concept of the public sphere as a non-mediated 
space, to the situation in Uganda. He argues that similar to the public sphere of Habermas that 
gave voice to members of the public who had previously been excluded from issues of 
governance and also evaluated issues based on merit, Uganda‘s online forums, bulletin boards 
and community websites appropriately take up this role. On social media, Javuru (2013) further 
notes that citizens have been able to express opinion on political, economic and social issues. 
This suits Habermas‘ description of the public sphere, since the anonymity of people online 
ensures that their comments are evaluated on merit.  
In addition to equality of members engaged in online discussion, Bentivegna (2002:53) notes that 
in interpreting and debating topics, these members draw from both their personal experience and 
information available in the media. She further asserts that the online discussants do not have 
preconceived positions of power. There is no expert or professor of knowledge who commands 
the discussion in this online communication exchange, unless it is a discussion groups requiring 
the regulation of a host. The knowledge shared comes from common experience as an important 
foundation for the continuous discourse on the Internet. Consequently, such engagement based on 
available knowledge in society has become a privileged element of mediation in the online 
political discussions.  
Be that as it may, Javuru (2013: 372), disagrees with Bentivegna (2002) and notes that when it 
comes to Uganda, the online discussions are not based on rationality. He argues that there is a 
tendency for the argument to be won by the discussant that shouts loudest and successfully puts 
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down other discussants. This is coupled with name-calling and several other tactics to win the 
argument. In addition, Javuru (2013) criticises Habermas‘ public sphere for ignoring the power 
differences in society since for the case of Uganda, the expert opinion still matters. He argues that 
journalists, academics, university students and the Diaspora community carry more weight and 
authority in online discourse than the ordinary citizen. As a result, they make other participants 
feel intimidated or less knowledgeable about the subject at hand.   
For Tufecki and Wilson (2012:365), the online public sphere is comprised of three interrelated 
components. These include satellite TV channels, the rapid diffusion of the Internet and its social 
media platforms, and finally the mobile phones. They note that the proliferation of mobile phones 
and consequently their addition to the aforementioned public sphere has been aided by low costs 
and enhanced capabilities of these gadgets. These three components are indeed available in this 
thesis, which examines a television station‘s Facebook page, arguably accessed by the citizens 
through various ways including the mobile phones. 
Nonetheless, Bentivegna (2002: 54) observes that although there is rapid diffusion of Internet 
connections across different countries, the Internet remains a new phenomenon for a host of other 
nations. Its presence, she argues further, has tended to be a complementary resource for those 
who are already engaged in public affairs. The effectiveness of this ‗selective‘ Internet diffusion 
has been that the arrival of politics on the Internet has not caused the much-anticipated 
transformations. It has instead left the exchanges and confrontations among citizens in their 
original intense form (Bentivegna, 2002:56). But to Zuckerberg (2010: 178) social media, and by 
extension the entire Internet experience, are inherently democratic. They make it possible to 
produce and consume content in a broad form. Such ability to share content therefore has 
implications on the efforts for democratiation across the globe. Valenzuela (2013: 920) agrees 
with Zuckerberg (2010) that social media is democratic. He observes that the Internet‘s ability to 
avail news and other information which may not be available in the mainstream media makes it 
possible for citizens and other interested parties to take part in political causes. 
From the African perspective, Gumede (2016: 414) agrees to the potential of the Internet. He 
observes that the Internet and mobile phones are crucial in the ongoing efforts to extend quality 
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democracy across the continent, and in advocating for peace in some areas. This owes to the fact 
that the Internet, unlike any other media, has accommodated more voices in debating the civic 
and public issues in an unprecedented manner. Consequently, many citizens on the continent are 
in position to hold their governments accountable and directly contribute to the shaping of 
policies for better governance and democratic dispensation. For Avis (2016:3) the fact that the 
Internet penetration rates for Africa are still low should not be a cause for disregard of the 
potential of social media on the continent. He observes that in 2015, the penetration of the 
Internet was reported to be at 28.6% in Africa, a figure below the 46.4% global average. 
Nonetheless, he argues that the numbers of those able to access information online are increasing 
in Africa. This is especially true for those joining social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, with a consequence of changing the above statistics for the better. As of the June 2020 
projections from Internet World Stats, the number of Internet users in Africa is over 39%
5
. 
The advent of social media has made it possible for mass distribution of information, news and 
entertainment by anyone as opposed to this being a preserve of a few people or institutions (Dijk 
and Bell, 2013:3). This poses a challenge to institutions such as mass media and governments 
concerning the amount of information that they can keep to themselves. By implication, the 
operational and institutional power balance of media systems has changed. The ability to produce 
and distribute content online has since seen people use social media platforms in various ways, 
some of which require less reliance on traditional media houses. As argued by Mazali 
(2011:290), social media platforms have allowed users to create identity and even put up an act, 
which may be different from whom the real person is. The platforms thus become both 
representational and performance spaces, since people are not limited on the amount of creativity 
they can bring forth.  
Moreover, social media can promote personal and group identity construction; aspects that 
Velenzuela (2013: 922) argues are prerequisites for political behaviour. This is possible since 
social media provide for multiple channels of interpersonal feedback, peer acceptance and re-




enforcement of group norms (Papacharissi, 2002). Miller et al. (2016:145) agrees and adds that 
social media is used to increase one‘s social status, make connections and affiliations with groups 
deemed to be prestigious and generally for maintaining good relations with other people. In 
addition, the services make it possible for users to create or join groups with similar interests. 
With this comes the ability for faster circulation of mobilisation information and political 
engagement. Velenzuela (2013) adds that increased participation in online social networks builds 
trust among members, consequently enhancing the potential of social media to increase their 
engagement in protest and other political behaviours.  
For all the above positive impacts of the Internet and subsequently social media, Bentivegna 
(2002:56-57) cautions that the same aspects responsible for the Internet‘s democratic potential 
can deliver to the contrary. That with the increase in information comes with the possibility of 
information glut, capable of disinteresting citizens. In addition, the ability for all citizens to speak 
out online can become an obstacle to the development of democracy. This is because it can tend 
to become an incomprehensible jumble of voices. In this jumble, it becomes difficult to 
understand and come to the aid of a citizen. Bentivegna adds that this is compounded by the high 
possibility of disseminating fake or false information, especially since the Internet allows for 
users to hide behind pseudonyms or fictitious codes. This kind of cover arguably makes such 
users relay falsehoods in an almost unabated manner. Gronlund and Wakabi (2015: 5) also 
question the Internet‘s actual ability to enable greater participation. They wonder if the Internet 
attracts new groups of people to participate or it avails an alternative channel to those already 
engaged. Here, they are in agreement with Bentivegna‘s (2002: 54) earlier observation that rapid 
diffusion of the Internet may serve as a complementary resource for those already engaged in 
public affairs. Gronlund and Wakabi (2015) emphasise therefore, that there is a general lack of 
consensus on the precise manner in which the Internet enables participation. This emphasis is 
embedded in the fact that intensive Internet use is said to carry a withdrawal from public life by 
those actively engaged. In other words, while they are active online, they become dormant or 
non-existent in the ‗physical‘. 
Although Moog and Sluyter-Beltrao (2001:30-31) acknowledge that new media technologies are 
transforming political communication, they observe that this has come with deterioration in the 
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quality of public discourse. The deterioration is seen through an increase in public cynicism and 
an erosion of participation in civic affairs. Moog and Sluyter-Beltrao nonetheless conclude that 
all media technologies always generate criticisms, and this is the case for the on-going misgivings 
about social media and the Internet. Lievrouw and Livingstone (2002:51) sum it up with the 
analysis that whereas those in support of new technologies argue that they can be used to promote 
citizen participation in debates regarding matters of concern to the public, and whereas those 
against these technologies identify a risk of creating a form of technological dominion over 
individuals, these technologies have so far only proven to have created an additional platform for 
communication. Lievrouw and Livingstone (2002) further argue that to understand the use of new 
media within the broader communication process involving political citizens, their use ought to 
be put into context of a given society. In this analysis, the social and political implications of the 
use of new technologies ought to be assessed in tandem with the values, behaviour and 
expectations of a citizenry in a given historical and political context. 
About Facebook and its use in Uganda 
In 2003, a Harvard Computer Science student, Mark Zuckerberg, started an online site called 
Facemash. The site allowed him to place portraits of colleagues side-by-side and compare them 
in a sarcastic game to determine who of the people in the portraits was better looking than the 
other. For this to be possible, Zuckerberg accessed university records. Facemash signalled the 
coming of Facebook the following year, 2004 (Lester 2014:49). Daniel Miller (2016:184) 
observes that in the initial stages of Facebook, the platform was dismissed as something trivial 
and for young people. However, this position changed when after a while, parents started using 
the platform too. For instance, mothers started sending friend requests to their children and this 
made it feel like a platform for kinship. With time, people that worked together or lived near one 
another became friends on Facebook and it felt like a community of people who can have a 
conversation. Facebook became popular within a month of its launch and as noted by Xia 
(2009:470), half of the undergraduate students, for whom it was initially intended, registered on 
the service. The Ivy League schools took it on thereafter and soon other college students 
followed. The platform was mainly used for the sharing of information and ideas about university 
issues.  
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In the years that followed the launch of Facebook, this platform was opened to the public with 
membership climbing to tens of millions of active users to date. Facebook‘s 2012 initial public 
filing as a company indicated a growth of 845 million active users worldwide, having 161 million 
active users in the USA alone (Safranek, 2012:1).These figures led Safranek (2012) to compare 
Facebook to some of the world‘s densely populated countries, and to argue that it would take 
third place after India and China. As of 2012, more than 80% of those registered on the platform 
were outside the United States (Lester, 2014: 49). It is arguably the most used platform on the 
African continent, with Bohler-Muller and Charl van der Merwe (2011:4) putting the number of 
users at 17 million, a figure helped by the high proliferation of mobile phones and Internet 
services. But as of June 2020, the number of Facebook users on the continent has grown to over 
212 million (internetworldstats.com). 
As noted by Cheung, Chiu and Lee (2011:1340), the platform also provides for multiple add-in 
functions such as virtual pets, online games, and virtual gifts thus allowing users to customise 
their own interface. The other features allow for one to update their profile, share photos, 
message and connect with long-lost friends who might be on the platform. This makes Sheldon 
(2015:41) describe Facebook as a social Bible. In relation to news consumption, the Facebook 
platform maintains active news updates, commonly known as the ‗newsfeed‘ for followers. These 
updates are strategically positioned in the middle of one‘s Facebook page and as observed by 
Roese (2018: 321-321), users come across the news on such feeds as they check what their 
friends have posted. For such updates, Facebook works with algorithms that rank posts according 
to relevance per user. Without such algorithms, Roese (2018) observes that users would be 
overwhelmed by the growing amount of content, which is estimated to lie between 1,500 to 
15,000 stories in a newsfeed. The Facebook filter reduces the figure to about 300 stories, which is 
arguably manageable to scroll through. Most of the features on Facebook are user-friendly and 
call for little technical expertise. This makes it possible for people to express themselves with 
ease and as desired (Zuckerberg, 2010:179). Facebook is not only available to individuals and 
interest groups, but corporate companies too. Such corporate entities mainly use the platform to 
connect with their desired audiences and seldom require approvals for members to join 
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(Mukhopadhyay, 2016:3). The NTV Facebook page is one such platform. It was set up for NTV 
to connect easily with its audience, as will be expounded on in subsequent chapters.  
Uganda is one of the African countries whose citizens use Facebook in various ways. The 
country started using the Internet in 1991 when Makerere University was linked to universities in 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe with the help of Fidonet technology (McKonnell, 1998: 
152). This system allowed for regional interconnection across dial-up telephone lines. It can be 
argued therefore that by 2004 when Facebook was created by Zuckerberg, a section of Ugandans 
were familiar with using the Internet. 
Uganda presently has a number of Internet service providers targeting different markets, but as 
observed by Ndiwalana and Tusubira (2012:13), the major mobile telephone operators such as 
MTN, Airtel and Africell, have chosen to concentrate more on Internet and data services. This is 
because the intense competition in mobile voice service providers has meant that tariffs have 
plummeted, thus making Internet and data services more profitable. The Annual Market and 
Industry report by Uganda Communications Commission (2015/2016: 7) on postal, broadcasting 
and Telecommunications puts Internet penetration in the country at 42.5%. Furthermore, a 2017 
audience research by Ipsos, a research firm in Uganda, puts the number of people with smart 
phones at 32% of the country‘s estimated 40 million population, with a 3.3% population growth 
rate. Ipsos further notes that the highest concentration (40%) of people with smart phones is in 
the age bracket 25- 34 years, with men commanding more ownership. Over 90% of the Internet 
activities of the population are on social media. Consequently, owners of traditional media have 
used the opportunity of social media to share their content in different corners of the world, for 
instance through broadcasting on Facebook Live. As of the January 2019 projections by the 
social media statistics website, Facebook commands 82% of social media use in Uganda. The 
NTV Facebook platform alone has 1,184,418 million followers.
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Uganda witnessed significant incidents of Facebook use and other social media prior to the 2016 
polls. Chibita and Ugangu (2017:249) narrate how in 2007 a section of Ugandans successfully 
mobilised through social media and averted plans by the state to have part of the country‘s 
natural forest, Mabira, demarcated for sugarcane growing. With hashtags such as #Mabira and 
#SaveMabira and in addition to use of traditional media, about two million protesters are said to 
have been mobilised to march on the streets of the capital, Kampala.  
About two years later in September 2009, riots broke out in Kampala, following a stand-off 
between the government and the Buganda kingdom. This was over the former‘s restriction on in-
land travel of the Buganda king to Kayunga district (central region). These riots, as noted by 
Javuru (2013: 367), left 27 people dead and consequently saw the government close four local 
radio stations (Central Broadcasting Services (CBS), Ssuubi FM, Radio Sapientia, and Akaboozi 
ku Bbiri) for allegedly inciting violence and promoting sectarianism. With this blackout, 
Ugandans resorted to social media, mobile phone SMS and the website Witness, to keep updated 
on the events surrounding these riots.  
Ojambo (2016: 33) narrates how another two years later, in 2011, Ugandans were inspired by 
events shared on social media and other fora in relation to the Arab Spring, in which several 
heads of state were overthrown as partly coordinated on social media. For example, Ben Ali of 
Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Gadaffi of Libya were deposed almost in 
succession. Back in Uganda, preparations for the 2011 elections were ongoing. The coincidence 
of these preparations with the aforementioned deposition of leaders made a section of Ugandans 
convinced that the same could happen back home. Consequently, they started sending each other 
messages of encouragement and hope towards the presumed overthrow of President Museveni. 
Ojambo (2016) further explains that such messages included phrases such as ‗Mubarak is going‘, 
‗Ben Ali is no more in Tunisia‘, ‗People power‘ and ‗say no tear gas‘. These messages were not 
in vain. Although they did not cause the toppling of Museveni‘s government, Ojambo (2016) 
observes that they had the effect of motivating citizens to join the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests. 
These protests happened in the aftermath of Uganda‘s 2011 elections, which as noted earlier, 
retained incumbent Yoweri Museveni as President. 
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According to Kayunga (2017:82), the ‗Walk to Work‘ urban protests were organised around top 
opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye, who had come second to President Museveni in the polls. 
These protests attracted several other political leaders and their followers as spearheaded by a 
political pressure group, A4C (Action for Change). The country was going through an economic 
crisis, which seemed to worsen by the day. This crisis, coupled with a general demand for 
improvement in people‘s welfare, helped the ‗Walk to work‘ protests gain momentum and attract 
other groups. Such groups included Suubi lya Buganda (Buganda‘s Hope), which focused on the 
call for restoration of a federal system of governance, and the ‗Black Monday Movement‘ which 
focused on exposing acts of corruption and embezzlement of government funds. 
According to Ojambo (2016: 34), the brilliance of the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests lay in its 
simplicity of advocating for walking since no government could have accused its citizens of 
choosing to walk to their work places under normal circumstances. Ojambo (2016: 33) further 
notes that just as was the case in the Arab spring, social media especially Facebook and Twitter 
were used for quick organisation and mobilisation of participants in the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests. 
In addition, the protestors are said to have watched television and listened to other media sources, 
with a view to pick tactics used in the Arab Spring to be replicated in Uganda. Of particular 
interest was the need to understand how to deal with security forces. In this regard, social media 
was one of the meeting points for sharing information. As noted by Bohler-Muller and Charl van 
der Merwe (2011:6) social media has replaced the market places that were historically used to 
garner revolutionists. For the case of Uganda, such places included the constitutional square, 
Kiseka and St. Balikudembe markets (Ojambo, 2016: 32).  
But the government of Uganda did not let the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests carry on unabated. To 
begin with, these public places for gatherings were cordoned off and restricted from unauthorised 
public gatherings. According to Kalinaki (2016), the sealing off of these grounds in Uganda was 
similar to the situation in Egypt at the height of the protests in which President Hosni Mubarak 
was ousted. During the protests in Egypt, Tahrir Square, a common ground for people to gather, 
was sealed off with iron grating. Kalinaki (2016) further recalls a similar incident in Bahrain, 
when the pearl roundabout, often used for public gatherings, was replaced with a traffic light 
junction.  
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In addition to closing the physical spaces, those involved in the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests were 
subjected to house arrest and legal proceedings over inciting violence and also charged with 
treason. The activities of this pressure group were eventually banned. However, the members 
agreed to form a democratic alliance. This alliance was tasked with identifying a joint 
presidential candidate to contest the polls against the incumbent in the approaching 2016 
elections (Kayunga 2017:83). In conclusion, (Ojambo 2016:33), observes that Uganda‘s use of 
social media did not equal that of the Arab Spring. This is irrespective of the efforts by Ugandans 
to learn the Arab Spring tactics. To Kalinaki (2016), this implies that the increased use of social 
media in Uganda has only served to enable citizens to be active online as they retweet and tag 
posts. He argues that this is complemented by the absence of physical space for protesters to 
converge. Nonetheless, for Ojambo (2016: 33), although the ‗Walk-to-Work‘ protests were 
unsuccessful, they changed the notion of struggle from armed confrontation to peaceful 
demonstration on the streets.  
Another incident of the massive use of Facebook and other social media in Uganda was in 2012 
when a film about Uganda‘s ‗War Lord‘ Joseph Kony of the Lord‘s Resistance Army went viral. 
The film, as noted by Hinton and Hjorth (2013: 74), sought to make the situation in Northern 
Uganda more known and consequently get support from the United States towards efforts to have 
him arrested. The video was widely shared on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. It attracted over 
84 million hits online after just a few days of its launch. One of the strategies for popularising the 
video was to use celebrities in enhancing the cause. As observed by Adelaja (2013: 327) several 
celebrities, including Oprah Winfrey and Justin Bieber, joined the cause. On 21 March 2012, the 
United States Senate resolved to support the sending of troops by African Union to assist in 
capturing Joseph Kony.  
Nonetheless, the film about Kony was criticised for among other things simplifying a complex 
conflict, factual inaccuracies and for depicting Ugandans as powerless. This criticism came from 
Ugandans, journalists and academics online. The online platforms, including Facebook, provided 
space for this conversation, with some people questioning the finances of Invisible Children, the 
company that produced the film (Hinton and Hjorth, 2013:74).  
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In response, the then Prime Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi, uploaded a video on 
YouTube, in which he reassured tourists and investors that Uganda was a safe country and not at 
war as depicted in the film (Javuru, 2013: 373). This film on Kony and consequent reaction was 
another major demonstration on how social media was used in Uganda and across the globe to 
connect people for a common cause. Social media has had, and continues to have, impact on 
decision making in several African states, especially where online input from various people is 
considered (Adelaja, 2013: 327). Mukhopadhyay (2016: 6) agrees that social media has impact, 
and notes that platforms such as Facebook have amplified the communication process. This 
amplification has resulted in these platforms assuming a global character and reach, in which 
news is mutualised. With this type of impact, Mukhopadhyay (2016) further notes that social 
media has become a powerful tool for advocacy and activism. Nonetheless, the type of activism 
on social media has also been criticised as slaktivism. This implies a lazy and half-hearted 
activism (Hinton and Hjorth, 2013: 74). 
The 2016 Presidential elections in Uganda and media coverage 
Gibb Ryan (2016: 94) observes that Uganda‘s highly contested presidential campaign started on 9 
November 2015. Although Uganda‘s electoral commission declared President Museveni the 
winner of the election, some of the other competing candidates maintained that the election was 
gerrymandered in his favour and that the environment surrounding the election was one of voter 
intimidation (Oloka-Onyango and Ahikire, 2017). Presidential candidate Amama Mbabazi, who 
was initially thought to pose a strong opponent to the incumbent, consequently filed a petition to 
the Supreme Court over the outcome of this election. In contrast, Dr. Kizza Besigye- who had 
come second in the polls and had contested in several previous elections with the incumbent 
opted not to petition court. Dr. Besigye‘s argument was that he had lost confidence in the 
country‘s judicial process (Ryan, 2016: 99).  
Part of the tension surrounding the elections was created by a vigilante group known as the 
‗crime preventers‘. As noted by Tapscott (2016: 1), this group was a volunteer force whose role 
was to complement police in gathering intelligence information, control crime in local 
communities and help enhance security during the elections and in incidences of emergency. 
 58 
With such authority secured from the then Inspector General of Police, Maj. Gen. Kale Kayihura, 
the Crime Preventers were positioned at the several polling stations and had permission to arrest 
anyone who attempted to cause chaos. Tapscott (2016:2), further observes that the crime 
preventers were framed both as state security forces, who were part of a community policing 
system, and as civilians who had opted to volunteer their time during this critical period. In 
addition, they were convinced to stay the cause through several tactics including a promise of 
material rewards and training. These promises had the added advantage of making the cohort 
internally compete for the promised opportunities.  
 According to Ryan (2016: 95), about 2.5 million crime preventers were recruited across the 
country. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2016:608) agree that the crime preventers intimidated 
voters, adding that this was similar to the role played by the army and other security forces in the 
run-up to the elections. This involved arbitrary arrests, detention of members of the opposition 
and prevention of political parties from holding public events without police permission under the 
Public Order Management Act. Ryan (2016: 95) notes that prior to the polls, in July 2015, both 
Amama Mbabazi and Dr. Kizza Besigye were placed under preventative arrest and that for 
Besigye, this continued even after the polls, to prevent him from organising protests. Golooba-
Mutebi and Hickey (2016) conclude that Uganda‘s security forces have for long played a 
repressive role to political parties. The case of the 2016 elections was not any different, but rather 
a continuation of the repression. This atmosphere of intimidation preceding the election was also 
noted by the European Union Election Observation Mission in addition to other human right 
bodies (Ryan, 2016:94). 
Tapscott (2016:1) further notes that more tension was created by an announcement made by the 
secretary general of the ruling party (NRM) that anyone disrupting peace would be shot. This was 
in addition to some of the election adverts ran by this political party. These adverts featured 
skulls of those who died in the five-year bush war that brought the NRM to power. Bringing back 
these images at the height of the 2016 elections was a tactful way of reminding the citizenry that 
poor choice in the polls could easily result into war. In addition, Ryan (2016: 98) observes that 
President Museveni further emphasised the fear when he made a public caution that ―Elections 
are no joke. It is a matter of life and death. If you decide wrongly, you will bear the 
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consequences.‖ As noted by Beardsworth (2016:764), attempts by the opposition to form a 
coalition and defeat the incumbent were failed by intra-party factionalism, interparty competition 
and distrust.  
So, a divided opposition ran against the incumbent, who in 2016 had been in power for 30 years. 
In the run up to the elections and for the first time in the country, the electoral commission 
introduced a biometric voter verification system in addition to giving voters slips that indicated 
the location of their polling stations (Ryan, 2016:94). Despite this, the election was marred by 
what Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2016: 608) describe as credible evidence of vote tampering 
which included multiple voting by army officers and alleged ballot stuffing. This was further 
compounded by the delayed arrival of voting material at several polling stations for example in 
Mbale district, Muzimya Municipality, Wakiso District, and parts of Kampala. The voters kept 
waiting in queues for these materials, sometimes in vain (Ryan, 2016:95). A decision was taken 
the electoral commission to extend the voting to one more day. To sum it up, Ryan (2016: 94) 
describes presidential politics in Uganda as a national drama. Nonetheless, Banducci and Karp 
(2003:443) argue that elections still serve an important function. They build and maintain support 
for a given political system thus creating legitimacy. To put this in context, Banducci and Karp 
contend that there is a general declining voter turnout in different parts of the world. In addition 
is a growing lack of trust in politicians and public institutions the world over. Certainly, Uganda 
is no exception given the dissatisfaction as expressed by some of the presidential candidates and 
the allegations of vote rigging among others. 
Media coverage of the 2016 elections in Uganda 
In times of elections, the media are often faced with unbalanced coverage resulting from financial 
difficulties and shortage of competent staff, and yet citizens still expect the media to be 
ubiquitous and report from all over the country (Frère, 2015: 6-7). This expectation creates more 
pressure in newsrooms. In addition are the attempts to manipulate information, especially by the 
contending parties seeking favourable coverage of their activities or candidates. It can be argued 
that the other advantage Uganda‘s incumbent enjoyed during the elections which could have 
contributed to his victory, was the unbalanced media coverage. According to ACME(2016: 40- 
 60 
41), President Museveni was the most covered candidate by both the privately owned and state-
owned print and electronic media in Uganda. For the case of television, the incumbent took up 
44.9% of the time dedicated to presidential candidates against Dr. Besigye‘s 21.6% and Amama 
Mbabazi‘s 19.2%. In the print media, he took up 38.8% of the space dedicated to presidential 
candidates compared to 29.1% of candidate Amama Mbabazi and 21.3% of candidate Dr. Kizza 
Besigye, the three top contenders. The media indeed makes some candidates, their traits and the 
issues focused on, more prominent than others, and this can have impact on voters' early 
perceptions of the campaign(Weaver, 1996:39). Ryan (2016: 98) notes that incumbents tend to 
receive more coverage especially through state-controlled media houses and more access to other 
state resources. Ryan adds that President Museveni and the NRM were no exception during the 
2016 elections, with the party covering up the illegality of using state resources by blurring the 
distinction between campaigning and civic education. According to Hopmann et al. (2012:174), 
party strategists usually try to influence media coverage with substantial success and this may in 
turn affect the voting patterns. For the case of Uganda, the ACME report (2016:33) notes that the 
NRM campaign team provided drone footage of the campaign trail to NTV for use. The 
television station however insisted on using its own footage, and this made the NRM team to 
deny NTV journalists access to the incumbent‘s subsequent campaign rallies. The television 
station eventually accepted to use the aforementioned video footage. The ACME report further 
notes incidences of bribery of journalists with money disguised as transport refund or facilitation. 
In some of the incidents, ACME observes that the journalists were instructed to give negative or 
unfavourable coverage to opposition candidates if they were to report about them at all. 
During elections, journalists remain concerned with the need to balance news coverage, 
especially as depicted in the necessity to include candidates from all contending parties 
(Hopmann et al., 2012:177). This implies that journalists and the media in general are in a 
constant interface with the contenders, relying on them as sources of news (Hopmann et al., 
2012:186). It is through the media that these candidates and parties therefore make their agenda 
known to the electorate. This is in addition to other information about the entire electoral process 
which is availed through the media (Frère, 2011:6), for example as sourced from the electoral 
commission or other institutional bodies charged with the electoral process.  
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Whereas all types of media are important for the elections, Shaw (1999:185) argues that it is 
television media that people usually tend to rely on more for political news and that this therefore 
makes such news more important. The view on the importance of television in comparison to 
other media is shared by Banducci and Karp (2003: 446), who caution that the quality of content 
on television needs to be put into consideration. They explain that if the news coverage is of high 
quality, then it has the potential to mobilise people. This is in contrast to sensationalist tabloid 
television, which they further argue can have the effect of turning off the electorate. In support of 
the argument on quality television news, it can be argued that at a time of elections, the electorate 
is more likely to turn to programmes that are informative about elections to keep abreast with 
what is happening, especially if such programmes are well presented.    
Legislation of social media and online platforms in Uganda 
The continued penetration and use of the Internet and social media has not gone unabated by 
different governments across the globe, with both authoritarian and democratic regimes 
increasingly devising means to limit access (Shirky, 2011:28). One of the ways in which access 
has been limited is through legislation. As noted by Dijk (2012:138), new media is usually first 
established before relevant legislation follows, because it is certainly difficult to legislate against 
the unknown. As a consequence, this makes laws and justice lag behind technology. The lag is 
resultant from the fact that the consequences of new technology are not always clear from the 
onset, and may therefore require adjustment in existing legislation gradually. For the case of 
Uganda and the East African region in general, Chibita and Ugangu (2017:250) note that the 
states embarked on a policy revisit to accommodate changes in technology, with emphasis on 
new technologies. In these revisits, Uganda streamlined ICTs in her vision 2040, which aims at 
achieving middle-income status for the nation by 2040. A similar streamlining of ICTs is evident 
in Kenya‘s vision 2030 and Rwanda‘s vision 2020.  
Whereas Article 29 (1) of Uganda‘s 1995 constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech 
and expression, Chibita and Ugangu note that social media has ironically been accompanied by 
stricter state surveillance. The 2013 Facebook global government requests report shows that the 




 ―Regulation and control of social media has been justified on the basis of 
countering terrorism, shutting out political opponents and dissenting voices, fighting pornography 
and guarding against cybercrime‖ (Chibita and Ugangu, 2017:252). The country has other 
provisions to regulate the media, which include the UCC Act 2013 for regulation of broadcasts 
and telecommunications, and the Press and Journalist Act of 2000 for regulating practitioners. In 
addition, Uganda has a Media Council with the mandate to regulate the media and license 
journalists. Journalists are required to hold at least a bachelor‘s degree in order to be recognised 
as professional. Journalists however do belong to an independent association, the Uganda 
journalists Association (UJA). 
The implication of this multifaceted legislation is that journalists are sometimes unsure of which 
legislation to follow, or which one may be used against them. As noted by Javuru (2013: 373), 
Uganda‘s media environment appears to allow freedom of expression but actually suppresses it. 
Javuru argues that with this type of regulation, online platforms become a viable option for 
people to exchange information. But this argument of resorting to online platforms is applicable 
under the assumption that they will remain clear of suppressive legislation, which is not true of 
Uganda. As noted by Amamukirori (2018), Uganda‘s prime minister asked lawyers to help 
government draft laws and policies to regulate social media. She notes further that the Executive 
Director of Uganda Communications Commission, Eng. Godfrey Mutabazi, was in support of the 
need for local legislation. UCC‘s concern was premised on the fact that several of the online 
platforms are created and managed by the western world. This, Eng. Mutabazi further reasoned, 
exposes Ugandans and leaves them vulnerable. 
Part of the strategy on regulation has been to impose tax on social media, which according to 
Mugerwa and Malaba (2018) stems from the fact that the citizenry is increasingly critical on 
social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, Skype and Viber. Consequently, in 
a letter dated 12
th
 March 2018, the President directed the Finance Minister, Matia Kasaija, to 
effect taxation on use of social media. This directive made it explicitly clear that the tax was not 




to affect use of the Internet for other purposes such as educational engagements, research or for 
reference. It was to target only social media. Mugerwa and Malaba (2018) further note that the 
proposed tax was contested by human rights defenders and users of social media who described 
this upcoming legislation as diversionary, deceptive, burdensome and injurious to individual 
freedoms. Irrespective of this contestation, preparation to have the tax effected continued. 
Consequently, the tax took effect on 1 July 2018. On this day, many Ugandans were unable to 
access social media platforms including WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Google Hangouts, Yahoo 
Messenger, Instagram, YouTube and Skype (Kimuyu, 2018). The parliament of Uganda had in 
June 2018 assented to the tax as part of the amendments to excise duty. Users of social media 
were as per this tax required to pay UGX 200 before accessing any social media platform. 
Mugerwa and Malaba (2018) note that President Museveni considered the talk on social media as 
„olugambo‟ (opinions, prejudices, insults, friendly chats). He supported the tax as a necessity for 
widening the country‘s tax base. The president‘s projection was that proceeds from this new 
legislation would amount to between UGX 400 billion and 1.4 trillion annually. As observed by 
Kimuyu (2018), the tax was to be paid via mobile money platforms of the three telecom firms 
operating in Uganda: MTN, Bharti Airtel and Africell. The system of payment was designed in 
such a way that one had to pay tax before accessing the aforementioned platforms, even if they 
had Internet data on their devices. To Mugerwa and Malaba (2018), this was double taxation 
since users already pay taxes on the Internet data bundles and on airtime. The government of 
Uganda nonetheless defended the tax with the argument that collected revenue was to be used to 
improve the provision of social services. Cited in this category were services such as free 
education, free healthcare and maintenance of roads, all of which were occasionally demanded by 
citizens (Kimuyu, 2018). 
In an earlier public notice dated 6 March 2018, Anthony Wesaka (2018) notes that the Uganda 
Communications Commission directed all online data and news service providers to register with 
it or face disciplinary action. Such action included the possibility of directing Internet service 
providers to block access to websites or streams whose owners did not comply. Wesaka (2018) 
further notes that prior to this directive, Uganda‘s capital Kampala witnessed an increase in the 
number of online news publications some of which were synonymous with circulation of fake 
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news. It can be argued therefore that the environment of increased online legislation was to 
protect citizens against such manipulation, although it came with a constraint to freedom of 
speech and expression towards the genuine ones.  
But Javuru (2013:373) remains optimistic that the enthusiasm for new media in Uganda will see 
the development of online public spheres, which will eventually flourish. Such flourishing is 
however subject to more tolerance and openness in the political system. Kalinaki (2016) agrees to 
the need for allowing growth of online platforms, which he argues ought to be used as spaces for 
enlightenment. He adds that in order for social media to transform society, good Internet 
penetration, a democratic regime and a citizenry that unwaveringly demands for deeper 
democracy, are important. 
The issue of whether state authorities ought to regulate online platforms remains debatable more 
so in the face of self-regulation of these platforms. As noted by Reid (2017:227), some social 
media platforms have availed functions to allow for reporting of content deemed inappropriate by 
other users. Facebook is one of them. In instances where inappropriate content is reported, the 
moderators of these platforms may remove the content or nullify the user‘s account. But it can be 
argued that this ability of moderators to remove or nullify online accounts is in itself regulation. 
By implication, additional regulation by state authorities would in this case make it double 
regulation or triple considering that some employers have set regulations on how their staff use 
social media (Reid, 2017). Such employers fear that uncontrolled use of social media by their 
staff may harm the reputation of their organisations. This is the case for media organisations that 
regulate their staff‘s social media engagement for fear of what Reid terms as posting of unethical 
or untrue social media content, injurious to the organisation‘s credibility.  
Reid (2017:230) further cautions that even in the face of trolling, online bullying and publication 
of harmful content, there is need to exercise restraint in regulating any media content since 
freedom of expression is a fundamental human right. This is in addition to that fact that social 
media platforms are self-regulating as seen when users criticise each other for publishing 
inappropriate content such as hate speech. Reid further argues that even the credibility of trolls is 
often questioned by users of a given platform, all of which puts into question the need for 
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additional official legislation. It is nonetheless important to note that such calls for non-regulation 












Chapter 3 Theoretical framework 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has placed the study in context of social media and its application in 
politics, demonstrating how the citizenry in Uganda have taken to Facebook as an alternative 
platform for political debate, so much that the state has had to impose a separate tax on use of 
Facebook and other social media. This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. It 
places the study in the theory of the public sphere as espoused by Jurgen Habermas (1989) and 
the agenda setting theory of McCombs and Shaw (1972). The choice of these two theories is 
premised on the need to support different aspects of the research questions as will be explained 
further in the chapter. In addition, social media has arguably taken the place of the public sphere, 
initially conceived by Habermas. 
The theory of the public sphere 
To date, the theory of the public sphere and its relevance remain both contested and appreciated 
by the scholarly community. Whereas this section is not an attempt at presenting all the 
arguments for and against this theory, it will present those deemed salient to the study.  The 
leading modern authority on communicative rationality and the public sphere is the German 
philosopher and sociologist, Jürgen Habermas. This chapter will therefore present the tenets of 
this theory, heavily relying on the works of Habermas and his arguments on how the public 
sphere gradually went into a decline. The chapter further discusses how news and public opinion 
got shaped in the public sphere, with a chronology of the impact of the printing press. It is argued 
later in the chapter that (social) media redeemed the public sphere, contrary to what Habermas 
describes as a contributor to the collapse of the public sphere brought on by the media. The 
chapter then moves on to discuss the agenda setting theory in brief, to give a possible explanation 
for traditional media‘s involvement in the online social media spaces.  
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Tracing the theory of the public sphere 
Tracing the theory of the public sphere takes one to the historical feudal Middle Ages. Caldwell 
(2017:113) narrates how monarchs and aristocracies dominated the rural populations during this 
period stretching from the 5
th
 to the 15
th
 centuries. It was the role of the peasants to oversee the 
maintenance of the royal court, a public centre for the feudal society. It is in the French feudal 
society that Habermas (1989: 14-15) situates his theory of the public sphere, at a time of 
burgeoning capitalism. This capitalism emanated from the feudal organisation of the 13
th
 century 
agricultural production and the petty commodity production of the craftsmen. Trade spread from 
the northern Italian city-states to western and northern Europe. This trade brought in its wake, the 
eventual rise of the Dutch entrepôt or centres for staple foods and trade fairs at the cross-roads of 
long-distance trade stretching across the globe. Consequently, there was traffic both in 
commodities and in news. This long-distance trade supplemented the already existent local 
markets in towns, which were gradually relegated to serving as instruments for the domination of 
surrounding areas rather than for a free commodity exchange between town and country.  
The political order remained unthreatened by this burgeoning trade as long as members of the 
ruling class participated as the primary consumers of such commodities as luxury imported cloths 
and spices. Nonetheless, this capitalism both stabilised the power structure of the society 
organised in estates, but also brought forth the elements within which this structure would 
dissolve as a result both of the French Revolution and of the Industrial Revolution. Habermas 
(1989:141) further narrates how the middle class of wealthy businessmen occupied the field 
between the state and society. The market economy saw the emergence of the public sphere. This 
sphere broke the domination based on landed estate and called for administration invested with 
state authority, thus creating a new order that reached its zenith in the 19
th
 century. The increased 
expansion of trade further entrenched the middle class and enabled them to gather and debate in 
public houses (Caldwell, 2017:114). The public sphere was therefore the realm between the state 
and the private realm. It was comprised of private individuals, who came together to form a 
public, although it remained part of the private realm (Habermas, 1989:175-176).  
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Fast forward to the 18
th
 century, the new and affluent middle classes were engaged in critical 
debate in the coffee or chocolate houses in the major settlements. Such debates often initially 
focused on works of literature and art. Gradually, the debates incorporated economic and political 
disputes. From these informal gatherings in coffee houses, political, philosophical, sporting and 
scientific clubs emerged. Wealthy women, abandoned by the men of the house every evening 
frequently took to the salons. In these salons, particularly in Paris, the bourgeoisie and the 
nobility met with the intellectuals on equal footing. Habermas (1989) notes that although the 
composition of the salons and coffee houses differed in terms of size and gender, the style of their 
proceedings was not dissimilar. The two had several other institutional criteria in common, which 
included the climate of their debates and their topical orientations. In addition, they both 
organised discussions among private people and, up to a point, disregarded status.  
The coffee house and salon discussions problematised areas that hereto had not been questioned. 
Initially, church and state authorities had the monopoly of interpretation of ‗common concern‘ 
from the pulpit, philosophy, literature and art. This continued even when the growth of capitalism 
necessitated more information. Nonetheless, since the works of literature and art were produced 
for the market and distributed through it, they became similar to that type of information. In 
addition, such works were generally accessible and no longer the reserves of church and court. 
This, according to Habermas, meant that these works lost their aura of extraordinariness and their 
once ‗sacramental character‘. Furthermore, the public was now regarded in principle as being 
inclusive of any private person who was educated and had the interest of participating. This 
intellectualised public was nonetheless aware that it was part of a larger public and consequently 
acted as its mouthpiece in name, and as its educator. Discussions in the public sphere did not 
remain internal to it. They could be directed at the outside world, as for instance published in The 
Spectator or in the Diskurse der Mahlern (Habermas, 1989:34, 37), two political journals of the 
mid-late 18
th
 century.  
The first newspapers were essentially political, single-page broadsheets containing political 
propaganda. These appeared irregularly, then weekly and finally with the advent of the modern-
type newspaper in the early 18
th
 century, on a daily, twice-weekly or weekly basis. And parallel 
to these were the political journals or magazines and the political pamphlets which were to 
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dominate political thinking for some 200 years. The early newspapers had content about foreign 
and local news (termed ‗intelligence‘) foreign trade, transport of precious metals, imperial diets, 
wars, harvests and taxes. They also contained, invariably covering the front page, a mass of 
personal advertisements. All this information entered the public sphere and created a new 
revolution. Much of this information had passed through the sieve of the merchants‘ unofficial 
information control and sometimes the state administrations‘ official censorship. So ‗News‘ 
became a commodity and was subject to the laws of the market (Habermas, 1989: 20-21). 
Going further, Dahlgren and Sparks (1991:29) look at the public sphere as the space between 
government and society. This space allows private individuals to exercise control over the state 
for instance through the election of governments and local government councils. In addition, 
these private individuals exercise informal control over the state through the pressure of public 
opinion. Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2009:196) view the public sphere as an arena between 
state power and the power of the commercial and industrial base. In this arena, people converge 
as citizens, not political players and not as motivated by commercial interests. These citizens 
freely engage on matters of public concern, and formulate a public attitude called ‗public 
opinion‘, resulting from reasoned consensus (Caldwell, 2017:115).  
Calhoun (2003:1) considers the public sphere as a space of communication. Such a space 
transcends any particular place as it weaves conversations together. Calhoun adds that the space 
of a public sphere is constituted by communication among strangers. McNair (2006:136) agrees 
with Calhoun and defines the public sphere as all allocations, physical or virtual, where ideas 
relevant to politics are openly exchanged. To McNair, such spheres encompass the media. This 
media acts as a conduit for information exchange to enable meaningful political participation. 
Dahlgren and Sparks (1991:29) notes too that the media are central to the public sphere in 
contemporary times. It is through the media that citizens are availed with the necessary 
information, especially during elections. Similar to Habermas‘ reference to public opinion, 
Dahlgren and Sparks assert that the fourth estate of the media facilitates the formation of public 
opinion. 
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News and public opinion in the public sphere 
A discussion of the concept of the public sphere for this thesis would be incomplete without 
proper grounding and understanding of the contribution made by newspapers. As discussed 
above, the content of newspapers sparked off debate in the public sphere in as much measure as it 
did report what was said in these debates. This upsurge in newspaper production and circulation 
owes its existence to the earlier invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg. Gough 
(1988:1) traces the history of newspapers to the civilisation of ancient China, Egypt and Rome; a 
history that was later to be complemented by the printing press. But printing itself initially faced 
restrictions. It was seen as an impingement on the prerogative of Church and State to control 
information (Smith, 1980:9-10). Printing meant that knowledge could now be shared far and wide 
to inspire new thought in various fields. In consequence, Smith (1980) observes that originality 
became a need rather than a danger as had been perceived in medieval society. Printing spread to 
affect all sectors. In some instances, a printing privilege for specified content would be extended 
to a guild or to trusted master printers, by the Church and State authorities.  
Clearly, these restrictions could only be short lived in the face of a spreading literacy. As noted 
by Caldwell (2017:114), the printing press was used to produce several publications such as 
books, newsletters and eventually the newspapers, which usually published information about the 
specific towns in which they were produced. These newspapers would then find their way into 
the coffee houses, where their content would be debated. The newspaper was the most regular of 
all the above publications, most of which were produced in response to specific political, 
religious, astronomical or metrological events (Gough, 1988:1). It is as a result of the impact of 
newspapers in the public sphere that Zaret (1997:213- 214) castigates Habermas for neglecting 
the invention of the printing press. This is so because Habermas refers to the printing revolution 
as a means of disseminating ideas. To Zaret, the printing press was an independent factor that 
shaped new modes of thought. It was as a result of the printing press that scholars were able to 
assess the sources and validity of legal, religious and philosophical documents and debate the 
same (Zaret, 1997: 227).     
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With increased news, came an unprecedented wide spread literacy and a reliance on the printed 
word for public information (Calhoun, 1997:8). In addition to a literate population, several 
factors and events in subsequent centuries in Europe aided the content and therefore the 
continued existence of newspapers. These included the political interest in the religious wars of 
the 16
th
 century, urban life and the booming trade and finance centres where news of commerce 
was both picked from and circulated. Zaret (1997:213) scolds Habermas yet again, for not fully 
exploring the impact and relevance of religion to the public sphere in politics. Zaret argues that 
religious discourse was a key lens through which individuals defined and debated issues in this 
sphere. 
An outstanding outcome of the public sphere debates was the formation of public opinion. This 
public opinion rivalled and eventually surpassed that of the royalists, consequently transforming 
both the public sphere and its participants. These participants now became political actors 
(Caldwell, 2017:114-115). Taking Britain as an example, Lee (1976:22) observes that both 
liberals and radicals had for long fought for freedom to form public opinion. The contestation of 
the 1819 press laws and the agitation to repeal taxes on knowledge in the 1850s, were some of the 
historic efforts to safeguard freedom of public opinion. In addition, limitations on the use of the 
printing press were resisted. Lee (1976: 23) alludes to a literary work commonly referred to as 
Areopatitica (1644). This was a speech by John Milton, an English scholar and poet, advocating 
for unlicensed printing and resisting parliament‘s press ordinance. The speech among other things 
argued that a hidden truth was no truth at all, and that only the furnace of continued debate had 
the potential to safeguard the truth, as opposed to censorship. These arguments were to be 
replicated and integrated in struggles for a free press/public opinion elsewhere in Europe.  




 centuries in 
France, German and Britain. Britain took lead in the 18
th
 century when wealthy people, often the 
product of the new Industrial Revolution, sought to influence decisions of the state by appealing 
to the critical public over an issue. Many of these decisions were in relation to the booming trade 
in textiles (especially cotton), iron smelting and paper manufacture. Habermas (1989:57-59) talks 
of an opposition between landed and moneyed interests. There arose as a conflict between the 
older and younger generation. The older generation was already established in the market while 
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the younger entrepreneurs still had to open new branches of trade and industry. The government 
on the other hand sometimes, but not always, considered the coffeehouse discussions as a 
breeding ground for dissent against it. By the turn of the 18
th
 century, the press was subject to a 
strict law of libel. Newspapers also had to be registered and each newspaper had to be 
individually stamped and pay a tax before it could be sold to a member of the public. 
In France, so powerful was the newspaper press considered that it was referred to as the fourth 
element of the constitution – the so-called Fourth Estate. But this does not mean that the press 
had any formal status. Rather, it was regarded as an opinion-maker and political force of great 
power. So, too, across the English Channel in Britain, the power and influence of the press grew 
and became more and more critical with the emergence of satirical and political journals. 
Habermas (1989:60-61) notes that throughout the century, the public sphere‘s development was 
commensurate to the state of confrontations between government and the press. Such 
publications have since been referred to as pioneers of the modern press because of their criticism 
of the king or queen, government ministers, top military officers, and even jurists. This was 
particularly so during the American War of Independence. 
In the many German states of the Holy Roman Empire, as the 18
th
 century drew to a close, 
several journals blossomed. And they too had content critical on political matters as expressed by 
the emerging middle classes. Habermas (1989:72-73) narrates how reading societies proliferated 
in many of the towns and how these availed space for critical debate. These reading societies 
were associations with ‗public rooms‘. In these rooms, the opportunity to read and discuss both 
newspapers and journals was made possible. Membership of such societies was according to the 
consensus of the majority. Women were excluded. These societies were designed to discuss and 
exchange personal opinion, which frequently developed into what today we would term public 
opinion.  
As observed by Calhoun (1993:273-274), Habermas‘ main preoccupation in the theory of the 
public sphere was to establish the extent to which the opinions guiding political action can be 
formed or were formed basing on rational critical discourse. Habermas therefore assumed that the 
main differences among actors would be related to class and political-economic status. Calhoun 
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(1993) adds that Habermas focused on how opportunities for discourse could be structured 
without emphasising the inequalities of class and status. Dahlgren (1995:8) sees the existence of 
the public sphere in the active reasoning of the public. Such reasoning avails the necessary 
discourse to shape public opinion. In turn, the policies of the state are shaped, consequently 
developing society. Dahlgren is nonetheless cognisant of the fact that today‘s society does not 
operate in this manner. He observes that Habermas‘ public sphere is historically specific to 
Britain, France and Germany. The public sphere owed its existence to the demise of feudalism 
and the growth of national states. With this came the parliaments, commerce, the middle classes 
and printing. These aided the emergence of a public sphere in some Western Europe societies. To 
Susen (2011:54-55), Habermas‘ insistence on privilege to rational critical discourse in the public 
sphere is myopic. Susen argues for the need to recognise other cultural forms such as art and 
painting that rise above the realm of reason.  
Decline of the public sphere 
Dahlgren (1995: 8) notes that with the advent of advanced industrial capitalism and a social 
welfare state of mass democracy, the fledging public sphere began to decline.  The state became 
more interventionist to manage the growing contradictions of capitalism. This saw the 
disintegration of the boundaries between the public and private realm, which were initially 
crucial for the public sphere‘s sustenance. According to Holub (1991:3, 6), the public sphere 
promised democratic control and participation. Holub attributes its decline to both state 
intervention into private affairs and the penetration of society into state. Holub further argues that 
this interference inevitably destroyed the public sphere since its rise depended on a clear 
separation of the two: private realm and public power.  
Dahlgren further points to the re-feudalisation of politics as seen when big organisations and 
interest groups partner with the state. He argues that this re-feudalisation displaces the role and 
exclusivity of the public. Livingstone and Lunt (1994:19) assert that the public sphere has also 
been undermined by class biases. Such biases are depicted in the criteria of admission. The public 
sphere has further been undermined by the absence of institutional meeting places and by new 
techniques of managing opinion. This absence is true of Uganda where, as noted earlier, spaces 
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for public gatherings are restricted by the state. One needs to ask for permission under provisions 
of the Public Order Management Act to access such areas.  
Silverstone (1994:66) agrees with Livingstone and Lunt. Silverstone acknowledges that as the 
interventionist state took on more and more of the traditional responsibilities of civil society, the 
public sphere declined further. This was coupled with monopoly capitalism, commercialisation of 
culture, and control of information. To Silverstone, in this situation of inequalities in access to 
public fora, the public sphere was re-feudalised. Citizens became consumers as the public sphere 
was relegated into insignificance. Livingstone and Lunt (1994:20-21) further note that Habermas 
later alludes to the incompleteness of the process of refeudalisation. To Livingstone and Lunt, the 
incompleteness of the refeudalisation process is supported by an active audience debate. Modern 
media have made it possible for individuals to acquire new forms of power, information and a 
new awareness of rights more than ever before. Livingstone and Lunt further assert that the 
consequence of all this is that individuals are not passive consumers.  
These private consumer citizens passively watched, read and listened to information from the 
comfort of their homes (Cushion, 2012:14). Cushion observes that much of this information was 
heavy with content on entertainment. The public sphere of mass media was in this regard short of 
what Habermas idealised. By mid-twentieth century and with capitalism further entrenched, the 
mass media became factually dubious and politically motivated (Cushion, 2012:14). By then, 
both print and broadcast media were in operation. The rise of public relations and advertising 
industries saw the emergence of what Cushion describes as a ―trivial and commercially motivated 
public sphere.‖ Dahlgren (1995:8) argues that mass democracy had the effect of drawing many 
less educated citizens into the public sphere. Consequently, the sphere‘s socio-discursive 
coherence fell apart. The public‘s critical function was further eroded by the presence of public 
relations, entertainment and advertising. These elements further fragmented the public and 
reduced it to what Dahlgren termed ‗a group of spectators‘ with a minimised intrusion in 
fundamental political questions.  
Livingstone and Lunt (1994:20) argue for the absence of a uniform public voice since the public 
is inherently diverse. They reason that the public is sectioned into property owners and workers, 
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and each of them is mindful of their peculiar interests. For the specific case of elections, 
Livingstone and Lunt observe that political communication may be seen to be managed by the 
mass media. The voting patterns are neither formed rationally nor in discussion with other 
people. Such patterns therefore do not constitute public opinion, nor do they reflect rational 
participation. Livingstone and Lunt further observe that the people who argue in public spaces do 
so only to confirm their previous ideas. In this case, argument serves to express diverse appeals in 
persuasion. It all comes off as a staged display. Calhoun (1993:276) argues that a political public 
sphere is successful if it provides for a rational-critical and influential discourse. Such discourse 
ought to relate to shared societal concerns.  
Contemporary mass media and contestation in the public sphere 
Habermas (1989:160-164) decries how the highly critical public sphere of coffee-houses, salons 
and reading societies was replaced by what he regards as a pseudo phenomenon one, of 
consumption of media content. It must not be forgotten that in the 19
th
 century, thanks to the 
French Revolution and the export of its ideas, imperialism and the Industrial Revolution, the 
counties where coffee house politics had thrived changed dramatically. In particular, one should 
mention that sailing ships were replaced by iron steam ships which cut the journey that had 
initialy taken months down to weeks. There was also the development of electronic 
communication, first of the cable telegraph (often across ocean beds for thousands of kilometres) 
and Morse code, and then of the telephone. The invention of photographs was also very 
significant for creating a public sphere. Also to this formula which created a world society with 
world news was the formation of news-gathering agencies such as Reuters, and the development 
of modern journalism. And parallel with this was the state endeavouring, not always successfully, 
to regulate newspapers and magazines. And finally, and very important, there was a dramatic 
increase in the amount of literacy in society. All these factors are developed (as with the advent 
of radio and television) in the 20
th
 century as new nation states began to emerge from what had 
been colonial possessions of European powers. 
The public was subjected to a cycle of production and consumption as the laws of the market 
penetrated deep into a rapidly changing society. Literary family periodicals were gradually 
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replaced by advertiser-financed magazines. By the mid-twentieth century, radio stations, 
publishers and associations staged and profited from panel discussions. Habermas (1989) further 
alludes to professional dialogues administered from podiums, and round table shows on radio, 
television, conferences and other fora. He argues that in all these formats, the rational debate of 
private people is subjected to production numbers. It is a saleable package and assumes 
commodity form. Positions presented are bound to pre-arranged rules of the game. All these 
aspects make critical debate lose its publicist function. At this point, Habermas (1989: 172, 175) 
castigates the mass media for recommending itself as an addressee of personal needs and an 
authority on the problems of life. He argues further that the mass media propagates a culture of 
integration of information, governed by the principle of human interest. But Habermas‘ 
conclusions on the mass media‘s entrance to dismantle the public sphere have been contested.  
To begin with, Hallin (1994:2) describes as ‗confused and ultimately unsustainable‘, the 
description by Habermas of how a reading public was replaced by a mass public of culture 
consumers. To Hallin, mass culture replaced a complex popular culture and not the elite public 
sphere. The popular culture combined traditional, preliterate forms of folk culture with early 
efforts to join the printed public sphere. Livingstone and Lunt (1994:16-17) question whether the 
impact of the media inevitably causes fragmentation of public opinion and wonder if the media 
can play a more positive role in the formation of a discursive public sphere. They nonetheless 
agree to the possibility of the media becoming unrepresentative and non-participatory. This is 
attributed to the market, mainly comprised of centralised monopolies that offer a narrow and 
uniform range of meanings. To Phelan (1991:75), the public sphere availed by news media, 
especially television, allows for policy decisions to be legitimised. Phelan observes that although 
such decisions are made behind closed doors, it is not until they are subjected to the public sphere 
that their integrative propaganda and legitimacy takes place. Cushion (2012:15) considers the 
current public sphere as seen through news media and argues that this is what best captures 
Habermas‘ public sphere, envisioned centuries ago. 
Livingstone and Lunt (1994:1-2) look at the public sphere of television through the lens of 
audience discussion programmes. For such programmes, lay people are invited to form part of a 
studio audience as experts discuss a topical issue. They conclude that whereas the physical 
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audience for such programmes may be small, the reach of the programme may cumulatively avail 
an audience in millions. Livingstone and Lunt (1994:10) further conclude in agreement with 
other scholars that the media constitute a major forum for political communication. It is through 
the media that the citizenry plays a role in democracy by expressing opinions and questioning 
established power. McNair (2006:138) agrees too and adds that the media ought to be 
independent of public and private interests in order to fulfil its function as a public sphere. In 
addition, McNair advocates for media regulation that guarantees that the content of the public 
sphere is not distorted. Silverstone (1994:67) observes that one of the outstanding strengths of the 
theory of the public sphere is its call for a sphere distinct from the economy and the state as well 
as the emphasis on a strong and independent media, to allow for democratic politics. 
The relevance of the theory of the public sphere in today‘s world is one of the major criticisms of 
this seminal work by Habermas. According to Fuchs (2014:65-65), cultural imperialists view this 
theory as an effort at westernisation of the political, economic and social systems of other 
countries. In defence, Fuchs argues that public spaces or spheres cannot be confined to the West. 
He looks at the public sphere as both process and space. For as long as people act politically for a 
joint cause in advancing democracy, then the public sphere will always be present. Fuchs cites 
the uprisings in different parts of the world that succeeded due to mobilisation in the public 
sphere. Some of these uprisings, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis, were in Egypt, Greece, 
Spain, Tunisia, Iraq and other areas. These uprisings had the common aspect of making space 
both public and political and usually happened after a common or shared crisis. Fuchs (2014:62) 
notes that the public sphere created its own limits and critiques. Although the sphere emphasises 
universal accessibility, the social preconditions to enable equality of opportunity were lacking.  
To Silverstone (1994:67), the historical and sociological inclination of the public sphere theory 
poses weaknesses. One of these weaknesses is that the sphere was restricted to middle-class 
males, in some instances, and consequently excluded women. Calhoun (1993:274) argues too that 
the neglect of gender and of other kinds of differences is a major flaw in the work of Habermas. 
Calhoun (ibid) further observes that efforts by Habermas to acknowledge the significance of 
gender inclusion or exclusion in his later works left a lot to be desired. Habermas still regarded 
this issue as a matter of the representation of one interest group among many. For Gillwald 
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(1993:69-70), the additional burden on women's time makes them less likely to enter the political 
sphere. Gillwald argues that Habermas‘ failure to explore the nature of the private sphere is a 
failure in democratic debate.  
Hallin (1994:7) agrees with the gender flaw and observes that Habermas‘ work generally ignores 
the importance of subgroups within society. Such subgroups would have their own public spheres 
and work out their identity before entering dialogue with the rest of society. Essentially, the 
public sphere comprised of educated rich men in contrast to the private sphere of women. Fuchs 
(2014:64) agrees with Hallin and adds that struggles against oppression would today better 
happen in multiple spheres. Fuchs nonetheless raises concern over the divided nature that 
pluralistic spheres would bring forth. In incidences of social struggle, such spheres may be more 
bent towards reformist identity politics as opposed to challenging the whole. In advocating for 
some semblance of a single public sphere, Fuchs quotes the works of Garnham (1992:369). That 
democracy needs ―some common normative dimensions and more generalised media.‖ To Hallin 
(1994:7), there is need for a universal public sphere at both the national and global levels. 
Silverstone (1994) further points to the individualistic nature of the theory of the public sphere as 
another weakness. This is because this theory presupposed that individuals had access to relevant 
information and debates. Dahlgren (1995:8) agrees and observes that the public sphere had 
segments of the educated and propertied strata. It exchanged information and heated debates via 
intellectual journals, pamphlets, newspapers, salons, coffee houses and clubs. Silverstone further 
points to the fact that the theory presupposed the absence of mediating institutions to control the 
movement of information. 
Habermas is further critiqued for idealising the public sphere, which makes him fail to examine 
other non-liberal competing public spheres (Fraser, 1997:115). In defense of this criticism, Fuchs 
(2014:63) argues that Habermas uses a ‗dialectical logic‘ in portraying the limits faced by the 
bourgeois ideals and values. These limits exist in the stratified power relations and class. 
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Is the theory of the public sphere still relevant? 
Despite the above criticism of the theory of the public sphere, a number of scholars argue that the 
theory of the public sphere is still relevant today. Hallin (1994:3-4) contends that it is a useful 
theory in studying media and democracy. In these fields it is a significant empirical concept and 
standard of evaluation. He calls for preservation of the public sphere through continued 
professionalisation of the mass media. The call is premised on a concern for the 
commercialisation of news, which Hallin argues threatens the balance of commodity-production 
and public-interest in news organisations. Fuchs (2014:62) observes that the public sphere is a 
concept of immanent critique for criticising the shortcomings of societies. Habermas does not 
necessarily say that it exists everywhere, but that it should exist.  
Dahlgren (1995:8) asserts too that this theory is relevant today and is present in the mass media. 
This is especially the case since modern society cannot permit for large groups of people to 
occasionally assemble and hold discussions (Dahlgren, 1995:7). To Silverstone (1994:67), the 
media today replaces and provides sustenance of the public sphere, albeit in a different way. 
Silverstone quotes extensively the works of Thompson (1990)who argues that Habermas 
underplays the active engagement of media consumers. To Thompson, Habermas regards media 
consumers as vulnerable to the media‘s influence. Consequently, the fragility acquired by 
political processes in the advent of mass communication is underestimated. Thompson makes a 
final argument that the theory of the public sphere was premised on an understanding of print-
based culture. That the scope has since changed to allow for electronic means of engaging in 
public debate. Thompson further points to television and other media, accessible to an infinite 
number of people and concludes that mass communication has transformed the public realm. To 
Dahlgren (1995:23), the public sphere remains a political accomplishment, ever in need of 
renewal, structured by macro societal factors and shaped by the mass media, especially 
television.  
To Fuchs (2014:60), modern society consists of distinct but connected spheres. These spheres 
exist in economic, cultural and political terms. The economic spheres answer to production of use 
values, politics deals with collective decisions, and culture handles social meanings and moral 
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values. To Hallin (1994:7), eliminating interests from the public sphere would be equivocal to 
rendering this theory null and void. This is because the theory advocates for unrestricted content 
in the political realm. A sense of responsibility towards the common good must therefore 
transcend these interests. Public dialogue on political issues collects around conflict of interest.   
Gerhards and Schäfer (2009:2) are in agreement too that the public sphere concept is still 
important for modern societies. It is through the public sphere that relevant issues are collectively 
communicated to the citizenry. To Gerhards and Schäfer, the participatory nature of the public 
sphere allows for empowerment and inclusion of different actors. They further argue that 
although the mass media presents only a fraction of all collected information, it is still an 
appropriate forum for the public sphere today. This is because of the technical and organisational 
infrastructure of the mass media. The presence of media specialists such as journalists and other 
actors is significant for how the media operate. Nonetheless, Gerhards and Schäfer (2009:3) 
acknowledge that the selection modes of media content are biased. The bias owes to economic 
and political pressures. This limited selection of media content constrains the participatory nature 
of the public sphere. They conclude by advocating for use of the Internet as a less constrained 
public sphere. With increasing reach of the Internet in many parts of the world, Gerhards and 
Schäfer assert that it has the potential to fundamentally change societal communication. They add 
that the less restrictive nature of the Internet allows for more diversity, plurality of voice and a 
strengthened political interest among citizens and beyond. 
To Rasmussen (2007:4), the Internet ought not to be considered as a public sphere of itself. 
Rasmussen argues that the discussion should instead focus on the normative energies and burdens 
brought to the public sphere by the Internet. In this breath, Rasmussen asserts that whereas the 
Internet broadens participation, it complicates the observation of the political public sphere. This 
point of view is advanced from the perspective of politics/state but not the media. Rasmussen 
insists that the public sphere should be looked at as possessing two dimensions. Each of these 
dimensions is oriented towards different solutions and problems. Rasmussen (2007:6-7) further 
argues that the traditional mass media complements political activity on the Internet. For political 
messages to have impact, they are in most cases picked up by the mass media. Rasmussen is 
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further concerned by the ‗hasty, unfocused and inconsistent chat‘ on the Internet. Such chat is 
attributed to the expansion, democratisation and un-edited discussion offered by the Internet. 
As noted by Susen (2011:52), the theory of the public sphere offers useful insights for the public 
sphere in the modern period. These insights give the much-needed theoretical framework for 
understanding structural transformations in today‘s public sphere. Susen further argues for the 
need to continuously revise the theory of the public sphere to suit contemporary times. Social 
media has since been labelled the new public sphere (Castells, 2008; Lim, 2009), as discussed in 
chapter two of this thesis. Taylor (1992:221) is also in support that the public sphere remains 
central for modern society. This is because the public sphere is a free self-governing society and 
therefore a centre of concern. Taylor argues that of concern is whether debate in the public sphere 
is not subject to manipulation by money, government or both. The other concern relates to 
whether modern media allow for truly open exchange to enable common opinion. Taylor asserts 
that because the public sphere is so central to society, it is even faked in incidences of 
suppression. In such incidences, the result is controlled right from the start. Taylor alludes to 
newspaper editorials that purport to express opinion of the writers, and mass demonstrations held 
purportedly on behalf of a bigger public, to emphasise this argument. To Grbesa (2003:113-115), 
Habermas‘ view of the public sphere ought to be evaluated in its historical context. Grbesa agrees 
with Taylor (1992) that further reflections on this theory need to be mindful of the affordances of 
modernisation. This modernisation is characterised by an ever-increasing social complexity. 
Grbesa further argues that current dictates allow for more pluralistically organised public spheres. 
Such spheres have professionals to identify and interpret social problems. This is in opposition to 
Habermas‘ single public spheres. To Grbesa, the current public sphere of the media ought to avail 
information and allow for reasoned public dialogue. Citizens must be able to debate this 
information and hold government to account.  
The above discussion demonstrates that the theory of the public sphere has been threshed and re-
threshed, so much that a disregard of its relevance going forward would be ill advised. As noted 
by McNair (2000:176), both the public sphere and the idea of rationality itself have not 
degenerated but have been prodigiously enlarged. Perhaps Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2009: 
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86) sum it up nicely with the emphasis that the public sphere has been applied to media with an 
almost canonical reverence and re-embraced with an enthusiasm verging on faith. 
The theory of public sphere for this thesis 
It is ironic that, whereas Habermas conceives the media as a major contributor to the collapse of 
the public sphere, this research opts to embrace both traditional and social media as a redeemer of 
the public sphere. To Habermas (1989:160), the critical public sphere was replaced by a pseudo 
one of consumption of media content. The researcher departs from Habermas in choosing to 
associate with the views of all the above scholars who support a continued relevance of the 
theory of the public sphere. The public sphere has now been restored by a competitive market-
driven media in which the masses are made up of citizens, irrespective of their levels of material 
possessions and other qualifications (McNair, 2000:176). It is worth noting that Habermas in his 
later writings acknowledges flaws in his conceptualisation of the public sphere. He justifies the 
reluctance to put out a revised version in the argument that the book, as published in the 18
th
 
edition, had become established as a textbook in some study programmes. In addition, he talks of 
a ―contemporary relevance bestowed on the structural change of the public sphere by the long-
delayed revolution occurring before our eyes in central and eastern Europe,‖ as another 
justification (Habermas, 1997:421). 
As is the case with any sociological generalisation, selection, statistical relevance and 
weighting of historical trends and examples pose a problem involving great risks, 
especially for someone who, unlike the historian, does not go back to the sources but 
instead relies on the secondary literature. Historians have rightly complained of empirical 
shortfalls (Habermas, 422- 423). 
Away from Habermas‘ confessions on the shortcomings of the public sphere concept, the 
researcher finds important connections between this theory and some of the literature review 
relating to how social media, particularly Facebook, operates as a public sphere (see chapter two 
on this). It is important to note that the African continent has in general not benefitted from well-
developed literature and theorising on the concept of the public sphere (Caldwell, 2017:121). The 
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researcher finds the theory of the public sphere pertinent in answering the research objectives in 
relation to Uganda, one of the countries in Africa, and consequently contributing to theorising of 
the concept as seen in online spaces. Of interest is the trend of traditional media moving online to 
among other things engage more with the audience. As noted by Rasmussen (2007:9), more 
people speak up on the Internet compared to traditional media, such as television. To this effect, 
the blend of television and social media will be crucial in answering the research objective ‗to 
determine how NTV used Facebook in engaging followers on the political discourse during 
Uganda‘s 2016 elections.‘ As noted by Cushion (2012:3), a play-off between television and the 
Internet is the way of the future. Rasmussen (ibid) further adds that the volume of interaction on 
the Internet is so high that it produces heterogeneity. This heterogeneity has difficulties in 
controlling itself communicatively. For the case of Uganda, Habermas‘ public sphere is an 
extremely useful construct. The high levels of engagement on social media allow for comments 
to be evaluated on merit (Javuru, 2013:371). This is concretised by the fact that social media is 
considered democratic (Zuckerberg, 2010; Valenzuela, 2013). It is hoped that social media will 
bring quality democracy to Africa by the high volume of civic matters discussed thereon 
(Gumede, 2016). The middle-class sought to influence civic matters and politics too, through the 
public sphere (Habermas 1989). As earlier discussed, social media has been used in political 
situations in various parts of the world, Uganda notwithstanding (ACME, 2016). The special case 
of the 2016 elections stands out as Uganda‘s first social media election. The researcher is 
nonetheless cognisant of the fact that the Internet and its use are still new in Uganda, similar to 
other parts of the world (Bentivegna, 2002; Kalinaki, 2016).  
To Rasmussen (2007), the online public sphere offers more possibilities for expression but less 
guidance for politics. It also offers a wide range of topics and allows various individuals to select 
what suits their interests. This plurality of voices in the online public sphere resonates with 
Habermas‘ public sphere that allowed the nobility and the intellectuals to meet on equal footing 
(Habermas, 1989:33). Rasmussen (2007:10) nonetheless contends that new forums tend to have 
polarised debates, unequal participation and lack of respect in debates among other issues. This 
raises questions on the value of digital forums as a public sphere. To Grbesa (2003:118), the 
Internet provides a forum for discussion between pressure groups, which may result into real 
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actions. Ramussen (2007) is further concerned about how the numerous segmented online 
conversations integrate into larger sentiments of public opinion. Ramussen concludes that 
although online communication is widely accessible, it draws more on genres for private 
communication. The above arguments by Rasmussen (2007), Grbesa (2003) and other scholars 
on use of social media will guide a subsequent discussion of the research objective ‗to examine 
the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere.‘ 
Habermas (1989:37) points out that the traditional media, such as the 18
th
 century political 
journal Diskurse der Mahlern, often published discussions in the public sphere. This stemmed 
from the fact that the public sphere was aware of the larger public. This research shows a 
manifestation of television linking with the public sphere of social media. As further noted by 
Rasmussen (2007:7), traditional media complements social media. In addition, public spheres 
cannot be confined to a particular space and place (Fuchs, 2014:65). 
The connection to agenda setting 
Whereas the theory of the public sphere is sufficient in explaining the presence of citizens on 
social media as they debate issues of common interest, it falls short of explaining the presence of 
traditional television media in the same space. As argued by Cushion (2012), television news 
attracts a large section of the audience of traditional media as a valued and trusted source of 
information for many activities. The viewership and interactivity has seen television contribute to 
the public sphere by allowing viewers to debate through talk shows or phone-ins (Bignell, 2004). 
This then raises questions as to why television/television news finds it necessary to enter the 
online public sphere, yet it commands a substantial share in traditional media audiences. Could it 
be that television‘s presence in the online public sphere is to gain more popularity as is the case in the 
offline mode? To help find an answer to this puzzle, the agenda setting theory is adopted and will 
be discussed in relation to social media.   
The events that citizens read or watch in the news come from structured processes of media 
houses. As noted by McCombs (2014:1), citizens deal with a second-hand reality structured by 
journalists‘ reports about events and situations. This ability of the news media to first of all 
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identify key issues and secondly to influence the salience of these issues on the public agenda is 
what McCombs and Shaw termed agenda setting. To establish the validity of this agenda-setting 
claim, McCombs and Shaw (1972:177-178) investigated what the key issues of concern for 
voters in the 1968 presidential elections in the USA were. The investigation was limited to voters 
at Chapel Hill. The issues raised by these voters were compared to the issues in the news media 
consumed by the same voters. It was discovered that the five issues of foreign policy, law and 
order, economics, public welfare and civil rights that dominated the media agenda had a 
correspondence to those raised by the Chapel Hill voters (McCombs, 2014:4-6). 
But as observed by Uscinski (2009:797) the public occasionally influences the media's agenda 
too, even if agenda setting experiments were not designed to explore this possibility. Therefore, 
attempts to study the influence of the public agenda on the media using units of time lags, and 
sets of issue areas may be insufficient. The audience driven framework would be evident where 
general concerns such as the environment would make the media alter its agenda (Uscinski, 
2009:798). Weaver and Choi (2017:359) agree with Uscinski (2009) that the bulk of research on 
media agenda setting has prioritised the relationship between news media agendas and public 
agendas yet the reverse is true when the public influences the media agenda. External factors 
such as news sources, other news media, the norms and traditions of journalism, unexpected 
events and media audiences influence the media agenda. Weaver and Choi (2017) further argue 
that with these external factors in place, it is doubtful that the media and journalists are the 
original agenda setters for the public. This argument is cognisant of the fact that the media retains 
the discretion on what issues to amplify. Personal experiences, group perspectives, and real-world 
conditions avail several issue concerns to people, as noted bye bring, Goldenberg and Miller 
(1980:18-19).  
By implication therefore, Erbring et al. argues that the agenda setting effect ought to be analysed 
one issue at a time. Behr and Iyengar (1985:39) agree too that several other issues contribute to 
issue salience amongst the public, such as personal experiences and the prevailing circumstances 
in society at a given point in time. In such instances, agenda setting serves to alert citizens of 
current realities. Agenda setting is further guided by editorial and news norms or commercial 
interests, in which case the media agenda setting would be divergent from the pressing issues in 
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society at a given point in time (Behr and Iyengar, 1985: 40). Consequently, the media create an 
image about reality. This is done either consciously or unconsciously (Fourie, 2018:244). 
Uscinski (2009) concludes that researchers continue to struggle between the ‗agenda-setting‘ 
framework that allows the news agenda to influence the public agenda and the ‗audience-driven‘ 
framework, which allows the audience agenda to influence the news agenda. This study adopts 
the agenda setting theory to make sense of how NTV positioned itself on Facebook and to further 
examine any external factors that could have had a bearing on the station‘s choices of news 
postings. For the special case of elections, Owen (2017:823) observes that reporting on 
campaigns is not exclusive to professional journalists, since bloggers and average citizens cover 
events and provide commentary that is widely available. From this analysis, the study argues (as 
explained in chapter five) that the fear of extinction coupled with a struggle to retain control over 
national political discourse explain Television‘s aggressive presence on Facebook.  
Television and agenda setting 
In explaining why agenda setting occurs, McCombs (2014:24) observes that the limited space 
available in traditional media, coupled with an ever-increasing host of issues necessitates 
journalists to relay only a sample of the available concerns. This is done following a traditional 
set of norms that inform and guide the practice of journalism. McCombs (2014:2) makes 
reference to an observation by Cohen that ―the news media may not be successful in telling 
people what to think but they are stunningly successful in telling their audiences what to think 
about.‖  
The selection criteria on what to include or exclude in a media report is even more intense in 
television given its nature of limited airtime. For television therefore, even a mention on the 
evening news communicates high salience of a topic (McCombs, 2014:2). Topic salience is 
further demonstrated by its recurrence in the media, and it is the same issues that the public will 
tend to prioritise as most important. This way, the news agenda becomes the public agenda. Behr 
and Iyengar (1985:40) assert that the medium of television has significant agenda setting clout, 
contrary to scholarly output demeaning the same. To Hill (1985:341-342), the viewers‘ ability to 
recall what was on the news has direct implications for agenda setting and cannot be ignored. 
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This ability is influenced by several factors including the motivations for viewing in the first 
place, prior knowledge about the topic and the attentiveness with which they view. For television 
news, Hill hypothesises that the traits that influence agenda setting are higher in the presence of 
colour television, uninterrupted planned viewing of the news and a higher perception of 
television as informative as opposed to associating it with relaxation.  
Social media and the demise of agenda setting 
This study is interested in the online scenario of agenda setting. As noted by Fortunato and 
Martin (2016:130), an analysis of the construction of public agendas in contemporary times ought 
to consider individuals‘ and organisations‘ use of social media. This is so especially since ―these 
technological communication options now combine with the distribution of messages through the 
traditional mass media and advertising to influence the agenda- setting process.‖  
With the advent of the Internet and subsequently social media platforms such as Facebook, the 
agenda-setting role has come into question especially since traditional media have joined these 
platforms. As noted by McCombs (2005:544), the vast Internet communication options including 
websites, emails, chat rooms and of course social media, have changed the communication 
behaviours of people and allowed for a multiplicity of agendas to surface. Feezell (2018:482) 
agrees that social media is capable of causing an agenda-setting effect through exposure to, and 
the subsequent sharing of, political news and that this effect is strongest for politically 
uninterested individuals owing to their uncertainty of political affairs. To Fortunato and Martin 
(2016:129-130), the format of today‘s political communication environment is a nexus of content 
from media houses, agendas of different individuals/organisations, new communication 
platforms, audiences seeking information and finally, the laws governing election campaign 
policy. In such a multi-faceted political communication environment, Fortunato and Martin note 
that the media‘s inherent role of informing citizens has now become more challenging. This is 
especially so because technology allows individuals and organisations to use social media to 
directly reach the desired audience in times of elections and other periods. 
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In addition, Fortunato and Martin (2016:130-131) note that during campaigns, social media is 
used for controlling the message content and as a result, it performs an effective agenda setting 
function.  The implication is that analysis of public agenda setting must be cognisant of how 
social media is used. The agenda setting theory is especially important in analysing the 
reciprocity between political reporting and political views of people during elections (Fourie, 
2018:245). For the special case of elections therefore, McCombs (2014:117) observes that those 
involved in the campaign see an immediate purpose to capture the media agenda. Such efforts are 
informed by the fact that success in capturing the media agenda translates into success in 
capturing the public agenda. As a result, a lot of money is spent on political advertising in both 
the traditional mass media and on social media to relay the agenda as desired by campaign teams.  
In addition, campaign teams are at liberty to set the agenda through political advertising on social 
media, with a consequence of influencing the agenda in traditional media. This direct 
communication enables less distortion of the message towards the intended recipients (Fortunato 
and Martin, 2016:142). But to Hayes (2008:134), it is after the media choose to focus on the 
issues or agendas that different candidates or their teams have focused on, that the same can be 
transmitted to voters. In the face of social media however, and with the ability of candidates to 
directly reach audiences, it can be argued that the choice of traditional media to amplify 
candidate messages or not, loses intensity.  
The ability to use social media and other online platforms by different people and organisations 
has seen McCombs (2005:544-545) point towards a possible demise of the agenda setting 
function as traditionally known. This fear of demise is premised on the continued fragmentation 
of audiences, as they pick information from diverse online sources. In this situation, the result is 
presumed to be a diversified public agenda and scattering of public attention. Nonetheless, this 
possible demise will best be in action as and when the proliferation of the Internet reaches its 
equilibrium in different societies. McCombs (2005) acknowledges that with the digital divide in 
different societies, a substantial number of people still receive information through the traditional 
media. In addition, the popular Internet news sites are subsidiaries of traditional media such as 
television and newspapers. Aruguete (2017:36, 42) agrees with McCombs (2005) on the possible 
demise of traditional agenda setting. Aruguete (2017) notes that new media platforms threaten 
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traditional media‘s ability to steer the public agenda, since these platforms allow for unrestricted 
alternative sources of information. Aruguete (2017) sums it up with a call for recognition of 
audiences as active users, empowered and capable of forming their own perceptions not 
necessarily permeated by the press.  These active users can therefore challenge dominant agendas 
in an unprecedented manner. The ability of users of social media to share content is what Roese 
(2018:315) terms as the number one currency in social media, and it is at the core of making 
content go viral. As social media users produce and share content amongst themselves, they are 
able to bypass both the gatekeeping and agenda setting role of traditional media.  
The subsequent section describes the exact details on how this study was designed and executed. 
Details on data collection, requisite ethical considerations and analysis methods are provided to 
enable clarity on the process and practice of method. Describing the methods and assumptions 
informing the study is important to facilitate easy evaluation of the research as well as to enable 
not only comparison and/or synthesis with similar studies on the topic, but also to help other 




Chapter 4 Research methodology 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this study is to examine how the 2016 Ugandan presidential elections discourse, 
as reported on NTV Uganda‘s Facebook page, was engaged by followers online. The study 
departs from Habermas‘ (2006: 416) argument that ―there are two types of actors without whom 
no political public sphere could be put to work: professionals of the media system— especially 
journalists who edit news, reports, and commentaries— and politicians who occupy the centre of 
the political system and are both the co-authors and addressees of public opinions‖.  Accordingly, 
politicians and political parties are generally the most important suppliers of news as they hold a 
strong position about negotiating privileged access to the media (Habermas, 2006).  
‗News‘ is often claimed to be the lifeblood of democracy, and by others as governance by 
dialogue (Fenton, 2010). Broadcasters are understood as ideally placed to provide space for and 
facilitate this dialogue. However, this can only happen if broadcasting services are marked by 
elements of accessibility, plurality and participation, that is, if they are open to the full spectrum 
of diverse views (Lugalambi et al. 2010). The interactive and participative nature of new 
technologies is claimed to impact on the democratic practice so much that web-based operations 
have come to be viewed as essential for newspapers, broadcasters and news agencies (Fenton, 
2010).  
But new media research on politics and news media has been concerned with fulfilling 
democratic ideals and the ICT potential (Davies, 2010). These studies have observed how the 
Internet has made traditional media such as print and broadcasting more publicly responsive, and 
widened public participation and engagement with politicians and journalists (Fenton, 2010). For 
Djick (2012) terms such as democracy, collectivity, and participation implicitly conjure 
Habermas‘ model of speech communities and present these platforms as new carriers of the 
public sphere. This is particularly so as television has increasingly integrated social media 
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in its mass media logic (Dijk and Poell, 2015: 
149). With the same orientation, NTV runs content channels on the social networking site 
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Facebook, where not only stories are made available to a wider audience but also the television 
can engage with these audiences based on the posted news content.  
Spawned by curiosity arising from the foregoing, this study employs netnographic techniques to 
address the following questions:  
1. How did Nation Television use Facebook in engaging followers on the political discourse 
in Uganda during the 2016 presidential elections?  
2. What is the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere? 
3. In what ways do institutions of government and television media interfere with public 
participation on Facebook?  
In order, therefore, to place the methodological choices followed in this study into perspective, 
the chapter begins by examining the paradigmatic and theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
qualitative approach to research. This is followed by an explanation of the research paradigm, 
design, sampling strategy and the approach to data analysis. 
Qualitative research approach 
A quantitative approach rooted in its positivist philosophy may not yield meaningful analysis on 
the nature of the public‘s engagement with NTV news content on Facebook, and provide insight 
into responses to news coverage within a speech community. An adequate explanation for this 
complex phenomenon in the context of Uganda requires an approach rooted in a qualitative 
paradigmatic philosophy. Qualitative methods are ideal for studying the ways people understand 
complex phenomena and difficult-to-understand concepts (Weiss, 1994). In so doing, qualitative 
research transforms the world and makes it visible through interpretive, material practices 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 3). The interpretive researcher therefore makes meaning of 
phenomena in its natural setting, which is a key attribute for qualitative research.  
The qualitative approach is preferred for its ability to allow for a combination of both macro 
social critic and micro organisational analysis and understanding of whether social media, with 
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specific reference to Facebook, can be considered as a new public sphere in Uganda. And if it 
can, an understanding of how Facebook is used in Uganda shall be discussed subsequently. 
Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive (Creswell, 2007). Accordingly, this research 
falls within an interpretivist research philosophy whose underlying assumption is that a 
positioned researcher makes subjective interpretation of subjective experiences. When 
conducting a qualitative inquiry, a researcher is already embracing the assumption that there are 
multiple subjective realities. Thus for Creswell (2007), choosing a research approach is 
effectively making a philosophical assumption and stance towards the nature of knowledge 
(ontology), and how that knowledge can be discovered (epistemology).  
This qualitative approach contrasts the quantitative one which privileges distance and objective 
separateness from independent reality. Due to the minimised distance between the researcher and 
the participants, the procedures of qualitative research thus tend to be inductive and shaped by the 
researchers‘ experience and values and paradigms or worldviews, that is beliefs that guide action 
(Guba, 1990). There are four dominant paradigms that mark the beliefs that qualitative 
researchers bring to their inquiry namely postpositivism, (social) constructivism/interpretivism, 
advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism (Creswell, 2007).  
Research paradigm 
Researchers are always urged to declare their own philosophical assumptions and sensibilities not 
least because ―the procedures for conducting research evolve from a researchers‘ philosophical 
and theoretical stances‖ (Creswell, 2007: 2). There is also a general acceptance that good 
research requires making these assumptions explicit in the writing of a study. Research 
paradigms are an integral part of one‘s research philosophy, which frames the development of 
knowledge and researchers‘ understanding of the nature of that knowledge. A paradigm can be 
defined as ―a way of examining social phenomena from which particular understandings of these 
phenomena can be gained and explanations attempted‖ (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhil, 2009: 
118).  
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As with other qualitative inquiries, this study employed social constructivism, which is often 
combined with interpretivism (Creswell, 2007). Informed by this philosophy, the researcher 
operates from a position of appreciation that knowledge is created, in an ever-ongoing process 
that occasionally calls for revisiting of established constructs.  
As noted by Kaya Yilmaz (2008: 162), the constructivist paradigm privileges the position of an 
observer in describing and making meaning of the world or its events. This notion implies that 
different individuals have the ability to construct knowledge as informed by their experiences. 
Therefore, knowledge cannot exist outside the mind. This is arguably the case with how the 
notion of the public sphere is currently conceived; as an online virtual gathering of political 
actors by some scholars, while others argue for its nonexistence (refer to chapter three). This 
research adds to the dimension of the online public sphere and therefore seeks to create 
knowledge by bringing forth the voices of followers on a Facebook page of traditional media, and 
as indicated above, departing from Habermas (2006). The need to make meaning out of 
phenomenon necessitates the creation of concepts and schemes, whose validity is often put to test 
with new experience. Such validity does not take place in a vacuum but is rather informed by 
shared practices. It also embraces the fact that all knowledge claims happen within a conceptual 
framework. In this framework, the world is consequently described and explained (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000: 197) 
As with Denzin and Lincoln (2000), Yilmaz (2008: 162) notes that under the constructivism 
paradigm, knowledge is constructed by individuals or groups as they consistently make meaning 
of their environment and the world at large. This implies that the knowledge created is internally 
constructed as informed by particular experiences; and not passively received from the world. 
Consequently, such knowledge can be temporary and arguably specific to particular situations. 
For Yiasemina Karagiorgi and Loizos Symeou (2005:18), the entire process of actively 
constructing knowledge is inherently subjective.  It follows therefore that constructivism presents 
in various forms. These include radical, social, physical, evolutionary, post-modern and 
information-processing. For purposes of this study, the social constructivist approach is preferred. 
Social constructivists believe that knowledge is viable in social contexts and they therefore 
advocate for a shared reality. In explaining the social constructivist approach, Yilmaz (2008:163) 
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notes that it considers bodies of knowledge as human constructs. As a consequence, a series of 
events and happenings in the political, economic and social context have had and continue to 
have implications on the shaping of knowledge. The theory of the public sphere as seen in 
chapter three has been constructed and reconstructed over time, starting off with the feudal 
Middle Ages to its current contested form on social media. This thesis continues in this tradition 
of constructing relevance and bringing further meaning to the theory of the public sphere, in the 
context of Uganda.    
Ethical dilemmas for research on Facebook 
Research on social media presents with several ethical dilemmas to researchers, and so was the 
case for this research. One of the dilemmas this researcher was faced with was how to secure 
permission or informed consent from the different people whose Facebook posts were to be 
analysed in the study. The real challenge was due to the fact that the Facebook posts chosen for 
analysis were posted in 2016, and the study was to be concluded four years later in 2020. This 
dilemma of securing informed consent was also in recognition of the additional fact that not all 
Facebook users go by their actual names while engaging on the platform, nor can their submitted 
online addresses be taken to be factual should a researcher attempt to reach out to them. Niina 
Sormanen and Epp Lauk (2016: 63) observe that attaching meaning and getting a proper 
description of what qualifies to be ‗informed consent‘ when dealing with big data on social media 
remains a puzzle. This situation is compounded by the absence of ethical guidelines on how to 
conduct scientific research on social media in different countries. The researcher agrees with 
Sormanen and Epp Lauk (2016) and observes that the absence of ethical guidelines on social 
media in Uganda was a challenge for the period of this study. 
To address the dilemma of securing informed consent, the researcher approached NTV for 
permission. This was because this researcher was interested in Facebook data particularly off the 
page of NTV and not individual pages of Facebook users. Such data can arguably be considered 
public since it was posted on the Facebook page of a television station. As explained by 
Townsend and Wallace (2016: 5-6), researchers are constantly in debate as to whether data and 
information publicly posted on social media is best categorised as public or private data. This 
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concern is often in recognition of the fact that social media users subscribe to the terms and 
conditions of the platform, although it is debatable whether a substantial majority of these users 
fully read the terms or even comprehend the implications of their online engagement. Luckily for 
researchers, some of these terms carry provisions that allow them to access the data for scientific 
research. It is generally difficult for researchers to obtain informed consent from online users. 
Consequently, social media‘s big data is accessed and analysed without informed consent from 
each of the users, most of whom are barely aware that the data is being used. Townsend and 
Wallace (2016) conclude with the emphasis that researchers at least need to obtain informed 
consent when accessing data that is considered to be of a private nature. However, data from 
Facebook users is considered public owing to the fact that users individually determine the 
information they are willing to share publicly (Sormanen and Lauk, 2016). It is with this 
hindsight that the researcher approached NTV for permission and not the different users whose 
posts were to be analysed. Through this avenue, two letters of consent to conduct the study were 
secured from the management of NTV. The letters were to accommodate a change in topic as the 
research progressed. This change was more in relation to a narrowing in the scope of research 
investigation. The letters are attached as appendices A and B. 
Ethical clearance 
The first step at securing ethical clearance was with the Humanities and Social Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Such clearance is given after the 
successful presentation and defending of one‘s research proposal. For the Centre for 
Communication, Media and Society, such presentations happen at weekly colloquia. The 
researcher made her presentation on 25 October 2016. The aforementioned ethics clearance form 
is attached as appendix D. 
Back in Uganda, UNCST (Uganda National Council for Science and Technology) requires that 
all research to be conducted in the country must be approved by this institution. The approval 
process is conducted at two levels. The first level requires that researchers submit their research 
proposals to the relevant REC (Research Ethics Committee) in the country as per the discipline of 
study. Over 25 RECs are accredited to perform this function. This research was subjected to the 
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Makerere University School of Social Sciences REC. The approval letter from this REC was 
given in February 2018 and is herewith attached as Appendix E. The second level of approval is 
given by the UNCST following recommendation from the REC. The approval letter, secured in 
April 2018, is herewith attached as Appendix F.  After the successful completion of all the above 
ethical clearance processes, the researcher proceeded to collect data.  
Methods of data collection 
In this study, a range of methods were employed to bring to empirical scrutiny the ways in which 
followers on the NTV Facebook page engaged news on the political discourse in Uganda during 
the 2016 presidential elections. Ethnographic studies are known to use a combination of research 
methods. These may include focus group discussions and in-depth interviews (Pitout, 2005: 274). 
This study used a combination of netnography and in-depth interviews for data collection. These 
two methods are explained further below, with their respective sampling strategies. But first is an 
explanation of ethnography and by extension, netnography. 
Ethnography 
The study utilised the ethnographic research tradition whose intent is to obtain a holistic picture 
of the topic under investigation, examining the everyday experiences of individuals by observing 
and interviewing them and relevant others (Creswell, 2007; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhil, 2009). 
Ethnography, as observed by Deborah Cameron (2001: 53), belongs to the specialist vocabulary 
of anthropology and relies on participant observation to gather data. Ethnography privileges the 
need for researchers to go to places where the action is taking place and live with the affected 
people for extended periods of time, to allow for first-hand information gathering. This action, 
Cameron (2001) further notes, implies that the researchers are simultaneously inside the culture 
and outside it, trying to understand the way its members think and act, while at the same time 
maintaining a professional distance to enable gathering of facts. This ability to be at close 
proximity with the subject of research makes researchers appreciate the reality as seen by the 
participants. To ethnographers, it is such lived reality that allows for the revelation of social 
reality. This lived reality can either be overt, where the researcher makes themselves and their 
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purpose known, or covert where the researchers‘ presence is concealed from the participants 
(Pitout, 2005: 266-270). An inquirer can only get to understand subjective realities by getting as 
close as possible to the phenomena being studied, mainly through conducting studies in the field 
where participants live and work. Ethnography carries the advantage of allowing researchers to 
get first- hand information immediately, and to modify the research questions as they go along. It 
is arguably one of the outstanding ways to study people‘s attitudes and behaviours (Pitout, 2005: 
277- 278). This study picks from these benefits of ethnographic research to investigate social 
media in an online version of ethnography. 
Previous empirical studies on social media as a potential public sphere have used conversation 
analysis of social media posts or other quantitative measures to examine avoidant or participatory 
behaviours (for a list of these, see Kruse et al. 2017). But the increasing interest in using online 
communities such as social networking sites, blogs, and news groups among others to study 
phenomena has not only projected the Internet as an important site for research, but also birthed 
new approaches to such research. One such approach employed for the present study is variously 
known as online-ethnography, virtual-ethnography or simply netnography. Ethnography is an 
increasingly popular methodology to study computer-mediated social interactions (Bowler, 2010; 
Kozinets, 2010). The study employed online ethnography that utilised both observation and in-
depth interviews to enable detailed appreciation of the political discourse on Facebook as a social 
media platform. All forms of ethnography, as Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath (2017: 319) 
note, are a form of case study (though the reverse is not true). As with any case study, an 
ethnographic case study investigates a unit or units, observed either at a single point in time or 
over time (Gerring, 2007: 19). This enables researchers to gain a rich and deep understanding of 
the context of the research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 146).  
Netnography 
As already alluded to in the previous section, this study picks from the benefits of ethnography to 
investigate an online phenomenon. The technique is known as netnography. While others think of 
netnography as a recent phenomenon, it is only recent to the extent of its name, coined by Robert 
Kozinets in 1995 when he studied online fan discussions (Kozinets, 1997). Defining ethnography, 
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Creswell (2007:68) categorises it as ―a qualitative design in which the researcher describes and 
interprets‖ the meaning of the behaviour, the language and the interaction among members of a 
culture sharing group.‖ Netnography can thus be understood as an online version of ethnography 
that attaches itself to the same qualitative research approach and various research techniques as 
with ethnographic studies (Bowler, 2010). In other words, netnography applies qualitative 
research techniques in an online context. Its foci are the reflections and data on human 
communication—textual or multimedia such as video, audio, pictures - provided by online 
communities. There is general consensus that ethnography uses observation as the main data 
gathering technique although interviews can also be used (Creswell 2007, Lewis, Thornhill and 
Saunders, 2009). For this study, data was collected through both observation of the online 
conversations as well as interviewing officials from NTV Uganda. The study period was two 
months, January - February 2016. This enabled an analysis of the Facebook conversations posted 
prior, during, and shortly after the 2016 presidential elections which took place on 18 and 19 of 
February 2016.  
As an online version of ethnography, netnography is commended for being less intrusive because 
it uses mainly observational data. Netnographic observation is thus more naturalistic than other 
qualitative techniques such as interviews and focus groups. Crucially, netnography enables 
researchers to examine information, including sensitive details, voluntarily revealed by 
participants, unasked and naturally (Langer and Beckman, 2005). As such, there is no room for 
participants to alter their reactions or answers such as what happens during interviews or focus 
group discussions. Netnography allows researchers to download data from an online community 
even long after the social interaction. As such, interactive media pages present ‗big data‘ 
(Skalski, Neuendorf and Cajigas, 2017: 202- 204). For example, the observation reported in this 
study takes place in 2020, four years after the conversations happened on Facebook. What this 
means is not only that the observation was on what Wilson and colleagues (2012) call ‗traces‘ of 
observable behaviour, but also that the researcher observed but did not participate in the 
interactions as ethnographers do. Accordingly, some key elements of ethnographic research such 
as self-reflexivity in which the involvement of the researcher in the society and culture of those 
being studied is particularly close (Davies, 2008:46), was not required. The selection of 
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ethnographic/netnographic cases is generally challenging. Below is a discussion and justification 
for the selection of NTV Facebook page for this ethnographic case study.  
NTV Uganda Facebook page as a site for research 
While online social interaction on social media sites could be conducted on any platform such as 
Twitter, YouTube or any other microblogging site for any person or institution, selecting 
Facebook was a deliberate choice made from a consideration of practical, historical and 
contextual issues. Facebook, not only promises favourable conditions for the public sphere 
(Fuchs, 2012) but is also consistently ranked among the most popular speech communities in 
Uganda. This renders it as a rich site for analysis of how social power is discursively enacted and 
resisted in the Ugandan society. And as earlier explained, this study argues that Facebook was the 
run-to platform after the government of Uganda clamped down the famous radio talk shows, 
thereby narrowing the space for political debate. An analysis of how citizens of Uganda have 
continued to engage with political discourse would in this case be justified in testing the validity 
of the argument that Facebook is Uganda‘s new public sphere.  
Facebook is unarguably the most popular social networking platform not only in Uganda but 
across the world, with over a billion users spread in different countries. Facebook has not only 
increasingly become a popular site for articulation of national discourse, but also attracted 
recognition by researchers as a novel tool for research. As of April 2020, Facebook had 
approximately 2.5 billion active monthly users (socialbakers.com). Meanwhile, NTV Uganda‘s 
Facebook page has one of the largest followings in Uganda, standing at 1,357,273 followers 
million as per the April 2020 statistics from socialbakers.com. Billions of pieces of multi-media 
content and social interactions are shared every day. As Robert Wilson et al. (2012: 201) put it, 
this sphere of social behaviour ―provides social scientists with an unprecedented opportunity to 
observe behaviour in a naturalistic setting, test hypotheses in a novel domain, and recruit 
participants efficiently from many countries and demographic groups‖. The present inquiry 
derives from the fact that while other scholars have surmised Facebook as a form of ―online 
public sphere‖ (Robertson et al. 2010: 13), the question of whether it could be considered as a 
true public sphere remains unanswered.  
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Wilson and colleagues outline several reasons why Facebook, as an ongoing database of social 
activity, can be an important site for research. Crucially, activities performed on Facebook can 
leave traces and therefore provide a useful source of observable data, which allows opportunities 
for studying human behaviour.  They also note that as with other online social networks, 
Facebook is interesting to social scientists because it reflects social processes— how people 
relate to one another and share information— and has also become a core feature of daily life. 
Other scholars have also viewed Facebook as an ethnographic tool for social science research. 
Discussing the creative utility of Facebook as an ethnographic tool in which to study 
transnational migration, David Piacenti et al. (2014) argue that it allows the researchers to 
transcend the four structural dualities that constrain transnational ethnographic research namely 
geographic, travel funding, travel time, as well as the logistical constraints of entrée into new 
ethnographic contexts. These and many other functionalities are useful to social scientists who 
hope, as with this study, to understand how citizens react to political discourse driven by a 
television station that operates at a national level. Contextually, this research sought to examine 
the nature of engagement on social media in a specific physical setting as well as political, social 
and economic context (Stake, 2000: 438). NTV Uganda is a privately-owned television station 
with massive Facebook following currently at second position (1,357,273 followers) in the 
country after Nile Broadcasting Services (NBS) Television at 1,519,134 followers. Below is a 
breakdown of the distribution of Facebook followers across some of the top television stations in 
the country: 
Table 2: Facebook followers across some of the top television stations in Uganda 
Television station Facebook followers 
NBS 1,519,134 
NTV 1,357,273 
Bukedde Television (1) 700,273 
Spark Television 552,015 
BBS Telefayina 330,339 
Urban Television 241,879 
Source: socialbakers.com 
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Whereas NBS has a bigger Facebook following in comparison to NTV, the study prioritised NTV 
because of its known criticism of the state and its machinery.  NTV Uganda is one of the 
television stations seen to be critical of government, and has had a rough relationship with the 
state. The state onslaught on dissent saw the station being shut down in 2007. The explanation 
given for the shutdown of NTV then was that the national broadcaster, Uganda Broadcasting 
Corporation, did not have the capacity to accommodate NTV‘s transmission equipment. In 
addition, the station has in the past been banned from covering or reporting about the head of 
state. In 2014 for instance, the station was banned from covering President Museveni after 
showing videos of him asleep during a session in parliament. The government‘s Media Centre 
explained that the head of state was not sleeping but was mediating, one of his known habits
8
. 
This history places NTV Uganda as an interesting case for analysis particularly in the context of 
news dissemination through social media platforms. In addition, and as will be explained in 
subsequent chapters, the amount of planning that went into populating NTV‘s Facebook page 
with content ahead of the 2016 elections further presents it as a worthy site for research in 
understanding how this content was engaged with by netizens in the context of a public sphere.   
The period of study was the peak political highlight in Uganda—the 2016 presidential elections.  
The NTV Uganda Facebook page and the activities of its followers are analysed in context of the 
political setting of this period when most people are engaged in the national political discourse. 
The television station is thus considered as an ‗instrumental case study‘ (Stake, 2000: 437), in 
which the unit of investigation is of secondary importance. NTV Uganda‘s Facebook page in this 
situation provides insight to an external interest. This contrasts with what Stake (2000) describes 
as an intrinsic case study in which the researcher‘s interest lies in analysing a given case, as 
opposed to using that case for analysis of generic phenomenon.  
 
 





This study used interviews to gather further data in addition to netnography explained above. An 
interview is a ‗practical qualitative method of discovering how people think and feel about their 
communication practices‖ (Keyton, 2006: 269). In-depth interviews are necessary especially in 
incidences where the subject of investigation cannot be directly observed. This may include 
events that are in the past. Interviews are also important in getting people to talk about the 
meanings they attach to what happens around them, and by interviewing these people a 
researcher gets the opportunity to appreciate their perspective (Patton, 2002: 341). This is in line 
with this research, which seeks to analyse how Facebook followers engage with the political 
discourse on the platform. In addition to the need for theoretical and contextual knowledge about 
the subject, Keyton (2006: 269) advises that researchers ought to possess communication skills in 
order to enable them conduct successful interviews. This researcher‘s background as a journalist 
in Uganda was useful in enabling the productive interview sessions.  In discussing the advantages 
of in-depth interviews, Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick (2003: 127) explain that interviews 
allow for lengthy observations of non-verbal responses, and are also suitable for small sample 
sizes. This makes it possible to structure the interview questions in a manner that allows each 
respondent to answer different questions. This eventually leads to detailed information especially 
since each response can generate another question on its own. In-depth-interviews are more 
reliable in providing accurate responses to sensitive topics, mainly because of the rapport created 
between the interviewer and interviewee.  
For this research, journalists, editors and online content managers were interviewed for their 
views on use of the Facebook platform. Wimmer and Dominick (2003) nonetheless caution that 
in-depth interviews expose the interviewer to bias while questioning and this bias can be detected 
by the interviewee. Although the impact of such bias on the interviewee cannot be ascertained, it 
is something worth guarding against. Irrespective of the shortcomings of in-depth interviews, 
they were ideal for supplementing this netnographic study. To guard against the limitations of in-




Making a sample selection for the Facebook data 
As discussed above, Facebook presents with big data and this necessitates the selection of a 
sample for analysis. Such a sample would be a subset representative enough of the entire 
population (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003: 84). Sampling is done to accommodate constraints in 
time and resource for studying the entire populations. Wimmer and Dominick (2003) discuss two 
broad categories of sampling, probability and non-probability. Probability samples avail an equal 
chance for each unit to get selected and are based on mathematical guidelines unlike the non-
probability samples. As noted by Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis (2003: 78), a non-probability 
sample necessitates that a researcher deliberately selects particular units to reflect certain desired 
features of the sampled population. Sampling is in this case therefore not meant to derive a 
statistically representative unit. The selection considers certain defined traits and characteristics 
of the population to derive a suitable unit for deeper analysis. The ability to select preferred units 
implies that non-probability samples can be conveniently applied to small scale in-depth studies 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). This research adopts non- probability sampling to allow for purposive 
sampling of the Facebook data. 
Selecting a sample size 
The process of sampling further implies that a representative sample size needs to be derived. 
Such a size would be the exact number of people to be analysed and make meaningful 
conclusions as informed by the study objectives (Keyton, 2006: 130). This process therefore calls 
for a thorough analysis of a small qualitative sample/unit, since additional units will hardly avail 
new evidence (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 83). In addition, prevalence is not of concern for 
qualitative research, implying the absence of a requirement for the sample to be of sufficient 
scale to determine statistically significant discriminatory variables. These scholars further argue 
that since qualitative studies yield information that is rich in detail, sample sizes need to be kept 
small to be manageable. They advise that qualitative samples for a single study involving 
individual interviews only often lie under 50, lest they become difficult to manage in relation to 
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quality of data collection and analysis. These scholars nonetheless caution that samples should 
not be too small, lest they miss key constituencies of the population. Small-scale samples work in 
qualitative research if good purposive or theoretical sampling has taken place (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003: 85). For this research, the researcher chose a sample size of 30 responses off Facebook as 
expounded below.  
Because users of interactive media play an active role in adapting, altering, and producing 
content over a long period of time, the analysis and retrieval of this content can be difficult, partly 
because of its fluidity. In the initial stages of trying to observe the data on the NTV Facebook 
page, the researcher faced challenges. The researcher first tried to manually go through the NTV 
Facebook page and search for content dating to 2016. This involved scrolling down an endless 
number of pages to get to the desired year, months and days for analysis. At several points, the 
NTV Facebook page became unresponsive, necessitating the need for refreshing. Once refreshed 
the page would go back to the starting point. This is how cumbersome the observation process in 
this community (Facebook page) was.  
And softer weeks of unsuccessful attempts at retrieving the data set, it made sense to collect it all 
off the Facebook page at once. In order to achieve this, the researcher approached NTV and 
requested for retrieval, which was done through social news desk dashboard. The availed data set 
included stories posted by NTV on the Facebook page everyday throughout the months of 
January and February 2016. In addition, all the comments from followers of the page to each of 
these stories were availed. The data set was so enormous that it was impossible to analyse all the 
interactions. A strategy was therefore devised to limit the scope. It should be noted that the 
requested and availed data was specifically textual data off the Facebook page, and not posted 
videos, images, etc, to enable for a discourse analysis as explained below. 
Handling the ‘big data’ 
The heterogeneous, fast changing space of online participants on the NTV Facebook page means 
it is difficult and unnecessary to achieve a sample in the statistical sense, since the study is 
qualitative. Also the enormity of followers on the NTV Uganda Facebook page made it 
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impossible to observe all the interactions, which were updated by the minute. For example, a total 
of 1,300 comments were posted for the first week of January 2016 alone. If this were to be taken 
as a baseline, a total of 5, 200 comments would have to be analysed for this month. The situation 
is even more intense for the month of February where the week of elections alone availed a total 
of 4, 765 comments for analysis. At best, one could hope to analyse a satisfactory range of posts, 
sufficient to give a sense of this space‘s complexity. As Skalski et. al. (2017:204) note, scientists 
are usually concerned that volumes of big data used for research pose the risk of ignoring 
principles of representative sampling, especially when a study opts for a deductive approach. 
Nonetheless, a discursive analysis of interactive media was still possible since content analysis 
methodologies can be applicable to the most challenging of messages. 
Given the enormity of the data, Facebook posts included in the study were purposely selected. 
According to Jane Ritchie, Jane Lewis and Gillian Elam (2003:78) purposive selection implies 
that the chosen sample has desirable characteristics to allow for detailed research exploration. 
This sampling strategy recognises researcher judgment in identifying the relevant units or in this 
case the Facebook comments that would best answer the research objectives. This selection of 
components that best answer research objectives is an advantage of purposive sampling 
(Saunders et. al 2009: 237). In analysing the NTV Facebook page, specific content emanating 
from news stories that were related to the 2016 elections only, was desired. 
To get to a more realistic sample size within the above two months, the following was done: for 
the month of January, only stories that attracted the highest responses in the first week were 
considered. The week span from Friday 1 to Thursday 7 January 2016. The researcher intended to 
retrieve the comments posted on Facebook as far back as possible for the selected period of 
study. The intention was to examine the nature of engagement prior to the election dates. This 
made the first week of January more viable. To further arrive at a manageable sample, only 
stories that attracted at least 100 comments were considered for analysis. If a particular day had 
several stories with comments at100 and above, the story selected for analysis would be the one 
that has the highest number of comments. The researcher was convinced that the issues under 
discussion in such a story would present more diversity in opinion and therefore a good basis for 
examining the nature of engagement on Facebook, as opposed to stories with fewer comments. 
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The considered comments had to be written mainly in English and in non-abusive language. If a 
comment had one or two words in any of the local languages, these were considered negligible 
and the comment was considered for analysis. Negligible was in this case interpreted by the 
researcher to mean that these few words did not affect the overall message of engagement 
conveyed by the person posting.  
Table 3 shows the inclusion criteria: the day and week of publication (shaded) and the number of 
comments represented by the number in the shaded box. In bold are the final stories selected for 
analysis. In brown ink are the election days. 
 
 
Table 3: Selection of stories for January and February 2016 
Jan MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT SUN 













   
Week3        
Week4        
Feb MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT SUN 
Week1        








































Week4        
 
NTV Uganda published a total of 14 stories related to the presidential elections (not 
parliamentary) in the first week of January 2016. Following the above criteria for selecting stories 
that attracted at least 100 comments for inclusion, a total of six stories out of the 14 published in 
this period were identified as particularly relevant. To further narrow the sample, the top four 
stories with the highest number of comments were selected. For a day of the week with more than 
one posted story, a story that attracted the highest number of comments on this day was 
considered for inclusion. Furthermore, for each of the four selected stories, only the first 30 
comments were considered. The choice of 30 comments was informed by the argument that 
qualitative samples often lie under 50, if they are to be managed (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The 
researcher therefore, analysed a total of 120 comments for the month of January, taking 30 views 
only for each of the four selected stories. 
A criterion similar to the one used in January was used for selection of stories for inclusion 
during the month of February. The only variation was that the researcher considered the election 
week of this month, which span from Sunday 14 to Saturday 20 February 2016. Since this 
research is about the 2016 elections, the researcher considered this week as the most appropriate 
in examining the nature of engagement on Facebook then. In addition, this week enabled the 
researcher to examine the comments during the election days, 18 and 19 February (indicated with 
the orange highlight in Table 3 above), and shortly after the elections.  
For this week, a total of 39 stories were published on the NTV Facebook platform. The selection 
of stories that attracted at least 100 comments availed a total of 16 stories for consideration. Out 
of these, the top four stories with the highest number of comments were selected, as was done for 
January. In instances where several stories were published in a single day, the story which 
attracted the highest number of comments was considered over the others. For each of the four 
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stories that eventually made the selection list, only the first 30 comments were considered. This 
resulted in a total of 120 comments to be analysed for the month of February too. The researcher 
was convinced that the total of 240 comments from both January and February 2016 were 
sufficient to answer the research questions.  
Sampling of interview respondents 
To augment the Facebook posts, in-depth interviews were conducted with three categories of 
professional staff at NTV namely, the news editors, online content managers and journalists. The 
researcher used a census sampling method to include an entire population of respondents (Bhanu 
Sigdel, 2011)
9
. This decision was informed by the fact that newsrooms are usually comprised of a 
considerably small number of staff. Those selected were directly involved in the 2016 
presidential elections in Uganda.  A total of 11 respondents were interviewed. Of these, four were 
editors of the news bulletins at NTV, three were online content managers and four were 
journalists.  
The editors are in charge of the daily newsroom meetings where strategies on how news is 
sourced are laid. The journalists‘ responsibility is to report and file stories. It is these stories 
about the 2016 elections that were posted on the NTV Facebook page to generate engagement 
with the online audience. The journalists participated in the Facebook engagements by way of 
giving clarification on posted stories when required. The three online content managers available 
for the interviews oversaw the posting of these stories. In addition, the online content managers 
had the mandate of controlling the conversation on the aforementioned Facebook page.  
The interview process 
The interviews were conducted in April 2018 at the NTV main offices at Kampala Serena Hotel 
and at its annex offices at Airtel House, Kampala. Most of the respondents were interviewed in 
their respective offices. Only one respondent preferred to be interviewed in their car, which was 




parked at the Serena offices. This respondent was more comfortable speaking away from the 
confines of the office. The researcher held interviews in the venues that respondents 
recommended, to allow for comfort and consequent gathering of enough details (Creswell 
2003:18). In addition, it was important that the respondents recommend venues most convenient 
to them and not to the researcher (Yin, 2011:32). 
In conducting the interviews, the researcher worked with four research assistants. Interview 
guides that were structured to ask questions pertinent to the research objectives, were used in the 
interview process. These interview guides were customised to suit the different categories of 
respondents. The researcher ensured that ample rapport was created with the respondents to allow 
for lengthy exploration of the research questions (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003: 127). 
Respondents gave detailed explanations from which the researcher noted follow-up questions 
related to the research objectives for purposes of clarity. As noted by Saunders et al. (2009), 
interviews help in the collection of valid and reliable data, deemed relevant to research questions 
and objectives. Each of the interviews lasted between 1-2 hours, and was conversational to allow 
respondents recollect and narrate the events (Yin, 2011:32). An audio recording of all interviews 
was made and transcribed verbatim. The transcription was done by the research assistants and 
double- checked by the researcher to ensure consistence of the transcriptions and audio 
recordings. These transcriptions were used in the final analysis of data to sieve out relevant 
responses.  
One of the setbacks encountered during the interview process was a faulty recorder at the start of 
the very first interview. Luckily, both the researcher and research assistant were recording with 
their phones for backup. After this incident, the team was more cautious in checking that the 
recorders were in good condition. In addition, phones continued to be used to record for backup. 
The other challenge was last-minute cancellation of interviews by respondents. Two journalists 
who had assented to the interviews later cancelled and informed the researcher that they had to go 
cover some breaking news. One of them managed to reschedule the interview and came through 
on the agreed date. Unfortunately, the other journalist postponed indefinitely.  
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Data analysis 
This study combined two fields of analysis: discourse analysis and thematic analysis to enable 
deeper subjective interpretation of Facebook use in Uganda. Discourse analysis was important in 
locating the study in the broader debates of how power is enacted through discourse or the 
control thereof in Uganda. Thematic analysis was applied in the study to organise and categorise 
the engagement on Facebook. Each of these applications is explained in detail below.  
Discourse analysis 
The subjective interpretation of research findings necessitates this study to first and foremost 
anchor in an understanding of discourse as it relates to power. By presenting Facebook as a 
platform for contending factions and each of them demonstrating the power they have at their 
disposal, the study finds connections to theorists of discourse and power. The seminal works of 
Michel Foucault in understanding how power is enacted through discourse, becomes a reference 
point. Foucault remains an authority on the question of power in relation to discourse (McHoul 
and Wendy Grace, 1993: 22).He argues for a productive application of power as opposed to a 
repressive one. Such an application would imply that power does not carry the force of 
prohibition. Foucault raises the question on whether power would be obeyed if it were always 
saying ‗no‘. For Foucault, power is accepted not because it always says no, but because it induces 
pleasure and produces discourse (Gordon, 1980: 119). His understanding of the concept of power 
therefore seeks to analyse the mechanics of power.  
This approach deviates from earlier postulations of power for example by Marxists who 
understood it as domination by class. The focus on mechanics of power allows for an analysis of 
the struggles of ordinary people whose lives are impacted by the web of power, and consequently 
a deeper understanding of the nature of power (Gordon, 1980:116). This approach to power by 
Foucault explains why he prioritises the question on how power installs itself and the effects that 
come with such exertion, as opposed to the question of who wields the power. He consequently 
locates power outside conscious decisions by individuals, who are viewed as conduits for the 
demonstration of power (McHoul and Grace, 1993:21). However, Miller (1990:116) castigates 
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Foucault for using discourse to deny the possibility of an independent existing reality of the 
world. Miller argues that discourse is not and cannot be sufficient in explaining the world. He 
nonetheless acknowledges that discourse has had major contributions such as a worldly 
projection of institutions of social life. Seumas Miller (1990:115) notes too that the term 
discourse is inherently resident in non-literary disciplines such as historiography and cultural 
studies, most of which are associated with Michel Foucault.  
Foucault therefore conceives discourse theory as a foundation of grammar and as a theory of 
knowledge. In discussing the segments of this theory, he explains that the theory has invented 
itself in an empirical knowledge of grammatical forms but also as an analytic of finitude 
(Foucault, 1989: 366- 367).The application of the term discourse in this thesis and as espoused by 
Foucault relates to discourse as a body of knowledge and not as it is applied in the linguistic 
sense or by linguistic studies. As noted by Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace (1993:26), Foucault 
applies this term both as a scholarly discipline and also in reference to disciplinary institutions of 
social control such as prisons. McHoul and Wendy Grace (1993) note further that discourse as 
interpreted by Foucault therefore finds relations between disciplines (defined as bodies of 
knowledge) and disciplinary practices (forms of social control).  
Discourse analysis is not only a method for doing social research but is also a body of empirical 
knowledge about how talk and text are organised. Several theories about the nature and 
application of communications, and of construction and reproduction of social reality find 
anchorage in discourse analysis (Cameron, 2001:13). As explained by Louise Phillips and 
Marianne Jorgensen (2002:1), ―discourse analysis is not just one approach. It is a series of 
interdisciplinary approaches that can be used to explore many different social domains in many 
different types of studies. And there is no clear consensus on what discourses are and how to 
analyse them.‖ The above description effectively presents discourse analysis as a perspective on 
social life that incorporates both methodological and conceptual elements. Discourse analysis is 
therefore in essence an alternative to both conventional methodologies and to the perspectives in 
which those methodologies are embedded. These multiple perspectives have the consequence of 
availing multiple definitions of discourse and what counts as discourse. The most common ones 
are discourse as spoken language, written language, and language use beyond the level of the 
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sentence (Wood and Kroger, 2000:3). The study relied on the properties of discourse analysis for 
further understanding of Facebook as a speech community in Uganda and therefore the dominant 
discourse on the platform.  
In this study, discourse analysis is applied as a method of inquiry. The popularity of discourse 
analysis as a qualitative research method in the social sciences is increasing (Cameron, 2001:13). 
Its application in this study is within the ethnography and consequently the netnographic 
presentation and analysis of Facebook. The discussion in the next paragraphs therefore draws on 
discourse analysis‘ multi-disciplinarily nature to discuss discourse and power as it relates to the 
media, politics and society in general. This breakdown is important for the study, which as 
discussed earlier, presents Facebook as a battleground for hegemony by the state, the media and 
ordinary people or Facebook followers/netizens.   
Political discourse analysis and the media 
As with previous interpretive studies on Facebook which explored how the platform is used and 
how it affects social relationships (Bosch, 2017:67), this study used a critical discursive thematic 
analysis to examine how followers (netizens) engaged with the 2016 Ugandan presidential 
elections discourse on the NTV Uganda‘s Facebook page. This effectively locates the study in 
political discourse analysis, a field of discourse analysis, which focuses on discourse in political 
forums.  
Halperin and Heath (2017: 336) define discourse analysis as an interpretive approach to 
understanding political phenomena that draws on diverse theories and methodologies. The 
analysis is based on a premise that language is a form of social practice whose close analysis can 
reveal issues of power asymmetries, inequality, exploitation, particularly how the social power 
(abuse) is enacted, reproduced and resisted (Fairclough, 1995; Dijk, 2001). As Dijk (2001) 
argues, hypotheses linking discourse to power can be investigated through an analysis of how the 
powerful groups control public discourse, and how actions of the less powerful groups conform 
or resist that control. As observed by Cameron (2001:123) discourse analysis is applicable to both 
talk and text especially those that are institutional in nature. Cameron adds that the media are 
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important sites for the operation of discourse from the perspective of social theorists. The media 
is therefore a platform through which power exchanges or excesses are demonstrated. The 
manner in which NTV Uganda engages with its followers on its Facebook page is examined from 
this perspective. Studies on discourse partly concern themselves with the way that power is 
enacted, expressed, described, concealed or legitimated by text and talk in the social context 
(Dijk, 2008: 27).   
Thematic analysis 
Here the six steps of interpretive thematic analysis suggested by Virginia Braun and Victoria 
Clarke (2006) were employed. As noted by Braun and Clarke, (2006: 78-79), thematic analysis 
allows for the identification, analysis and eventual reporting of patterns within the data. This 
therefore implies that it can be used for interpreting different sections of a given research topic. 
Braun and Clarke further note that the flexibility and absence of clear guidelines on how to go 
about thematic analysis means that researchers can apply it differently to suit a given study. In 
addition, thematic analysis suits the interpretivist research paradigm. As an interpretivist method, 
Braun and Clarke (2006:81) note that thematic analysis examines the ways in which events and 
experiences result from several discourses operating in society. For this study, discursive 
thematic analysis is used to examine the nature of engagement between and among the public as 
they respond to NTV news content on the television‘s Facebook page.  
Thematic analysis involves identifying patterns of themes relevant to the phenomenon under 
study, wherein a theme reflects important aspects of the data in relation to the research question 
(Fereday, 2006:82). Basing on the epistemological position of interpretivism, the researcher 
inductively identified themes to help in answering the research questions. Inductive thematic 
analysis relates to the ability to identify themes linked to the data and not trying to fit themes into 
predetermined coding frames (Braun and Clarke, 2006:83). The inductive identification of 
themes was an iterative process guided by the six steps of thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke, 
which include: 1) Familiarising yourself with the data, 2) Generating initial codes, 3) Searching 
for themes, 4) Reviewing themes, 5) Defining and naming themes and 6) Producing the report. 
This data analysis process is explained below. 
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To begin with, the researcher read the data transcribed by the research assistants to ensure 
consistence with the audio recording from the interview participants. In instances where a 
mismatch was detected, it was corrected. In addition, the researcher needed to familiarise herself 
with the issues pointed out by the interviewees (news editors, journalists and on-line content 
managers) in relation to the research objectives. Furthermore, the researcher scanned through the 
folders of Facebook content for the months of January and February 2016 as availed by NTV. 
This enabled the identification of stories that were particularly about the 2016 presidential 
elections. The researcher noted that several stories were covered during this period and as the 
polling day drew near, more than one story was posted on some of these days.  
In addition, thousands of comments were registered in reaction to these stories. These comments 
were diverse in nature, depicting voices in favour of and those against the issues raised in the 
posted news content. This implied that a sampling criterion had to be developed for the stories 
and the ensuing comments from the Facebook followers. The exact manner in which this was 
done has already been explained above under ‗handling the big data‘. The identified stories and 
comments were then tabulated using Microsoft Word to enable the identification of patterns and 
eventual themes. The tabulation captured the following aspects: the story title and date of posting 
by NTV, comments from followers, nature of engagement and finally the response from NTV. 




Thematic analysis of engagement on the NTV Facebook Page 2016 
Table 4: A section of the thematic analysis of NTV Facebook data 
Story title and 
date of posting 
by NTV 
Comments from followers Nature of engagement:  
-Acceptance of news 
content 
-Resistance of news 
content 














Mbabazi should know that more is 
still to come and he will soon 
understand the true meaning of 
being a member of opposition in 
Uganda. When he was enjoying the 
comfort of his long time friend, Dr. 
Besigye was sprayed, his finger 
was shot. 
 
Resistance of news 
content 
 
 Great view 
 
Followers in agreement  
 And Mbabazi never condemned the 
above, he even geared the 
formulation of POMA to suffocate 
opposition rallies; now it's his turn 
to feel it. 
 
Followers in agreement  
 great Followers in agreement  
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wise Ugandans still exist 
 
 We are keeping a very close eye on 
Yoweri Museveni. God help him if 
any harm comes to Amama 
Mbabazi. For so long M7 has got 
away with murder, this time it will 
be him poking the behind of a 
leopard as he infamously said 
Followers in agreement  
 I'm waiting for Kayihura to arrest 
him or put 20 million as bounty to 
whoever gets him very sad for our 
country 
 
Followers in agreement  
 How about Amama Mbabazi, you 
mean for him he hasn't gone away 
with some murders or you think the 
public forgot about the boyfriend to 
the daughter who was killed in cold 
blood at the kololo residence. 
Again why should you try to cut 
the hand that fed you, after stealing 
from the government now you want 
to protect whatever you 
stole..SHAME 
 
Followers in disagreement  
 
In the above table, each comment from a follower of the page was categorised in relation to 
whether the person commenting was responding to the news content, or to an earlier post from 
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another follower on the page. In addition, the categorisation captured instances where followers 
were reaching out to NTV or if they chose to post their own comments, not related to the news 
story. This is what Braun and Clarke (2006) describe as collating codes into potential themes. 
The researcher developed the themes based on this coding. Further thematisation involved the 
review and regrouping of sub-themes into bigger and more meaningful themes. The above coding 
shows that followers of the page both resisted and accepted the news content. In addition, these 
followers were both in agreement and disagreement with each other on their respective posts, and 
also reached out to NTV with inquiries or compliments.  
The above table was then printed and the sections on ‗comment from followers,‘ and ‗nature of 
engagement‘ cut out with a pair of scissors for ease of analysis. Further cuttings were made to 
enable grouping and subsequent counting of responses that belonged together. This manual 
process was double checked by the application of Nvivo software as described in the next 
section. The researcher found it necessary to apply both methods first of all to preserve the 
traditional coding of data, but secondly to double check the validity of data distribution using 
Nvivo as computer-assisted data analysis software. In addition, the thematic analysis process as 
shown in Table 4 above enabled the researcher to sieve through the data. 
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Figure 2: An image of a section of the paper cuttings 
 
Application of Nvivo software 
The discursive analytical process required the Facebook data to be organised and presented in 
meaningful patterns. From the Facebook page, each of the chosen comments for analysis were 
first organised under the relevant theme in a word document (see Appendix C). These themes 
emerged from the thematic analysis process described above and shown in Table 4. The word 
document, which showed the overall nature of engagement on Facebook was then imported into 
Nvivo 12 software to enable visualisation. This software can be used in the analysis of text, 
images, audio and video in research methods such as discourse analysis, thematic analysis, 
network analysis and ethnography (Caldwell, 2018: 197). Figure 4.2 below is a screenshot of the 




Figure 3: Coding of Facebook data in Nvivo 
 
For this netnographic research, employing aspects of discourse analysis and thematic analysis for 
data interpretation, the Nvivo software was useful in the management and visualisation of big 
data from the NTV Facebook page. This data was then discursively analysed from an interpretive 
thematic analytical approach. 
The data that was imported into Nvivo was then coded under appropriate nodes (codes). Nodes 
allow for the central collection of similar elements, from which researchers then identify patterns 
and ideas (Caldwell, 2018: 22). For this study, these nodes were labelled as per the identified 
research themes developed in the thematic analysis of data. The nodes were consequently named 
as: resistance of news content, acceptance of news content, followers in agreement, and followers 
in disagreement.  
Figure 4 below is the resultant Nvivo Explore diagram, showing the diversity of engagement on 
the Facebook page.  
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This chapter has described the preferred research paradigm of constructivism and its particular 
application to this qualitative study. Basing on this paradigm, the researcher applied a discursive 
discourse thematic interpretation to the data in a bid to understand Facebook as a public sphere in 
Uganda. In addition, the chapter has described the methods of data collection and final sampling 
criteria for the choice of stories and comments analysed off the NTV Facebook page. This 
selection was considered highly important by the researcher because of the challenges that big 
volumes of data on social media in general and specifically Facebook, present to researchers. 
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Whereas NTV availed thousands of comments to the researcher off its Facebook page, only a 
representative sample could be used to answer the research questions. The next chapter is an 
interpretive analysis of the generated themes. The analysis is backed by both the theoretical 
















Chapter 5 Traditional media joins the Facebook public sphere 
 
Introduction 
Whereas Africa is yet to fully benefit from well-developed continent-specific literature and 
theorising on the concept of the public sphere (Caldwell, 2017: 121), this study attempts to 
address this gap in the context of Uganda. The subsequent chapters present empirical evidence on 
how Facebook can potentially be regarded as the new public sphere, allowing for free expression 
of views on political issues (Castells, 2008; Lim 2009) in Uganda. The platform is presented as a 
confluence of contending factions, namely, the media, the ordinary citizens and the state. Each of 
these factions is seen to join the Facebook communicative space to advance their interests and 
exercise power over the other two factions and consequently exercise power over discourse.  
This thesis argued in chapter three that traditional media redeemed the public sphere. This, as 
already noted, is contrary to Habermas‘ (1989: 160) argument that the media was a major 
contributor to the collapse of the public sphere. For Habermas, the initially discursive public 
sphere is said to have become one of consumption of media content. Moreover, the rise of public 
relations and advertising are said to have made the public sphere both trivial and commercially 
motivated (Cushion, 2012). This situation was further compounded by the fact that less educated 
people were now drawn into the public sphere, with a consequence of negatively affecting the 
sphere‘s socio-discursive coherence. It is within these confines of Habermas‘ notion and those of 
subsequent writers that this study seeks an understanding of what the situation is for the case of 
Facebook as a public sphere. All the above actors, such as the media, ordinary citizens/followers, 
the state, corporate entities customised to advertising and public relations, and a capitalist society 
are present in the Facebook public sphere. This therefore presents the question on whether the 
presence of these actors will lead to the demise of the Facebook public sphere, as was the case 
with that alleged and decried by Habermas. The section that follows is particularly dedicated to 
understanding if the presence of traditional media is destined to cause the re-incarnation of the 
collapse of the public sphere as surmised by Habermas, redeem the public sphere through 
Facebook, or present another dimension not initially envisaged, in the context of Uganda. 
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The increasing use of social media in Uganda therefore probed this study to investigate the exact 
manner in which citizens, the media and the state engage on Facebook as one of the commonly 
used platforms in the country. The research sought to address the following objectives: 
1. To determine how Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on the 
political discourse during Uganda‘s 2016 elections. 
2. To examine the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere. 
3. To establish the ways in which television media and institutions of government interfere 
with public participation on Facebook. 
This is the first of three chapters that present and discursively analyse the data from both the 
Facebook posts and the in-depth interviews conducted. The data is presented from a three-legged 
perspective situated in discourse analysis, thematic analysis and the study‘s theoretical 
underpinnings, namely the public sphere and agenda setting. 
This chapter addresses the findings of the first research question which sought ‗To determine 
how Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on the political discourse during 
Uganda‘s 2016 elections. The findings of the second and third research questions are presented in 
chapter six and seven respectively. Data from both the in-depth interviews and content off the 
Facebook page in relation to the entire research objective is presented and analysed from a 
subjective interpretation.  
On the objective ‗To determine how Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on 
the political discourse during Uganda‘s 2016 elections‘, the study found out a number of things. 
One of them is that NTV use Facebook as a news space. Secondly, the station used Facebook as a 
platform to set the agenda for national discourse. But as per the 2016 elections, the response to 
content from NTV was so overwhelming that the station had difficulty in coping with the volume 
of engagement. The study further discovered that there is a conflict of agendas and discourse 
among NTV and other entities present online. Finally, the study found out that NTV uses 
Facebook as an advertising platform. Each of these findings is explained in detail below. 
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How Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on the political 
discourse in Uganda 
Figure 5: A photo of NTV’s coverage of the electoral process 
 
An image off NTV‟s Facebook page shows News Anchor, Josephine Karungi (Left) interviewing 
the Electoral Commission Spokesperson, Jotham Taremwa (Right) on 18 February 2016 
Facebook as a news space 
The research findings indicate that NTV used Facebook as a platform for dissemination of news 
updates on the 2016 elections. Aware of the power of social media and with the intention of using 
Facebook to extend the television station‘s influence/power, NTV made deliberate efforts to 
maintain a consistent flow of information online. This, as explained by one of the news editors 
and in relation to the 2016 elections, involved ensuring that all NTV staff had smart phones ahead 
of the elections.  
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A smart phone loan scheme was introduced. The idea was that every single person in the 
company would be able to update their social media platforms, and re-share as much 
content from NTV across their own platform. We would use it as a tool for newsgathering 
and news sharing. So, it meant that if you are at a scene of an accident, you did not have 
to come to the station to tell us to send a person. You could actually take a video and post 
it on our WhatsApp groups from wherever you are so that we are able to share that 
information as quick as possible. And probably one of the reasons as to why NTV had 
both the fastest growing Facebook page and the most followers on Twitter is because we 
kind of had a presence almost everywhere. As long as we had people in the field, we had 
content coming in. So, the loan scheme was very critical in allowing us share as much 
content from the field in both stills and videos from the different rallies where these 
candidates were during the campaigns (Respondent B, 17 April 2018).  
This scheme allowed employees to pay up for the phones to the tune of UGX 3 million over a 12-
month period. Specifically, for the journalists, the television station required of them to file 
stories on the go while in the field. These stories were then uploaded on Facebook as first 
priority, before the same were shared on air. The media have traditionally been known as a 
powerful institution for the propagation of national discourse through news and other current 
affairs.  
Dijk (2008: 40) lists the media as one of the institutions of power in society alongside 
government, parliament, state agencies, the judiciary, the military, political parties, the church 
and institutions of education. The media arguably wields its power in several ways. One of these 
is by positioning itself as an authority on news and information. But the onset of social media and 
in this case Facebook threatens this media power since other users are at liberty to produce and 
share information. Faced with this reality, NTV was quick to ensure that it is present on 
Facebook purposely to use the platform for news sharing and gathering and out do those other 
players available in this space to avail information. As seen in the quote above from an NTV 
respondent, ―…one of the reasons as to why NTV had both the fastest growing Facebook page 
and the most followers on Twitter is because we kind of had a presence almost everywhere.” 
This way, the followers on the NTV Facebook page continued to look forward to the updates, 
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regardless of the fact that Facebook is populated by news feeds from other users. Consequently, 
NTV successfully used Facebook as a news space in the period of Uganda‘s 2016 elections and 
arguably maintained its power base as an authority on information in society.  
The second manner in which media institutions wield power is by amplifying the talk of other 
power institutions and persons. By doing this, the power of these institutions is legitimated. But 
whilst the media avails such a platform to these talkers, its role goes beyond that of a mediating 
power. The media in this respect also further entrenches its own power (Dijk, 2008:55). 
Journalists portray the power of others in as much as they portray that of their respective media 
organisations. To ensure that this amplification of other voices was consistently maintained, NTV 
employed additional staff to attend to the social media platforms including running live updates.  
Previously we had just about two people running the social media platforms. I will take 
you back to about early 2015. So, we had one social media executive and one online 
editor. In the run up to elections, we had to recruit another social media executive but 
also put together the digital department. Previously, the web master was independent of 
the social media platforms. Twitter and Facebook were run by our social media executive 
and the online editor. The web master was just running the website and directly reporting 
to me, independent of the others. We merged the web master, social media executives and 
online editor. We had recruited one extra executive. So we had four people responsible 
for running the entire digital platforms. It meant that we had to work around the shift 
plans, in which we needed to have had two people work per six hours and be available to 
run regular updates on all the platforms. These included the website, Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, and in some cases Instagram. But it was also the first time to do all the six 
platforms. Previously we were more interested in the website, YouTube, Facebook and 
Twitter, however we were also streaming live all the content that was being shared on air. 
We were sharing content on the go(Respondent B, 17 April 2018).  
Whereas NTV amplified the voices of various players during the 2016 elections, the necessity for 
NTV to share information live confirms what Rodny-Gumede (2017: 281) asserts, that journalists 
are now compelled to produce news at a rate similar to how fast information circulates on social 
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media. This further implies that journalists and media personnel are now required to possess 
multimedia expertise and integrate social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
(Mitchelstein and Boczkowski, 2009; Dwyer, 2010; Cushion, 2012). The demand by NTV that its 
journalists post stories on the instant for consequent uploading on Facebook and other social 
media is further confirmation of the convergence of traditional and social media platforms. 
Facebook as a platform for agenda setting 
It is ironic that whereas NTV populated its Facebook page with content and even hired more staff 
to manage the page, it did not respond to any of the queries raised by followers. In coding the 
activity off the NTV Facebook page, this study established that the television station did not 
respond to its followers. As earlier seen in Table 4 (a section of which is replicated below and 
renamed Table 5), the column on ‗Response from NTV‘ remained blank. The researcher 
purposefully included this column to record any response or engagement between NTV and its 
followers, but from the data set that was analysed, the column had no entries.  
Table 5: Selection of stories for January and February 2016 
Story title and 
date posted by 
NTV 
Comments from followers Nature of engagement:  
- Acceptance of news content 
- Resistance of news content 
- Followers in agreement 












Mbabazi should know that more 
is still to come and he will soon 
understand the true meaning of 
being a member of opposition in 
Uganda. When he was enjoying 
the comfort of his longtime 
friend, Dr. Besigye was sprayed, 
his finger was shot. 
Resistance of news content  
 Great view Followers in agreement  
 And Mbabazi never condemned 
the above, he even geared the 
formulation of POMA to 
suffocate opposition rallies; now 
Followers in agreement  
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it's his turn to feel it. 
 
 
Whereas social media is inherently interactive and avails opportunities for media houses to 
engage with audiences in a back and forth conversation, this engagement is absent on the NTV 
Facebook page. The non-responsiveness on the side of NTV is interpreted to imply that the 
television has carried its traditional agenda-setting role into the public sphere of Facebook, to 
disseminate information in a one-way process. In this process, the television station continues to 
populate the Facebook page with content, followers of the page engage with this content and 
sometimes ask questions, yet no response from NTV is registered. 
Traditional media is known to disseminate information and set the agenda for public discourse. In 
this role, traditional media positions itself as an authority on events and public happenings. This 
role carries with it an embedded implication of non-reciprocity between traditional media and its 
audiences in as far as switching such positions is concerned. This means that the audience is 
mainly considered as recipients of that which is constructed or interpreted by the media, and not 
vice versa. The responses from the in-depth interviews with three news editors at NTV, as 
presented below, confirm that the focus on agenda setting took precedent:  
We were more pushing than engaging. We had more content going out than engaging the 
different audiences on those platforms. We were happy to say that we are the first to give 
you this information but we were not as good at going back there and saying what is this 
person asking about, what are they saying, how many messages do we have in our inbox, 
have we cleared them (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
What usually happens is, if let‟s say we post something in error, then we would 
immediately correct, delete and then offer correction. However, usually the weakness 
comes in if somebody asks for clarification. So sometimes we would leave it up to the 
person running the social media desk to make judgment or to say you guys there is this 
thing I think we need to respond to. If they do raise that issue then we say okay, you 
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respond in this way. But again it depends on whether they are able to raise that issue. If 
they do not raise it for whatever reasons, then it goes unanswered. I believe they are 
overwhelmed because you can have somebody work from 8 or 9am up to 6 pm. And that 
person is running everything. Remember apart from the news, they are also supposed to 
be posting content for the other production programmes that we have and commenting. 
People are also raising issues that side, so they are also supposed to be responding to 
that. It‟s just that the task is enormous for such a lean team (Respondent A, 14 April 
2018). 
In the past, this station has ever been closed by government. On many occasions, the head 
of state has cautioned NTV to watch out. So sometimes you want to play it safe. Now that 
does not stop you from fulfilling the responsibility of generating debate on social media 
pages and leaving it at that. Let people debate and [you] take a back seat, but remember 
the content of debate came from us. So basically, you look at something that can create 
some kind of talk-ability (Respondent C, 13 April 2018). 
From the above submissions, television is arguably seen not only to set the agenda but also to 
attempt to exercise power over national discourse by availing topics for discussion and not 
engaging followers over these topics. The television station is yet to fully accommodate the 
possibility of sharing this assumed power over availing both the topics for discussion and 
engaging citizens online over the same. The station seems to be comfortable generating content, 
pushing it out and only coming in to rectify errors, but not to engage the netizens. As noted by 
Aruguete (2017:36, 42), new media platforms threaten traditional media‘s ability to steer the 
public agenda. This is so because these platforms allow for unrestricted alternative sources of 
information.  
The above testimonies by the editors confirm that television has joined the online public sphere 
of Facebook to use it as a space to set the agenda for national discourse and further entrench its 
power as an authority on discourse. Consequently, television is not coming into this space as an 
equal participant. This is contrary to the arguments that Facebook is a public sphere, and 
therefore congregants are expected to join this space on equal footing. Instead, television comes 
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in as a ‗superior‘ to dictate the discursive agenda. As argued by McCombs (2014: 2) in the 
agenda setting theory, news media are successful in telling their audiences not what to think, but 
what to think about. By implication, television uses Facebook to exert its dominance and extend 
its mass media logic. This is what Dijk (2001) implies in postulations about how powerful groups 
control public discourse. NTV, taking on the position of a ‗powerful‘ media entity, is therefore 
seen to attempt to control public discourse by influencing the discursive agenda. However, as will 
be seen in the next chapter, the netizens resist this control in various ways.  
Overwhelming response and the inability to cope 
Although the television station employed additional staff to handle the social media platforms, it 
can be argued that NTV underestimated the volume of responses that come from social media. 
The respondents in charge of managing these platforms explained that the staffing levels were 
still insufficient. This insufficiency meant that timely response to many of the concerns raised by 
followers of the page could not be effected. In the interviews, two online content managers 
confirmed that indeed the volume of activity was beyond measure, but that they sometimes 
answered queries sent through the inbox and not on the public page:   
The audiences we have online keep sending messages and asking questions. We follow the 
comments, the challenge is that at times they are way too many comments. You put up a 
post and suddenly you have about 500 comments and you have just a window of say 10 
minutes just to engage with that particular audience. I think 10 staff would be sufficient to 
cover the platforms (Respondent E, 19 April 2018). 
We discussed it and thought for purposes of making this whole thing as interactive and as 
participatory as possible, we would let it go unmoderated and hope that people stick to 
the issues and thankfully for the most part, they did. And having somebody to read 
through everything would require a full-time job which we did not have man power for at 
that time (Respondent F, 24 April 2018). 
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To the researcher, this insufficiency is further evidence that less priority was given to ample 
staffing, since agenda setting was preferred. The recruitment of additional staff to handle the 
online platforms only served in ensuring that these platforms were constantly populated with 
news updates. Shortage of competent staff during elections is one of the known dilemmas for the 
media, especially since audiences expect the media to be ubiquitous (Frère, 2010: 4). At the 
height of the 2016 elections, NTV was faced with this dilemma which was compounded by the 
fact that ample preparation for the vibrancy and engagement on social media was not prioritised. 
Consequently, some of the already insufficient staff to handle social media were often asked to 
multi-task by going out to the field to source news content for the platforms. As explained by one 
of them below, the sourced content was for populating social media platforms: 
Occasionally, I would go out of the office and especially for the small Kampala events 
like press conferences to cover the stories myself and still be able to update in real time. 
For example, they would send me out if there was like a protest usually near our area, 
near Serena or the parliament. I covered a few of those, and press conferences from 
Amama Mbabazi‟s home. Sometimes it was because again resources. If everyone is 
upcountry and you only have a few people, but also I think because the editors would 
recognise certain people‟s traits or like you know how some people may not be able to 
tweet. Even if they have a Smartphone for some reason, it is taking them a bit longer to 
adapt. So they are like, let us send someone who can tweet. I was not required to file 
because it was specifically for social media. Just for social media purposes(Respondent 
G, 20 April 2018). 
It is understandable that NTV was anxious to keep increasing the numbers of its Facebook 
followers during the 2016 elections, partly by keeping the platform populated. As observed by 
Freedman (2010: 35), audiences of news organisations are on a decline in the face of increasing 
competition from new types of suppliers, consequently pointing to the near collapse of the 
existing news environment. This nearing collapse owes to the fact that audiences are deserting 
them for the immediacy and interactivity of the Internet. These new types of suppliers that 
Freedman speaks of are on the Internet and in substantial numbers. This implies that for a 
television station to effectively compete for the attention of the divided online audience, its 
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platforms ought to be constantly updated. Fortunato and Martin (2016: 130) agree with Freedman 
and note that the media‘s inherent role of informing citizens has now become more challenging. 
This is especially so because technology allows individuals and organisations to use social media 
to directly reach the desired audience in times of elections and other periods. In addition, 
Fortunato and Martin (2016) assert that the agenda setting process is now influenced by a 
combination of the new technological communication options, distribution of messages through 
traditional mass media and advertising. 
A conflict of agendas and discourse 
But as television attempts to set the agenda, it is met with competing agendas of other players 
who are online to hold discussions on Facebook as a public sphere. These players present their 
own perspective of things, resulting into a conflict of agendas amongst the television, Facebook 
followers and state actors as per this study. These diverse agendas are what McCombs (2005: 
544) refers to as ‗a multiplicity of agendas.‘ In essence, this is a conflict of discourse, with each 
of the ‗powers‘ present online, fronting what they feel should be the dominant discourse.  
A case in point is the story posted on 18 February 2016 in which state actors explain the social 
media shut down on the day  of the elections. The story reads, ―ED UCC, Godfrey Mutabazi says 
Mobile Money and social media were shut down because there was information that people were 
using these to bribe voters.‘ In reaction to this story, one of the followers introduces a different 
aspect of the elections and posts, ―There are no ballots in opposition strongholds, be fair as we 
transition from H.E M7 to our DR.BESIGYE.‖ This post is picked up by other followers 
concerned about the absence of ballots:  
The government has failed to disperse voting material in time at the polling stations but 
can manage to cut off and sensor the media because it can!!! If this isn't an outright abuse 
of power and violation of people's freedoms I don't know what it is then. People who are 
still voting need to notice this and vote to change the situation in our country. This abuse 
of power should stop. #votethedictatorout. 
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The interpretation of such posts of user preferences is that even in the face of media‘s attempts at 
online agenda setting, people still use Facebook as a public sphere where they are at liberty to 
bring other topics for discussion. This demonstrates that they have agency in deciding topics and 
the direction of discourse, further emphasizing the argument that Facebook is a public sphere for 
free expression of views, not as dictated by the media‘s agenda. 
In describing this situation of competing agendas, which are further understood in this study as 
competing struggles for hegemony over discourse, Fairclough (1998: 147) critiques the media for 
not being the obvious place for the demonstration and determination of professional political 
discourse. This is because the media itself is involved in what Fairclough describes as a ―power 
struggle to achieve hegemony.‖ This struggle, Fairclough argues further, is reflected both 
internally and externally. The external reflection relates to the articulation of different systems 
and orders of discourse. The internal one, which is of concern to this study, manifests in the 
overall order of discourse of the political system which is also often a struggle between political 
parties and political tendencies. The media‘s involvement in this political discourse mixes the 
elements of the orders of the political system with journalistic discourse. It is this mixing of the 
aforementioned elements that Fairclough (1998: 148- 49) critiques the media for, because it has 
implications on how well the media represents the hybridity of the general political scape. 
Meanwhile, the Facebook followers, oblivious of the media‘s internal power struggles carry on 
with using the platform as a public sphere.  These followers arguably treat the media as an equal 
partner in the public sphere. They are at liberty to introduce their own issue preferences for 
discussion, irrespective of the fact that all this is happening on the Facebook page of a media 
house. In a discussion on how people determine what issues are more relevant, Joanne Miller 
(2007: 692- 693), observes that even when the media makes some issues more accessible than 
others, this does not mean that people will take these issues to be of relevance. Miller argues that 
people choose relevance of issues as guided by a number of factors, such as the negative 
emotions of fear and anxiety that a particular news story may arouse. That if a story arouses any 
of these emotions, people tend to pay more attention to it and engage more with its contents. This 
is the case as seen in the scenario above, in which Facebook followers have instead chosen to ask 
about a different story from what is presented in the media. The story of choice is related to 
 134 
missing voting material at the peak of elections. This story, has arguably aroused the anxiety that 
Miller (2007) talks about, and is therefore deemed more relevant by the Facebook followers. 
Users of Facebook table for discussion the issues they feel are more pertinent at a given time. 
They use social media as a way of engaging in the electoral process (Makinen and Kuira 2008: 
329), on issues they deem more pertinent. This therefore presents Facebook as a liberated space 
where various issues are presented by followers and conclusively discussed.  
The irony is that whereas NTV posted stories as a show of authority and power over the online 
political discourse, this authority is seen to be neutralised when followers on Facebook discuss 
both the story contents and other issues of preference. It is on this premise that this study argues 
that the agenda-setting role of traditional television is in conflict with the discursive nature of the 
Facebook public sphere. Facebook arguably has the power to disrupt the unilateral agenda-setting 
role of traditional media. And in essence, Facebook also has the power to disrupt the struggles for 
hegemony by taking it from the agents or organisations that have traditionally been known to 
hold such power, and redistributing it amongst all players online. 
It can therefore be concluded that ordinary citizens who converge in the Facebook public sphere, 
are safeguarding its discursive nature by exercising control over both the media agenda setting 
role and the assumed power of the media over national discourse. Whereas Fortunato and Martin 
(2016: 129- 130), consider Facebook as a nexus of content from media houses, agendas of 
different individuals and organisations, new communication platforms, audiences seeking 
information and the laws governing election campaign policy, this thesis argues that it is more 
than just a nexus. It is a struggle for control over this communicative space, by the different 
actors who converge online.  
Facebook as an advertising platform 
Followers on social media are known to engage with posts that are informative, entertaining and 
those that contain remuneration (Gaber, 2014: 57). A Facebook page of a media house would in 
this case fall under an informative social media platform and therefore a constant source of 
engagement. This study found out that beneath NTV‘s strategy to instantly share news content on 
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Facebook was an embedded intention to draw numbers to be ‗sold‘ to potential advertisers. 
Advertisers are attracted to accurately targeted audiences online. This is especially so since 
traditional news organisations no longer have the privileged position of delivering the world to 
their audiences (Freedman, 2010: 35). The editors interviewed at NTV confirm that the need to 
attract advertisers was one of the intentions in populating content on Facebook, and that it was a 
worthwhile effort.  
Whenever we are marketing the stations to advertisers, we tell them these are the number 
of people that you can get on Facebook, especially when we are selling live broadcasts. 
We tell them look, this is the talk-ability you are able to generate from all this 
(Respondent A, 14 April 2018). 
Whereas the need to attract advertisers is true for traditional media‘s Facebook engagements, it is 
also true that netizens expect adverts to reach them in this sphere. Whereas traditional mass 
media are known for allowing brand managers to use the platforms in reaching out to prospective 
customers(Killian and McManus, 2015: 540), the onset of social media reverses this role. Instead, 
consumers expect the brand to interact with them in a medium where they control the 
conversation. In addition, Roberts (2010) notes that consumers online enjoy the advantage of 
interaction amongst themselves and with the business. Facebook presents with various 
features/applications such as newsfeeds, photos and videos which allow for creativity in 
advertising. Therefore, advertising on social media now forms part of the different strategies 
employed by companies in their integrated marketing communication efforts (Gaber, 2014: 53). 
Furthermore, the growing numbers on Facebook imply that one can reach the desired consumers 
without any financial risk (Roberts 2010: 25- 26). The lessened financial risk is indeed true for 
NTV, where, as noted by one of the editors, the station stands more to gain from Facebook: 
There are a lot of advantages around the number of followers you have on social media. 
The digital platform is now a revenue cash cow for NTV. We now have contracts with 
different companies that share content for us to post on our social media platforms. The 
reason they are coming to us is because of the numbers. We reach more people than they 
would reach on their platforms. We are looking at about 4% of our revenue coming from 
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our digital platforms. It is still very small, but it is the fastest growing. If there is any 
platform making money for us without necessarily spending, it is the digital one. 
Secondly, it is a marketing tool for NTV when we are pushing content such as TV promos 
and personality graphics. If we are sharing content about things that will be soon coming 
on air, events that we are partnering on, it becomes another marketing tool (Respondent 
B, 17 April 2018). 
Gaber (2014) discusses two forms of advertising on Facebook. In one of these forms, advertisers 
pay for their adverts to appear on home pages of Facebook users/companies. The other type of 
advertising involves companies setting up pages and getting followers to like the page. Such 
followers will then be able to see any posts, including adverts, on the page. This study concerns 
itself with the latter form, as followers of the NTV Facebook page get exposed to the adverts 
thereon while engaging with the posted news content. One of the advantages of advertising on 
Facebook is the ability to customise an advert and successfully target a specific audience by 
gender, location, demography or any other considerations (Gaber, 2014). To Roberts (2010:26), 
the fact that networking and communication are already happening on Facebook presents this 
platform as an effective marketing tool. Aware of the potential of Facebook as an advertising 
platform, NTV has strategically positioned to reap from the growing numbers of followers. It can 
therefore be concluded that NTV‘s online agenda setting explained above, is complementary to 
the intention to grow the number of online followers. This makes it necessary for the television 
station to keep its Facebook platform constantly updated. Faced with the fact that television 
audiences are on a decline and with them the advertising revenues, expansion into online 
platforms is in this case seen as a way to redeem both the advertising revenues and dwindling 
audiences (Dwyer, 2010: 3).  
Conclusion 
This section has shown that the Facebook platform is used by television as an extension of the 
newsroom. On the platform, traditional media carries its known roles of agenda setting and 
dissemination of information to a waiting mass audience, who have been known to possess little 
access to facts/events. Whereas the interactive nature of Facebook changes this notion to give 
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netizens substantial power over discourse, feedback from traditional media is absent. The absence 
of engagement on the side of NTV is understood as a demonstration of power to dictate discourse 
by presenting topics and not engaging. NTV maintains a skeletal staff in charge of populating the 
platform, but not to engage and answer the numerous inquiries from netizens. By implication, 
mass media carries its assumed superiority over national discourse, which is in conflict with the 
collegiality of Facebook. The result of such an attempt is a conflict of hegemony over topics for 
discussion, as the media‘s agenda conflicts with that of Facebook followers. Topics for debate are 
brought by Facebook followers from their own experiences of events in their surroundings. The 
ensuing Facebook discussions are similar to Habermas‘ public sphere of the feudal ages, when 
citizens met in coffee houses and discussed both what was published in the newspapers and what 
was happening in society. This is therefore further confirmation that Facebook is indeed a public 
sphere (Castells, 2008; Lim, 2009) that traditional media has attempted to transform into a one-
way platform for setting the agenda on political discourse.  
In addition, this section has shown that Facebook is used as a platform to grow audiences to be 
sold to advertisers. In this space, there is seldom any response from television towards concerns 
from followers but rather the continuous pushing of news content. This content then becomes part 
of the topics for debate online, as more and more followers join the page. Advertisers are 





Chapter 6 Citizens on Facebook: Uganda’s public sphere 
 
Introduction 
This study set out to examine the political discourse on Facebook as a public sphere in Uganda, 
basing on a platform managed by one of the privately owned television stations in the country. 
On Facebook, ordinary citizens or netizens are availed with the opportunity to voice their 
thoughts and ideas. As such, the citizens find voice and dare challenge government positions on 
various current affairs issues. They use the power of discourse to exert themselves and resist 
attempts by both the media and the state to control this discourse. This juxtaposes with traditional 
media‘s involvement on Facebook, which seems to be driven more by a fear of extinction 
(Rodny-Gumede, 2017) than by a desire to be a conduit for information exchange to enable 
meaningful political participation (McNair, 2006:136).  
A discursive analytic approach to understanding political discourse will be applied. It will be 
concerned with how power is enacted, articulated and resisted and what structures are put in 
place by those in power to dictate what should or should not be said. It would be repetitive and 
unnecessarily wordy to present in this chapter and the subsequent one the entire list of eight 
stories and 240 comments identified for analysis in this study. Consequently, only a selected few 
that best represent the respective arguments will be discussed. A full list of the stories and 
comments is available as Appendix C. The Facebook posts chosen for analysis are presented in 
their unedited form to preserve originality. However, the names of the respective people who 
posted these comments on Facebook have been omitted for confidentiality.  
The previous chapter has demonstrated how the television station used Facebook, largely to 
extend its mass media logic. This chapter presents the findings based on the second research 
objective which seeks ‗To examine the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere.‘ 
The engagement by citizens or followers is presented in two categories. One of these categories 
shows how the followers directly engage with the posted content. The manner in which these 
netizens engage with the media content is presented to show how, by extension, they engage or 
reach out to NTV. It is this category that helped establish the absence of responses from NTV. 
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The engagement with media content was in some incidents a request for clarification from NTV, 
or simply an appreciation note. Similarly, through this category, the followers reach out to 
institutions of the state (in reaction to what the state has said through the media). As earlier seen, 
it is partly through the media that the power of other institutions in society is amplified. This 
section argues that the followers engage with the media content rationally. This rationality is 
demonstrated when these followers either resist or accept what is presented. The resistance or 
acceptance is understood to be a demonstration of what Dijk (2001) calls actions of the less 
powerful, against control of public discourse by the powerful groups. 
The second category relates to how followers engage with one another in reaction to posted news 
content. These followers are presented to be ‗in dialogue‘ with one another as they seek to make 
meaning of both the media content and the intervention of the state. In this dialogue, the study 
shows that these followers are both in agreement and disagreement with one another as they 
discuss or debate the media content. Below is a tabulated format of these findings, followed by 
their detailed explanation and presentation of relevant evidence: 
Table 6: Reflection of engagement on the NTV Facebook page during Uganda’s 2016 
Presidential Elections 
Nature of engagement on the NTV 
Facebook page 
Dimensions of engagement Number of 
comments 
Rational debate of media content  Resistance of news content 110 
Acceptance of news content  04 
Facebook followers in dialogue  Followers in disagreement 32 
Followers in agreement 94 
Total 240 
 
In brief, the nature of engagement on Facebook is one of i) rational debate of media content and 
ii) followers in dialogue. The table above is a breakdown of how these dimensions of engagement 
are spread across the data analysed. Whereas the table presents a counting of these posts under 
the ‗number of comments,‘ this counting is used only to give an indication of the spread of these 
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dimensions across the data. The subsequent discussion follows a qualitative interpretation and 
analysis. Uganda‘s Facebook followers as depicted on the NTV page have proven to be quite 
outspoken as per this study, whose number of comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of 
news content,‘ outweigh all the other dimensions. These dimensions are expounded on below.  
Rational debate of media content 
The ability to hold rational debate is one of the tenets of the public sphere. It is at the core of any 
public sphere‘s formation as a space for well-reasoned arguments. In Habermas‘ public sphere, 
the nobles and middle class are said to have met on equal footing in the coffee house debates, to 
advance arguments of good reason (Habermas, 1989; Holub, 1991). Such debates became a basis 
for change of controversial and widely contested government policies. As such, the quality and 
rationality of debate in the public sphere was respected by those who convened in it. Traditional 
media reported the discussions that unfolded in the public sphere, and so did the content of such 
media become a basis to spark off discussions in this sphere. 
In the current scenario of traditional media joining the public sphere of Facebook, a continuation 
of this role is seen. Content from traditional media is seen to feed the online public sphere and 
becomes a basis for rational debate. This rational debate is demonstrated through both the 
reasoned resistance and acceptance of news content as explained below. 
Resistance of news content 
This is the most prevalent dimension of engagement, standing at 110 comments of the 240 
studied as reflected in Table 6 above. This dimension of engagement manifests when followers of 
the page contest the facts reported in a given story. Specifically, this dimension presents through 
followers‘: contestation of media framing of issues, demand for better governance and rejection 
of interference in the public sphere and sharing experiences of better practice from elsewhere. 
Each of these categories is explained further below. 
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Contestation of media framing of issues 
The first category under the dimension of resistance is demonstrated through contestation of 
media framing of issues. A story posted on 3 January 2016 will serve as an example to explain 
this category. The story reads, ‗Police deploy to block Besigye‘s school visits. Besigye tricked 
police who were trailing him and sneaked to a dam where animals share water with locals.‘  
This is the narrative presented by the television station on Facebook, to explain that one of the 
presidential candidates- Besigye managed to sneak to a dam even though he was under the 
watchful eye of police. But in response to this narrative, one of the followers challenges the 
choice of language by NTV in describing the action of the presidential candidate as ‗sneaking‘. 
The follower posts, ―Ntv also, don‟t say Dr. BESIGYE sneaked, the Dr. went majestically to the 
pond in the name of a dam.‖ The contrast in the use of the word ‗majestically‘ over the word 
‗sneaked‘ is a demonstration of the power that citizens have in challenging media narratives 
online. Majestically arguably denotes an act done in confidence and honour, as opposed to 
‗sneaking,‘ which comes off as a dubious and timid act. In addition, the Facebook platform has in 
this case allowed the person posting to give his/her account of events. 
As observed by Allan (1998: 105), television news accounts often present certain preferred 
definitions of reality and expect audiences to perceive these as natural. Such definitions, as 
extended by the media, have profound implications for the cultural reproduction of power 
relations across society. News workers have been known to cause a strong correlation between 
the inflection of a news topic in a specific account and the audience members‘ reading of this 
topic (Allan 1998: 117). Media determines what is newsworthy and what aspects of an 
occurrence to make salient, especially in the production of news and other current affairs 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The media is often guided by certain values such as objectivity, 
truthfulness and the need for balance in news reporting. The media‘s role of availing information 
has often meant that citizens have over time debated issues as per the dimensions, confines or 
perspectives presented by the media.  
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But the online public sphere changes this notion by extending the power to present issues of 
national discourse from the sole custody of the media to a shared responsibility by ordinary 
people as well. This power has meant that netizens can expand the confines of debate in the 
online speech community, introduce new topics for discussion and resist or challenge the content 
presented by traditional media. It can be argued therefore that in this sphere, ordinary citizens or 
followers of Facebook take charge of the conversation even when traditional media attempts to 
present or frame issues as guided by standards designed to promote news content. Some of these 
standards are specific to certain in-house rules of different media houses. A known advantage of 
social media is its ability to allow users to co-produce content (Zuckerberg, 2010). In this case, 
the direct responses in availing additional information on given news content are a demonstration 
of the binary production of information. In the Facebook public sphere, followers co-produce 
news content by resisting that which is carefully or journalistically put forth by traditional media.  
Demand for better governance 
On the Facebook platform, netizens use the NTV page to air out their grievances to the state. This 
way, NTV is seen to play the role of availing voice to the voiceless, in as much measure as it 
amplifies the power of powerful institutions in society (Dijk 2008).On the NTV platform, 
netizens reach out to the state demanding for better governance. For example, and still in relation 
to the above story, some followers take the opportunity to remind government of its obligations, 
which have been neglected over time. Four followers post that:  
Why can't sevo [Museveni]also visit these schools.... Of course he would be ashamed of 
himself, tax payers drinking water with animals mbu steady progress. 
It's really unfair to the people of Nankasongola to share that dirty water with animals. 
Billions of shillings have been lost through corruption which could help them get clean 
water. 
If they have done a lot in 30 years of their rule as NRM, why don‟t they shame Dr. Kiiza 
for always telling lies to Ugandans? Why deploying heavy Police force? It means they 
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have done nothing in 30 years and indeed they have rotten health centres and schools. 
Shame on Museveni. 
But proper politics is about issues including provision of services for the electorate. The 
more reason the contestants are free to visit these facilities like schools, hospitals, 
rehabilitation centers etc to view how satisfactorily they have been managed in order to 
design a work plan in case any of them win. It‟s good politics to allow freedom to all 
candidates in these places. Even for the incumbent what we know many officials along the 
line of service provision have just been fleecing govt money from the ministries down to 
the district while giving the executive false reports about what they ve done on ground. 
Therefore exposing the rot will help the incumbent to strengthen the management team to 
ensure good service provision. That is my view as a management analyst. 
The dissatisfaction levelled at government and the police force in the above story is similar to 
that levelled at the country‘s Electoral Commission in a story posted on 5 January 2016. This 
story reads in part, ‗EC [Electoral Commission] says the recent ban on visits to hospitals and 
places of worship for presidential candidates was not based on any law but on concern for 
privacy of patients and worshippers.‘ The selected four followers of the page come out to fault 
the EC and blame them for being partial.  
EC supports M7. Have the patients & the worshipers complained that Besigye should not 
go to them? EC must watch out. 
The EC is neither religious nor health affiliated. So Kiggundu stop confusions but pray to 
God to remove the incompetence in you. For you are partisan according to your 
statement. [Eng. Badru Kiggundu was the then chairperson of the electoral commission].  
The few hospitals and schools Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye has visited people have welcomed 
him with great Joy and he has be prayed for in the churches so can the EC give examples 
of who complained? 
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Thank you EC for being concerned about our privacy but why don't you worry about the 
privacy and safety of our votes and let the Medical teams and the Religious teams worry 
about patients and Sick people. 
The deeper implication of the above resistance of news content is that additional voices, which 
traditional media has been unable to reach in the past, are now present in the online public sphere. 
In this sphere, such voices are at liberty to speak their mind and challenge the manner in which 
they are governed. Similar to the public sphere that Habermas talks about, these voices debate 
from an equal stand point. The constrained financial and human resource environment, coupled 
with limited news space, are some of the known explanations for traditional media‘s inability to 
reach as many voices as possible over an issue. But in the online sphere, these voices are present 
to challenge the state on issues of governance. 
In addition, resistance to power by dominated groups is one of the ways that other less powerful 
categories of people in society are known to exert themselves and find voice.  Dijk (2008: 30- 31) 
argues that the dominated categories of people in society, or those who are less privileged, are not 
usually completely powerless. That depending on certain socio-economic, historical or cultural 
conditions, these groups of people can be in position to display various forms of resistance. Dijk 
refers to these forms of resistance as the enactment of counter-power. Such counter-power can 
potentially turn the initially powerful categories of people or the rulers into a vulnerable lot, for 
example as is seen in political revolutions. He argues further that a discussion on power therefore 
ought to be cognisant of the various forms of counter power or resistance that can be brought 
forth by dominated groups. For Simons (1995: 83), such resistance or demonstration of counter-
power emanates from the inability to properly coordinate the various factions of power. The 
emphasis here by both Dijk (2008) and Simons (1995) is that people have power to resist 
domination and they will use this power when needed. It is from this premise that the study 
analyses the forms of counter power, herein reflected in the resistance of news content posted on 
Facebook. 
Indeed for the case of Uganda‘s Facebook public sphere, the followers are aware that they have a 
certain amount of counter-power and they take the opportunity to remind whoever cares to listen 
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that they can wield such power. This is demonstrated for example in the two quotes below, which 
were part of the aforementioned story in which police deployed to block Besigye's school visits: 
Animals have single suit and nothing is hidden of them. NRM government is like those 
animals with single suit. Now the keys are in the hands of Ugandans to open the house of 
freedom am enjoying the last kicks of a dying horse... bye bye Museveni. 
No retreat no surrender #DR KB our presdo come feb the choice of People In Arua & 
west Nile. 
Rejection of interference in the public sphere 
This category under the dimension of resistance of news content is best explained by the events 
that took place on the elections days of 18 and 19 February 2016, when social media was shut 
down in Uganda. The shutdown was effected by telecommunications companies, following a 
directive from UCC. The story on NTV‘s Facebook page that communicated this shutdown 
partially read, ‗ED UCC [Executive Director Uganda Communications commission], Godfrey 
Mutabazi says Mobile Money and social media were shut down because there was information 
that people were using these to bribe voters.‘  
Directives for shutdowns are usually given with a threat of sanctions for non-compliance. For the 
case of Uganda, the directive was to be effected by telecommunication companies. Although the 
means of access to the Internet are usually in the hands of private firms, including the hardware, 
software, and physical infrastructure, governments have been known to exert control of access 
through regulation- which involves the capacity to shut down the Internet (Eriksson 2009: 208). 
The action was in addition a demonstration of how powerful groups control discourse by limiting 
or closing access to communicative spaces and platforms (Dijk 2008: 29, 67). The government of 
Uganda, in a demonstration of power, ordered the Internet shut down. It is this demonstration of 
power that netizens, unlike the telecommunication companies, resisted. These netizens or 
Facebook followers were aware that the directive was interference into their public sphere of free 
debate and that it carried a consequence for their freedom of expression.  
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Whereas the shutdown was meant to curtail communication amongst citizens, it did not fully 
achieve this. As a way of regaining control of the Facebook public sphere, followers took to 
Facebook to express their rejection of government‘s interference in the Facebook public sphere, 
as seen in the four comments below that were posted on the NTV page: 
Please tell them they are under qualified for the job because as you can see we managed 
to access them sites! 
These guys should upgrade their thinking. UCC never created internet so it can never 
limit or block its accessibility. 
They should have shut down even sms services, because I received a msge from the 
President M7 campaign team at 8.00 am advising me to vote Mr. M7. 
They want to ban us from access to information so that they can easily manipulate the 
outcome of the results. Is there any who has bribed more than them? The möney they have 
been sending 2 villages? Access 2 information is a fundamental human right according 2 
international standards. 
The online public sphere, similar to that of the feudal Middle Ages, allows ordinary citizens to 
exercise control or power over the state (Dahlgren and Sparks 1991: 29). The above rejection of 
government interference in the public sphere is a further demonstration of what Dijk (2008: 30) 
describes as various forms of resistance that the less powerful groups have at their disposal. On 
Facebook, these groups are seen to resist state control by use of discourse and scorn against state 
actions. Such power in the hands of citizens is best demonstrated through social groups or 
collective actions as opposed to individual actions. Dijk (2008: 29) observes that social power is 
a function of the relationship between groups or classes of people who come together with a 
focus on their belonging as social members. With this collective power, Dijk (2008) further 
explains that discourse is then presented as a form of social interaction. 
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Sharing experiences of better practice from elsewhere 
The online public sphere further makes it possible for citizens to crosscheck information 
available elsewhere and share it instantly with the other participants in demanding better from the 
state. As a further demonstration of this power in the hands of citizens, they are able to relate to 
experiences elsewhere in demanding for better accountability. At the time of the Internet 
shutdown for example, updates from the country‘s EC and the UCC were not in sync over who 
directed the shutdown. This uncoordinated communication is interrogated by the Facebook 
followers as seen below:  
It‟s so suprising! I can‟t tell who is fulling ugandans! Electoral commission have just said 
that they are not responsible for interferance in social media access that theirs is to 
arrange elections and yet ucc is just posting that they are waiting for communication from 
electoral commission on either to switch on social media networks. WHO IS FOOLING 
WHO? 
Whereas the government of Uganda defended the shut down in relation to security concerns, 
citizens were able to question why the same is not applicable in other countries. For example, one 
follower inquired:  
How comes other countries can vote without blocking the social media and yet it‟s 
peaceful? If it‟s a peaceful free and fair elections as you claim and yet everyone knows 
that they can only cast one vote why do you bring out all militants and police fully 
armed? WE NEED CHANGE FOR UGANDA TO DEVELOP. 
To add to this frustration, another follower reacts with the post that: 
Now UCC stop fooling around its Sevo [Museveni] that ordered you to shut down now 
you are saying it was the Electoral Commission. I wonder even What more are you hiding 
coz the whole world Knows Sevo rigged the votes.  
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As noted by Bentivegna (2002: 53), while engaging online, members use personal experience in 
interpreting the topics debated. Bentivegna adds that the knowledge used is derived from 
common experience as a basis for online political discourse. Some of the followers on the page 
drew on their professional experience to make succinct arguments, for example as earlier seen in 
the argument by a follower who identifies themselves as a management analyst. Others drew on 
analogies in the bible and stories in the media to support their argument on Facebook. A case in 
point is the story posted on 19 February 2016, titled ‗Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have been 
arrested in Najjanakumbi.‘ In response to this story, a follower on the page makes reference to 
the bible in urging Ugandans towards resistance. The post reads,  
Even in the Bible when Jesus entered into the Temple and found Israelites have changed it 
[into] a market, he did not prayed for them he used violence to bring normance. So 
Ugandans if u want democracy be ready to shed blood. 
From the position of this thesis that Facebook is a platform for contestation of power by the 
media, the state and netizens, the above section has demonstrated how netizens handle this 
situation. Netizens arguably successfully exercise the power at their disposal in challenging the 
power of the state and the media over discourse. It is on Facebook that they successfully resist 
control of the political discourse by presenting alternative views and rejecting the media narrative 
and the actions of the state. This success reaches its epitome with the ability to circumvent the 
Internet shutdown. Whereas the state and the media are known to be more powerful than the 
ordinary citizens, Facebook arguably changes this power balance or the lack thereof in favour of 
the last category (citizens). One of the journalists at NTV who was actively involved in covering 
the 2016 elections recalls that Facebook was indeed a point of contestation during the elections:  
I must say that Facebook was used like a weapon during the 2016 elections. A weapon 
which government tried even to dismantle but they failed and going forward I think 
government should just appreciate Facebook. May be they learnt a lesson or two and 
being the social media leaders in Uganda, I believe we [NTV] gave people the platform to 
raise their issues about this election. I think when UCC or government saw that people 
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were becoming tough on social media that is when they closed it down. But people 
continued after finding the short cut (Respondent K, 12 April 2018). 
The above comments further demonstrate how in the public sphere of Facebook, pressure of 
public opinion builds up against the state (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991: 29) as seen in the 
collective voice of people. The engagement shows how people converge in the online public 
sphere as citizens, not motivated by commercial interests (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2009: 
196), to challenge the status quo. These citizens debate issues of common concern. In addition, 
these members are able to hold meaningful conversation as strangers (Calhoun, 2003:1), who 
respect each other‘s opinion. So rational is the debate on Facebook that even the well-known 
state-surveillance of this platform (Chibita and Ugangu, 2017: 252) does not seem to stop 
netizens from speaking out and calling government officials to task. This is contrary to the 
observation by Miller et. al (2016) that the fear of state surveillance explains why not all citizens 
on Facebook are free to hold free debate. For Miller et. al (2016), this fear eventually translates 
into silence on Facebook and consequently relegates the platform to one for maintaining good 
relations amongst the followers. But this thesis has demonstrated to the contrary. 
The engagement further demonstrates how Facebook is used for the free expression of views in 
Uganda. Citizens dare challenge government, former government officials and the media. It can 
be concluded therefore that Facebook as a public sphere in Uganda has given citizens a platform 
to express their views and in big numbers as per the issue at hand. This resonates with the 
observation by Javuru (2013: 371), that social media has allowed people across the divide in 
Uganda to express opinion on political, economic and social issues. Such possible expression of 
views has had the consequence of making more and more citizens realise that they too can join 
the debate on civic issues, and that they can now hold their leaders accountable (Gumede, 2016: 
414).  
The limited space in traditional media has meant that Ugandans will continuously turn to social 
media for a larger and debatably unrestricted communicative space for debate and for the 
exercise of power. In this space, followers of the platform problematise issues that were initially 
taboo, for example calling the incumbent to task as seen in some of the comments above. This is 
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similar to the problematisation of areas that had not been questioned in the time of Habermas‘ 
writing (Habermas, 1989). Facebook is indeed a public sphere in Uganda. 
But it can be argued that a discussion would not qualify to be rational if it brings forth only one 
set of opinions as seen above under the dimension of resistance. In the Facebook public sphere 
however, there is accommodation of alternative views. These views were reflected on the NTV 
Facebook page as well. The next section presents and discusses these views under the dimension 
of ‗acceptance of news content.‘  
Acceptance of news content 
Acceptance of news content is interpreted to imply that the followers do not contest the news 
content but rather take it as is. Incidences of ‗acceptance‘ were less spread across the content in 
comparison to resistance of the same as seen in Table 6. To be specific, only two out of the eight 
stories chosen for analysis had incidences of ‗acceptance of news content.‘ Even across these two 
stories, the comments generated were only four, the lowest number across the analysis. 
One of the stories with this dimension of engagement was posted on 5 January 2016. It is titled 
‗EC says the recent ban on visits to hospitals and places of worship for presidential candidates 
was not based on any law but on concern for privacy of patients and worshippers.‘ In this story, 
the country‘s Electoral Commission gives a directive barring presidential candidates from visiting 
hospitals and centres of worship while on the campaign trail. In support of this decision, three 
followers post the following comments:  
This time EC is right here. Hospitals are not for campaigns. You trumatise those patients 
more by exposing them on TVs and social media. I think politicians would still gain 
popularity by donating to the hospitals other than visiting just to gain cheap popularity. 
It is not like they refused the politicians to visit the facilities, it is the timing that is 
hypocritical. For a man like Amama who is partially responsible for the current state of 
the hospitals to visit them for vote purposes is pure mockery. As for Besigye, he should 
have visited the hospitals in normal times not campaigning period. 
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Kale Kaihura [Gen. Kayihura was the Inspector General of Police] & kiggundu [Eng. 
Kiggundu was the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission] r protecting their jobs by 
accepting m7 order, anyway they know that no law aveils on candidates visit to hospitals 
or schools, so they see that when they part away 4rm m7 vos orders there fired, nd u pple 
well know employment is a problem, so lets blem m7 nd his supportes thats all. 
The other story in which this dimension manifests is the one in which police deployed to block 
Besigye's school visits and Besigye ended up ‗sneaking‘ to a dam where animals share water with 
locals. The only comment under the dimension of ‗acceptance of news content comes off as 
sarcastic. It reads, ―The swaga of tha curent regime..Ugandans drinkin with animals..Thnx NTV 4 
ur openness.‖ 
The above comments demonstrate conformity with the news content as opposed to followers 
simply posting in favour of their preferred presidential candidates. Although the incidences of 
this conformity or ‗acceptance‘ were fewer than those of resistance, they demonstrate that the 
rationality in debate on Facebook. The researcher therefore departs from earlier observations by 
Javuru (2013: 372) that the online discussions in Uganda are not based on rationality but that one 
who shouts loudest and puts down other discussants wins. The reviewed posts on the NTV page 
show that discussants that both conform to, and resist, content presented in the public sphere are 
active on Facebook to conduct rational debate. The higher number of those who debate under the 
dimension of resistance of news content is arguably not a demonstration that those who ―shout 
loudest and puts down other discussants win.‖ No. It is rather an aggressive demonstration that 
Facebook followers use the platform as a true public sphere in which they demand for 
accountability across a variety of issues in the country. These followers are arguably cognisant of 
the fact that such spaces for free debate are limited in Uganda and they therefore make maximum 
use of one of the few available ones- Facebook. As earlier explained, one of such spaces that is 
no longer available are the once famous radio talk shows (see chapter one about these shows, 
commonly known as ‗ebimeeza‘). 
 In their rational discussion of the country‘s political discourse, these followers put government 
officials to task, share experiences of better practice from elsewhere and resist interference in the 
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Facebook public sphere, as already discussed. It is therefore unlikely that netizens would take to 
Facebook to highly praise government in a period such as the elections, when the state and its 
institutions are seen oppress members of the opposition and citizens - to the point of shutting 
down social media.  These findings on rational debate on Facebook are further contrary to 
Javuru‘s (2013) assertion that name-calling takes precedent on Facebook and that the voice of 
journalists, academics, university students and the Diaspora community carries more weight and 
authority during discussions. As per this study, the Facebook followers post their comments 
minus identifying themselves or making their titles known. They therefore debate issues 
irrespective of the titles or backgrounds they each hold. It is only in one incident that a follower 
identifies themselves as a management analyst, and this is done to validate the specific 
information being given, which picks from this follower‘s professional experience. This post 
reads in part: 
…Its good politics to allow freedom to all candidates in these places. Even for the 
incumbent what we know many officials along the line of service provision have just been 
fleecing govt money from the ministries down to the district while giving the executive 
false reports about what they‟ve done on ground. Therefore exposing the rot will help the 
incumbent to strengthen the managemnt team to ensure good service provision. That is 
my view as a management analyst. 
This section has demonstrated and explained the first interpretation on the nature of engagement 
on Facebook titled: Rational debate on Facebook. The section has demonstrated that this 
rationality is diverse. The diversity allows followers to both resist and accept the content 
presented in news. These followers take charge of the conversation. In the public sphere of 
Facebook, the followers aggressively put government officials to task as they continuously 
contest oppressive government positions depicted in the news, and equally resist the media 
presentation of some of the issues. The next section proceeds to discuss the second nature of 
engagement on Facebook. This engagement focuses on the relationship amongst the followers.  
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Facebook followers in dialogue 
In discussing how political discourse in the media operates, Fairclough (1998: 148-149) explains 
the presence of confluences and alliances amongst the different agents such as the ordinary 
people, politicians and other groups. He describes such relations as depictive of antagonists or 
protagonists in the struggle for hegemony in the media. He argues further that an analysis of 
political discourse in the media therefore ought to be cognizant of the confluences and alliances 
between these agents and orders of discourse. It is with this hindsight that this study analyses the 
relationship amongst Facebook followers as they discuss and shape discourse on Facebook. 
This relationship is herein presented under two dimensions: ‗followers in agreement‘ and 
‗followers in disagreement.‘ These dimensions are similar to what Fairclough terms as 
confluences and alliances between agents, which presents them either as antagonists or 
protagonists. These two extremes of dialogue are analysed in relation to actions of both the media 
and the state. Facebook is in this case the run-to space for followers to hold conversation and 
directly speak to one another about their interpretations of the actions of these institutions.  
Followers in agreement 
Incidences of Facebook followers in agreement with one another over views relating to the news 
content were quite prevalent in the data too as shown in Table 6, standing at 94 comments of the 
240. Such incidences fell second place to incidences of ‗resistance of news content.‘ Below are 
the different strata through which this ‗agreement‘ manifested: 
Disaffection against the state 
The first category under this dimension of dialogue is demonstrated through consensus as 
Facebook followers support one another in raising a strong public opinion against the state. The 
story that reported incumbent Museveni‘s win will be used as an example to demonstrate how 
these followers supported each other.  
This story was posted on 20 February 2018 and is titled, ‗Kiggundu: The commission declares 
candidate Yoweri Kaguta Museveni as the elected President of Uganda this 20/Feb/2016.‘ In 
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response to this story, one of the followers, dissatisfied with the outcome, reaches out to other 
followers by posting that,  
…every ugandans believes with me that col. Dr. kizza Besigye is the people‟s elected 
president Naye kigundu will be judged type AMEN. 
This call for an ‗Amen‘ is embraced by the majority of followers on the page. To be specific, 20 
followers out of the 30 comments analysed per story (refer to chapter four on how this selection 
of number of comments was made) positively responded to this call. Some of these followers 
typed the required ‗Amen‘ while others added more text to it, for instance as seen in the response: 
―aamen may there dayz b shortned‖ and in another response ―Amen, may kigundu b judged.‖  
Figure 6: A screenshot of the engagement by NTV’s Facebook followers(with identities 
masked) 
 
Taking the above image of the Facebook page in which NTV reported that former premier 
Mbabazi had expressed concern over being shadowed by unknown men as another example, one 
of the followers posts: 
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Mbabazi should know that more is still to come and he will soon understand the true 
meaning of being a member of opposition in Uganda. When he was enjoying the comfort 
of his longtime friend, Dr. Besigye was sprayed, his finger was shot.  
In agreement with this post, another follower posts:  
And Mbabazi never condemned the above, he even geared the formulation of POMA to 
suffocate opposition rallies; now it‟s his turn to feel it.  
POMA is an acronym for the Public Order Management Act, which sought to restrict the 
activities of political parties by subjecting them to police approval. The Act was approved when 
Hon. Amama Mbabazi was prime minister. Clearly the citizens, still fresh from the events 
surrounding this Act, take to Facebook to remind Hon. Mbabazi of his past deeds. 
In yet another story posted on 19 February titled ‗Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have been arrested 
in Najjanakumbi‘, the followers point to the building frustration over the country‘s electoral 
body.  
As long as Kiggundu is chairman EC, and Museveni stands, no other person will win even 
if the election is organised in Heaven and Jesus, Angel michael and Gabriel stand against 
Museveni, reads one post.  
In support of this, other followers write: 
so true. And another adds, Praying for Uganda. 
The above posts demonstrate how Uganda‘s Facebook public sphere reincarnates what Habermas 
(1989) describes as a breeding ground for dissent against the state. Discussions in the public 
sphere have traditionally been considered as anti-government. In this environment, the followers 
continuously form a strong public opinion against the state, its institutions and even former 
government officials are not spared this wrath. These followers therefore form a solid block of 
antagonists against the state and protagonists in relation to the followers themselves. In the case 
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of Britain for example, such dissent was in relation to contestation of press laws (Lee, 1976: 22) 
and the industrial revolution (Habermas, 1989: 57-59), as dissatisfied citizens appealed to the 
critical public. The result was a strong formation of public opinion against the state. Participants 
in this public sphere would therefore transform into what Caldwell (2017: 114-115) refers to as 
political actors. Uganda‘s Facebook public sphere is not any different as a breeding ground for 
dissent or disaffection against the state. 
Concern over government interference in the public sphere 
At the height of the Internet shut down, not only were Facebook followers in agreement at 
scolding government for the unsuccessful attempt at the blockade, they also used the platform to 
help one another and circulate information on how to bypass the blockade. As seen in the 
following back-to-back communication, the followers share advice on how to overcome the shut-
down.  
We are accessing everything to the maximum, Orbot, tunnel bear and www.proxysite.com 
are all helping us to access social media.#basembye, reads one post.  
Can someone help how to do it? inquires a follower who is helped immediately with the 
response that download secure vpn now. 
As demonstrated in the above posts, citizens of Uganda are quick to react in support of each 
other‘s posts on Facebook, especially where such posts speak out against inappropriate actions by 
government. In this sphere, the citizens have built trust amongst themselves with a consequence 
of increasing their engagement in political activities (Velenzuela, 2013). Indeed, a lot more 
people find voice through the Internet, particularly Facebook, as opposed to the traditional media 
of television for instance (Rasmussen, 2007: 9). 
This study further seeks to draw a correlation between the dimension of engagement in which 
followers were in ‗agreement‘ with each other and the dimension in which these followers 
‗resisted‘ the news content. Here is how: when the news content did not favour an opposition 
presidential candidate, the followers supported or agreed with anyone who spoke out against this 
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content. This analysis explains why the two dimensions of engagement with the highest 
prevalence are: ‗resistance of news content‘ and ‗followers in agreement.‘ Both these dimensions 
of engagement were spread across all the eight stories selected for analysis. This spread is 
interpreted by the researcher to imply that since all the selected stories showed opposition 
presidential candidates in oppressive situations ahead of the polls, the followers of the Facebook 
page took to the platform to speak out against this oppression.  
Consequently, they supported anyone who dared speak out against this oppression. The public 
sphere has traditionally been known to be a place for free expression of views, some of which 
may be against the state. It can be concluded therefore, that Uganda‘s Facebook public sphere is 
the space where such free expression of views takes place. The analysis of the impact of 
Facebook best makes sense when applied in context of a given society (Lievrouw and 
Livingstone, 2002: 51). If the volume of civic matters on Facebook is anything to go by 
(Gumede, 2016), coupled with the number of followers who support each other on these matters, 
then it can be concluded that Facebook is capable of bringing higher levels of democracy to 
Uganda. This is especially true since, as noted by Mugerwa and Malaba (2018), citizens of 
Uganda are increasingly critical of the state on Facebook.   
Followers in disagreement 
Diversity in opinion 
From the domineering agreement between followers on Facebook (94 comments), it is less 
surprising that the platform demonstrates few cases of followers in disagreement (32 comments) 
over each other‘s posts. In some of the stories where followers seem to disagree with one another, 
the comments come off as light.  
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Figure 7: NTV’s Facebook page relays the 2016 Presidential Election results 
 
In the story that reported incumbent Museveni‘s win on 20 February 2016, when one of the 
followers on the page posts that: “every ugandans believes with me that col.Dr. kizza Besigye is 
the people‟s elected president Naye kigundu will be judged type AMEN,‖ not everyone typed the 
required Amen.  
In disagreement to this call, one of the followers writes: ―waaaaaaa which people? May be 
minority.‖ 
Another one hastily takes on this response and writes: ―… you have a big problem the people‟s 
president is Col Dr kizza Besigye that‟s all rigging imagine the support we had.‖ 
The story about the former prime minister, Hon. Patrick Amama Mbabazi, will be used as 
another example. This is the story in which he expressed concern that unknown men are 
shadowing him and could be harbouring a sinister plot to harm him. The three back-to-back 
conversations below from the Facebook followers demonstrates how they were in disagreement 
with one another over this story: 
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We are keeping a very close eye on Yoweri Museveni. God help him if any harm comes to 
Amama Mbabazi. For so long M7 has got away with murder, this time it will be him 
poking the behind of a leopard as he infamously said. 
How about Amama Mbabazi, you mean for him he hasn't gone away with some murders 
or you think the public forgot about the boyfriend to the daughter who was killed in cold 
blood at the kololo residence. Again why should you try to cut the hand that fed you, after 
stealing from the government now you want to protect whatever you stole..SHAME 
What have you been drinking? Boyfriend to the daughter? Is that what M7 has been 
telling you? 
These posts further demonstrate the plurality of voices on Facebook as a public sphere. As noted 
by Gerhards and Schäfer (2009: 3), the Internet is a less constrained public sphere. For the case of 
Uganda, this communicative space continues to allow for diversity in opinion. Robertson et al. 
(2010: 13) emphasises the importance of the relationship amongst citizens who converge in the 
public sphere to engage in public discourse. Such a relationship, he argues, ought to be defined 
by critical rationality, equality, freedom of expression, and dissemination. With these in place, he 
posits that the public sphere can sustainably function. All these factors that Robertson and 
colleagues talk about are present on Facebook as a public sphere in Uganda. The rationality, as 
explained above, is demonstrated through both the contestation and conformity in thought by 
netizens, who freely express themselves.  
The previous chapter demonstrated how these netizens emphasise equality in the public sphere by 
rejecting an attempt at dominance from both the media and the state, to allow for a thriving of the 
public sphere. As further noted by Robertson et al. (2010), communicative action based on 
equality in the communication process is a prerequisite in the public sphere. This prerequisite is 
cognisant of the multiplicity of voices and plurality of thought. 
The overall scenario of higher contestation by netizens against the state and the media can be 
summarised as one of antagonistic struggle for hegemony. Fairclough (1998: 149) advises that 
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the political discourse in contemporary politics is best understood as one that is either 
predominantly of struggle or complicity between or among the various agents in media discourse. 
He advises further that such an analysis makes it possible to determine how real or superficial 
apparent struggle or complicity is, and to determine who the real protagonists and antagonists are. 
As per this study, netizens are protagonists in their relationship with one another. They are 
antagonists in their relationship with the state and the media. 
Below is a hierarchy chart (Nvivo) to further illustrate the spread of the dimensions of 
engagement on Facebook. The colours in the chart as per these dimensions are as follows: 
Resistance of news content- yellow, acceptance of news content- blue, Followers in agreement- 
peach, followers in disagreement- purple.  
 





Facebook ebimeeza (FaceBimeeza): Making a connection to Radio talk shows 
This chapter has presented an understanding of how Uganda‘s netizens and those interested in the 
political discourse in Uganda engage on Facebook. The dimensions of engagement are 
summarised as Resistance of news content, Acceptance of news content, Followers in agreement 
and Followers in disagreement; all of which present Facebook as a true public sphere in Uganda. 
This study seeks to draw a correlation between the clamped down Radio talk shows, popularly 
known as ebimeeza (refer to chapter two for a detailed discussion on this) and Facebook. The 
nature of engagement on Facebook is similar to that of the defunct ebimeeza (plural) or ekimeeza 
(singular). By extension therefore, Facebook has successfully taken up the place of these 
ebimeeza. In the context of Uganda, a combination of Facebook and the ebimeeza construct 
brings forth what this study terms as Facebook ebimeeza, coined together in a new term, 
‗FaceBimeeza‘. The next chapter investigates this new term further by linking government‘s 
involvement in the public sphere as a continuation of where it (government) left off with the 
clamping down of ebimeeza. 
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Chapter 7 Interference on FaceBimeeza 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere. It 
has shown that followers on the NTV Facebook page debate in a rational manner and hold 
meaningful dialogue with each other. In this dialogue, the followers bring political leaders to 
task, in demanding for better governance.  
This chapter seeks ‗To establish the ways in which television media and institutions of 
government interfere with public participation on Facebook.‘It will concentrate on how both the 
media and institutions of government aggressively return to the Facebook platform to control 
discourse. Their actions cause interference in Uganda‘s FaceBimeeza (refer to previous chapter 
for an understanding of this term), which until now has been shown as one of active engagement 
by citizens. It is important to recall that this study argues for Facebook as a confluence of three 
contending factions, namely, the media, ordinary citizens and the state.  
As noted in chapter two, the public sphere that Habermas (1989) writes about is said to have 
disintegrated partly as a result of the interventionist state, interested in managing the growing 
contradictions of capitalism (Holub, 1991; Dahlgren, 1995). The Facebook public sphere has as 
per this study been interfered with by the presence of the state too, the media and private firms. 
This section therefore concentrates on analysing the specific ways in which this interference 
manifests. The directives of the state on use of Facebook are partly effected by private firms such 
as the telecommunication companies, which are not the focus of this study but will be mentioned 
briefly in the discussion.  
Interference of the State in operations of the media 
The interference of the state manifested through an attempt to influence media content. This was 
when the state meddled in newsroom decisions on the selection of news reporters for the 
presidential campaign trail. In addition, was the attempt to influence the content in the final 
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stories to be aired, and by extension to be posted on Facebook. This interference is confirmed by 
a response from one of the editors in the quote below:  
The president was very particular about who would cover his campaign, so if you sent 
other people whom they have seen to produce very critical stories, it was going to be a 
difficult campaign for them. They would have found it very hard to gather stories, they 
would have been disturbed at every point. In fact, if I recall very well for the president‟s 
campaigns, that was the only team we never changed because of the way in a sense the 
state muscle made it impossible. NTV received a lot of heat from the State in terms of 
what we were covering. I remember they kicked out our team, even when they were 
comfortable with the two people that we had assigned. We used drone footage of the 
president‟s campaign [the footage was availed by the president‘s team]. I think that was a 
wrong call, we should not have done it.  When we made an editorial decision not to use it 
again, they started putting us under pressure, kicked us out. I remember, we had a huge 
fight over it for some time. It was a very tense moment for us. Yeah, but it was a wrong 
call for us to use if for the first time. Those were the challenges particularly covering the 
president because he always looked at us as opposition (Respondent A, 14 April 2018). 
News is what journalists make it as they negotiate a process partly influenced by their working 
environment Fenton (2010: 3). This environment incorporates considerations of the economic, 
social, political and technological factors. Therefore, the aforementioned efforts by the state to 
influence media coverage form part of the political factors that affected how journalists at NTV 
operated during the 2016 elections. Elections are said to be a perilous period for journalists the 
world over. This results from what Marie-Soleil Frère (2010: 4) describes as heightened political 
pressure, an increase in the number of manipulation attempts, and the need to beat deadlines. 
With the incumbent‘s team now satisfied at the successful manipulation of the choice of news 
team to cover their candidate, as demonstrated in the quote above, they then attempted to 
influence the media portrayal of the incumbent in comparison to other contenders. One of the 
respondents, an editor at NTV, revealed that the station occasionally had to explain itself to 
institutions of the state in relation to coverage of incumbent Yoweri Museveni. Soon, the 
 164 
explanations had to be made to representatives of the other top contenders in the race for 
presidency: Amama Mbabazi and Kizza Besigye. 
One of the stories that got us a little problem during the election was the story we did on 
the unfulfilled pledges of the President. Oh my God, the heat we got after that from every 
single corner! “Is this the right time to talk about the President`s unfulfilled pledges?” 
We had taken a very clear decision that we are going to hold everyone accountable for 
what they have done. If the president promised things in the financial year 2015/16, why 
have they not been fulfilled and he is asking for another mandate? Some of the pledges 
dated as far back as 10 years. So NRM was not happy about that decision we took and 
that was a few days into the election campaign process.  
However, we reminded them that when we were doing the story on the changing faces of 
Amama Mbabazi, they did not complain but Amama Mbabazi did because we said this 
man was the attorney general of the party, was the secretary general of the party, was 
prime minister, was defence minister, was security minister. He previously had said that 
Museveni is like a god you know. He has been flip flopping on certain things, why should 
people trust him? We were basically asking general questions. Oh, everyone in the NRM 
was excited. So we told them that when you were excited about Mbabazi‟s story, why are 
you now mad that we have asked a question about your guy? 
Then we did a story on Besigye‟s change of heart, and it‟s only NTV that had that bite. 
My colleague had asked him in 2011 if he had intentions of running for presidency again. 
He said, “if nothing is done on the election process and the rules are not changed, and 
the law is not amended, I will never contest. I will not contest.” We did a story and said, 
this is what you said, what happened down the road? Mbabazi was happy, Museveni‟s 
people were happy, Besigye‟s people nearly finished us at the rally because we had done 
that story. So, you get that kind of delicate balance (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
The explanations above by the editors are what Frère (2015) describes as heightened pressure in 
newsrooms and attempts to manipulate information by different political parties. Nonetheless in 
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this situation, citizens expect the media to be ubiquitous in its coverage irrespective of the 
resource constraints that the media could be faced with. Perhaps the aforementioned attempts to 
manipulate information in favour of one‘s camp could partly explain why the incumbent received 
the highest coverage in both print and electronic media (ACME, 2016). This situation of undue 
coverage is what Fairclough (1998: 148- 149) warns about in the overall reflection of hybridity of 
mediatised politics. Fairclough (1998) projects that the media may end up giving undue 
prominence to the official political system since journalistic discourse has now mixed with the 
other antagonistic power struggles over discourse. Such struggles are by other agents such as 
professional politicians, political parties and analysts.  
In Uganda, the other political parties, especially of the top contenders, also raised concern over 
NTV‘s coverage of their candidates. NRM as the ruling party, received higher coverage. It can be 
argued therefore that at this point, the media ceased to be a neutral player in the public sphere in 
as far as extending equal coverage to all candidates was concerned. The counter argument can be 
that manipulation of the media by institutions of the state made it difficult for it to remain neutral.  
In addition, the ability to use statutory organs and highly placed state actors to exercise control 
over the media was evident in the 2016 elections. During elections, party strategists have been 
known to try to influence media coverage (Hopmann et al. 2012:174). In Uganda‘s 2016 polls, 
the state arguably wanted to use the media to extend its control of the political narrative about 
elections and retain power over national discourse. In this attempt, editorial staff at NTV were 
summoned to explain to state authorities why certain stories about the elections appeared in the 
manner that they did.  
We were summoned to see the information minister the day Besigye`s car got stuck on his 
way to Rukungiri. Minister Jim Muhwezi summoned us himself. We started with 
Museveni`s story then I think we went to Amama. We were waiting for the story 
[Besigye‘s] to come, it delayed. So we took a decision to run the pictures which had been 
sent earlier of him getting stuck. These were earlier pictures of him struggling, getting out 
of the car, and helping push the car. Now, when we were running that, the story came, 
fully packaged with voice over, bytes and the rally. We said let us run it back to back. We 
were summoned the next day and asked, “whose PR [public relations] are you driving? It 
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is very clear where you guys are. Have you watched your bulletin from last night?” We 
had to explain ourselves. Then immediately we left that place, UCC had summoned us. 
We went to UCC and also explained ourselves. At UCC, we met the executive director 
and his senior management team which included the spokesperson, the legal counsel and 
the director for television (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
As seen above, the state used some of its top most officials in attempting to influence media 
coverage. The Information Minister and the Director of UCC are top officials in far as regulating 
or controlling the media in Uganda is concerned. Dijk (2008: 40) observes that hierarchy of 
position or the rank of those signalling command within state institutions is one of the 
dimensions of power that are used to influence discourse and its structures. 
Given the fact that news media has the potential to shape views and actions of audiences, Graber 
(2017: 237) explains that battles over control of mass-mediated information flows have been 
relentless and pervasive. This owes to the fact that there are often many contenders, but 
governments have been among the fiercest. Graber (2017) further argues that governments want 
political information to reflect their political goals while weakening those of their opponents. 
They therefore need the media to circulate government propaganda, counter unfavourable stories 
and demonise the opposition. This explanation contextualises why state operatives in Uganda 
summoned the NTV staff to explain its editorial policy at different periods of the electoral cycle. 
The strong hand of the state in attempting to control the media by using its organs to summon 
editorial staff is evident of the power of political discourse and therefore why competing entities 
online would want to be in charge of this power. Dijk 2008 (67- 68) observes that access to the 
mass media is important in the struggle for discourse. This is because the entities that gain 
preferential access to journalists, and consequently whose views get amplified, are able to 
influence the public. Dijk (2008) further argues that when dominant groups gain access to the 
media, they gain access and control over the general public. This was the situation in Uganda‘s 
2016 elections when the NRM and its representatives sought to gain control over the media and 
by extension its discourse and that of the general public. 
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As per this study, the various interests by the state, political parties, the media and netizens all 
continue to struggle to have an upper hand over discourse. Whereas the state used its machinery 
to summon NTV staff, NTV arguably resisted this control by turning up to explain itself 
whenever it was summoned, as opposed to succumbing to state directives on editorial policy. The 
television station aired and shared on social media, stories that were critical of the state and of 
other political opponents. One of the journalists who covered the incumbent‘s campaign trail 
recalls such a story: 
One incident that I remember was when we went to northern Uganda, Agago district, 
during the incumbent‟s campaigns. At that time, people had shunned the rally. There were 
no people. The organisers had to ferry people so that the big man is not ashamed. We 
normally went a day before the event. This gave us room to see what is really going on 
and that was one of the stories we did. People were being ferried from neighboring 
districts and counties just to come for the rally of the incumbent. But when he came, the 
number of people was still low. In that particular place, his opponent from the FDC had a 
lot of support. When we aired that story, it got us problems as NTV and in particular, I 
was banned from the rally twice. We actually didn‟t cover the next rally. We had to 
bargain and plead and then they brought us back(Respondent H, 23 April 2018). 
In essence, the media was not about to give up its power over political discourse. With the state 
failing to succeed at this point, it resorted to high-handedness of restricting the available spaces 
for debating of political discourse as will be expounded on later. 
Interference of the media on FaceBimeeza discussions 
The study discovered that whereas the conversation on the NTV Facebook was unmoderated by 
the television, as for example seen in unanswered inquiries, the managers of the page 
occasionally deleted or pulled down some of the comments by followers of the page. This action 
is interpreted as a demonstration of power in the hands of the media to control discourse. The 
ability to control various dimensions of speech such as dictating what may or may not be spoken 
or written and in what language is one of the ways of exerting power over discourse (Dijk 2008: 
 168 
69). Two online-content managers of the page explained that comments were deleted in instances 
where the conversation was considered to be going off track, or where such comments were 
considered inappropriate as defined by these managers themselves.  
We did not moderate our Facebook platform. We tended to let people talk, say what they 
needed to say and for the most part, it was okay. However, on a few occasions if we got 
alerted to certain people spreading hate speech or deliberately misinforming others and 
found out in time, we would send texts may be to warn them or ban them. Chances are; 
some of these went unnoticed but generally speaking anything that involved a death threat 
of any kind is where we drew the line. You see there is some kind of argument that gets 
heated and while certain words are exchanged, they are within the issue being discussed. 
So that can go. However when something becomes completely abusive and violent and 
now no longer adding any value to the greater argument, we could ban or delete some of 
these comments and ban some of these people (Respondent F, 24 April 2018) 
On Facebook generally in our setting we do have something that not particularly deletes 
but it hides comments where people use vulgar language. In the settings you have to put 
there words like I do not want to see that word bitch in the comments so it will hide it. I 
don‟t want the F word, they are so many. Imagine some of them are written in Luganda 
[one of the local language in Uganda]. So you have to pick a word every day because 
people invent words every day (Respondent G, 24 April 2018). 
It is ironic that whereas citizens have initially been limited by space on television in relation to 
how many of their views and opinions can be aired, the same is happening on the Facebook page 
of a television station, and yet the Internet space has no limits. These citizens had until now found 
the online platforms as an unrestricted space to share their views, unlike both the televised space 
and the clamped down ebimeeza radio talk shows. It can be argued therefore that although 
traditional television has moved online, it has carried with it the assumed power over whose 
views can or cannot be aired. But this demonstration of power is contrary to Facebook as a ‗free‘ 
platform. In addition, the action of deleting or hiding comments posted on Facebook is 
consequentially limiting of the freedom of speech and expression inherently available to citizens 
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in the public sphere. The counter argument of course can be an inquiry as to whether this study 
argues that profane language and hate speech be allowed to populate Facebook. In response to the 
possibility of such a counter argument, the researcher seeks to align with Reid (2017: 230) that 
social media are self-regulating, meaning that the various players online are known for bringing 
order amongst themselves and consequently correcting each other.  
The control of speech by television was not only limited to followers of its Facebook page. The 
same control was extended to how the employees engaged on their personal Facebook pages. The 
study discovered that journalists at NTV were bound by in-house guidelines on how much 
latitude they may have in expressing themselves online and what kind of content may or may not 
be shared on their personal pages. This was irrespective of the fact that such content may not 
necessarily be news-related. These journalists, as explained by one of them, find such in-house 
policies to be limiting of their online freedom.  
I do not only represent myself but I represent the NTV brand. So, whatever I put on my 
page, at the back of my mind, I have to look at both interests, my interests as a person and 
also the interests of the company. It affects the way I operate(Respondent J, 14 April 
2018). 
As noted by Rodny-Gumede (2017: 279), newsrooms grapple with the question of how much 
latitude to allow journalists on social media engagement. This stems from a concern that 
journalists may give opinions as opposed to facts. Internal regulation is also informed by the need 
to protect an organisation‘s reputation (Reid, 2017:227). This thesis nonetheless argues that the 
media‘s involvement in how its employees use Facebook is more than just a concern that 
journalists may give opinions over facts. It is a show of power over the entire discourse on 
Facebook and therefore how the different agents available online should engage. This argument 
fits in with the explanation by one of the editors at NTV that control on how employees use 
Facebook is inevitable: 
The entire journalism principles we apply on TV and everywhere else applies on our 
social media platforms. If for example internally we do not show dead bodies, we do not 
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show blood on our social media platforms, you cannot do it on your platform on 
Facebook. We will ask you to delete it. But again you would have breached our 
relationship in terms of the rules of engagement on social media. All those things are 
clear to our journalists that you must apply both the digital policy and the social media 
policy in the way you actually post your content (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
In discussing media discourse as a genre of power, Dijk (2008: 55) explains that journalists not 
only portray the power of others but also learn to contribute to the power of their own 
organisation. In this case of NTV journalists abiding by the provision to be mindful of what they 
post on their personal platforms, it can be argued that they have both contributed to the power of 
the television station and also succumbed to this power. The journalists are victims of this power, 
just as the other Facebook followers are. At this point none of these victims is able to overcome 
the media‘s power. As seen earlier, posts by Facebook followers can be pulled down, and now 
the journalists have to be careful too about what they post. It is expected of them to abide by the 
rules that govern the organisation. And as they succumb, they give up their own power of free 
expression in the public sphere. This situation of entrapment that the journalists find themselves 
in is explained by one of the editors as a focus on priority to the television station. 
First of all, our policy does not in anyway say you cannot post news content on your 
platforms. It says you should be able to promote, you know, you can post the content but 
you should be able to drive the social media platforms more for your organisation. So, it 
is very clear. They are saying, you must make sure NTV is tagged in your communication, 
so we do not have a guy we are paying salary posting information about an event we have 
financed him to go and cover, on his platform. Remember we are in the business of 
content. So if he is at an event where there is a lot of content we are interested in and he 
is posting that content on his private platform, if NTV is not in that conversation, then you 
are actually doing us a disservice. That is the reason we have created things like 
hashtags, that is the reason we have created platforms where you can actually post and 
then everyone would then link you to NTV. However, we are very deliberate on what sort 
of content you are sharing(Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
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The issue of control and regulation of online platforms is one that will continue to shape debates 
related to the inherent freedom of speech and expression in contemporary times. This is because 
of the communicative power that online platforms avail to citizens. Such platforms have 
consequently attracted different controls at both international and national levels. Most of these 
controls target the cumulative communication patterns of individuals and institutions. For 
Eriksson et al. (2009: 206-207), a discussion of online control needs to reflect on three facets of 
the Internet: access, functionality and activity. Access involves controlling the physical 
infrastructure such as satellites and communications dishes. Functionality relates to the quality of 
Internet usage including bandwidth/speed and the quality of communications software. Whereas 
both access and functionality determine whether people are able to use the Internet, Eriksson et 
al. (2009) observe that it is activity that has continued to be a source of debate about the Internet. 
Activity can be controlled by surveillance, blocking of certain features such as websites/words 
and by attempting to shape social and political discourse.  
Interference of the state on FaceBimeeza discussions 
Control of the Internet in Uganda is encompassing of all the above three aspects of access, 
functionality and activity. The government of Uganda controls access and consequently activity, 
to the extent of blocking the Internet entirely as was the case at the height of the 2016 elections. 
In examining the dimensions of power, Dijk (2008: 40) observes that some acts in the enactment 
of power have the ability to affect an entire nation. The directive by UCC to shut down the 
Internet is one such act in the exercise of power or its excesses. By this act, the state effectively 
interfered or caused disruption in the FaceBimeeza discussions, as citizens were for a while 
unable to engage. At this point, they were at the mercy of the excesses of state power.     
The dissent against the state as demonstrated in the nature of engagement by netizens was 
overwhelming in comparison to support over the same. Through a demonstration of power to 
control discourse, government issued a directive that the entire Internet be shut down. This is 
indeed similar to the directive that was issued for clamping down of radio talks shows 
(ebimeeza). By implication, the reaction of the government of Uganda to criticism from citizens 
and other actors (irrespective of whether this criticism is constructive or not) is one of stifling the 
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available spaces for engagement. Such stifling in form of closure or shutting down of social 
media platforms is contrary to the inherent right to freedom of speech and expression. 
Nonetheless, this is how government controls access. It is from the demonstration of such actions 
of power that Foucault questions if power is not war-like domination. He questions if problems of 
power therefore ought not to be conceived in terms of relations to war. Foucault seeks to 
understand power as a generalised war that at times takes on forms of peace and the state. He 
looks at society as a place where permanent war is waged sometimes between classes or in the 
entire society (Gordon 1980: 123).  
Government‘s demonstration of power and control is further seen to rotate around the person of 
the president. As noted by Jeffrey Peake (2001:69), presidents are the most influential agenda 
setters for national governments. And as per this study, the person of the president certainly 
wields the highest power and his opinion about an issue cannot be ignored. During the shutdown, 
the head of state came out to defend this action, describing it as a necessary security measure to 
avert lies (Abrahamsen and Bareebe, 2016). It can be argued that the president‘s decision to 
defend the shutdown was informed by the high volume of dissent (resistance) against the state. 
The president‘s views and prioritisation of issues can be shaped by external factors, including the 
media (Peake, 2001). Jeff Yates and Andrew Whitford (2005: 577) agree and observe that the 
president has the ability to attract national attention to issues that he deems to be worth serious 
consideration. This was true in Uganda as demonstrated in the president‘s defense of shutting 
down social media. The president‘s defence of this shutdown was the ultimate point of 
demonstration of the power of the state. It further confirms that Facebook was the ‗battle ground‘ 
for control of discourse by the media, citizens and the state.  
It is important to note that functionality of the Internet in Uganda is in the hands of 
telecommunication companies such as MTN, Africell, Airtel, Uganda Telecommunications 
Limited (UTL), Smart telecom and Smile telecom that sell Internet data. In addition to these are 
the broadband service providers such as Infocom. Since the government does not have direct 
control of functionality, it issues directives to these private firms to effect Internet shutdowns. 
This directive, as explained by one of the editors at NTV was likely as polling day drew near: 
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I do not know if you are aware that a few weeks to that happening, the UCC Executive 
Director said that they had the capacity to shut down social media. A lot of us laughed 
about it, we did not believe them but through some of our sources, we were actually told it 
was very possible. They just needed to go to the source and ask the telecoms to switch us 
off, which is exactly what they did. So, go to the telecoms and ask them to turn off social 
media sites just like they do in China (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
This scenario of control is similar to what Balkin (2018: 2014- 16), describes as a triangle. One of 
the corners of this triangle is taken up by nation-states and supranational organisations, the 
second by infrastructure companies, and on the last corner are the mass media, civil organisations 
and protesters. Balkin argues that the first two categories in this triangle regulate the speech of 
the last category, which are sometimes able to navigate such regulation through protests. This 
regulation mainly targets controlling of the Internet infrastructure. Balkin argues further that this 
is contrary to the old-school regulation which targeted individuals with threats of fines or 
imprisonment. Nonetheless, Balkin observes that both old-school and new-school speech 
regulation co-exist to ensure control in present times. In relation to Uganda, this speech triangle is 
actualised as the state, gives directives to infrastructure companies to stifle conversation and 
debate on FaceBimeeza. By implication, both the ordinary citizens and the media have to contend 
with this control.  
The irony is that whereas NTV has the ability to control the speech of followers on its page by 
way of deleting comments, it is also subject to control of these telecom companies and 
consequently by the state. This is the speech triangle that Balkin (2018) describes, in which 
nation-states take up one corner, and infrastructure companies take up the other corner to control 
mass media and ordinary citizens/protesters. At this point, the power of the television station is 
arguably neutralised too and the state is the at this point the ‗winner‘ of this struggle for 
hegemony- albeit temporarily. The television station is consequently lumped with the netizens, 
forming what Fairclough (1998: 148) refers to as protagonists. These protagonists arguably relate 
to the state in an antagonistic manner. To sum it up, Eriksson et al. (2009: 207- 208) observe that 
governments, businesses and NGOs at national and international levels control different aspects 
of the Internet, with none of them able to control the entire spectrum. Whereas governments take 
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an upper hand in controlling access, functionality and online activity, private firms take charge of 
the infrastructure—both hardware and software. 
But the control of the Internet by the state as seen in the shutdown above was short-lived. A key 
finding of this research is that on 18February 2018 when Uganda was subjected to a social media 
blackout by government, the volume of comments from followers of the NTV Facebook page 
remained high. This was partly as a result of the ability to circumvent state surveillance and 
blocking of the Internet through use of virtual private networks. Phillips and Atuhaire (2016) 
observe that close to 1.5 million Ugandans managed to download the necessary software and 
continued engaging on social media about the elections. Figure 7.1 below demonstrates the high 
volume of online activity ahead of the 2016 polls, part of which period social media was shut 
down in Uganda.  
Faced with increasing surveillance and logging of the surfing behaviour of individuals by both 
state and non-state actors, Erikson et al. (2009) further observe that encryption software has been 
used to escape such monitoring. The use of such software is indeed true for Uganda where state 
surveillance of online activity by citizens and civil society is a reality (Chibita and Ugangu 2017).  
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Figure 9: Online activity in Uganda for the period December 2015—February 2016 
 
In essence both NTV and followers of its Facebook page managed to bypass the blackout. In fact, 
the story with the second highest number of comments out of the eight stories chosen for analysis 
on NTV‘s Facebook page was posted on the day of the social media blackout. This is the story 
titled, ‗ED UCC, Godfrey Mutabazi says Mobile Money and social media were shut down 
because there was information that people were using these to bribe voters.‘  
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Figure 10: UCC’s explanation of the Internet shutdown in Uganda 
 
This story attracted 422 comments, coming second to the one that declared incumbent Museveni 
winner, which attracted 539 comments (see chapter four on how selection of stories was done). 
As further noted by Phillips and Atuhaire (2016), the attempt to silence conversations on 
Facebook and other social media platforms instead caused the loudest reactions. For one of the 
editors at NTV, this overwhelming reaction by netizens was out of curiosity: 
When government shut down social media pages, people wanted to find out what it is that 
they are trying to hide. Even those who probably did not have interest before were saying, 
let me go in and post whatever I feel. I think it was curiosity and you see the election 
season, Uganda is a highly political country, with a lot of interest in politics. People like 
discussing politics and if you go to social gatherings of villagers, people are talking about 
politics (Respondent D, 13 April 2018).  
Not only was the circumventing of the Internet shut down a show of curiosity as explained by the 
quote above, it was also a demonstration of power in the hands of netizens to control discourse in 
the public sphere and to resist government interference. By circumventing the shutdown, these 
followers managed to regain control of the public sphere from private firms and the state. And so 
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did television media, which as seen above, was also a victim of the shutdown. The media‘s 
position is one that keeps shifting. At one point the media, just like the state, is a powerful entity 
with the ability to control the actions of Facebook followers by deleting comments. At another 
point, it is a victim of the excesses of the state and is affected by Internet shutdowns. On the side 
of ordinary citizens, this ability to retain control of the Facebook public sphere was the second 
during the 2016 elections. The first incident, coming after an earlier one (see chapter six) in 
which these followers resisted both the media and the state‘s attempts to control discourse by 
influencing the discursive agenda. By implication, Facebook has proved to be a true public 
sphere in Uganda where netizens converge as equals to engage in political debates. 
Reminiscent of prior events of successful use of social media such as the 2007 mobilisation 
against the sale of Mabira forest (Chibita and Ugangu, 2017: 249), the walk-to-work protests 
(Ojambo, 2016: 33), it was unlikely that Facebook followers would give up on using the platform 
at the height of the 2016 polls. This enthusiasm for new media in Uganda proves the presence of 
online public spheres (Javuru, 2013: 373). For a country whose Internet penetration is at 42.5% 
as per the 2015/2016 Annual Market and Industry report by UCC, and still growing, it can be 
argued that Facebook and other social media platforms are the way of the future for public 
engagement on civic matters.  
Although Facebook has arguably been used to circulate falsehoods and manipulate information in 
favour of one‘s camp during elections (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 221), this was not the case 
in Uganda‘s 2016 elections as seen off the NTV Facebook page. The page reveals rational debate 
of issues as citizens‘ dialogue with each other, prompting government‘s excessive demonstration 
of power through the aforementioned shut down. One of the journalists who covered the 2016 
elections at NTV confirms the volume of activity ahead of the polls: 
Government came out and said that the reason as to why social media was shut down was 
to try to reduce on incitement, it was a very volatile period. But in my opinion, it was 
gagging the mouths and also restricting freedom of speech because some of us were 
giving constant updates.(Respondent L, 24 April 2018). 
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The liberating power of Facebook has seen governments continue to censure it (Gumede, 2016; 
Shirky, 2011). For the case of Uganda, such censure is contrary to Article 29 (1) of the country‘s 
1995 constitution, allowing for freedom of speech and expression. But as noted by Chibita and 
Ugangu (2017: 252), control of social media is sometimes justified on grounds of countering 
terrorism and shutting dissenting voices. This then begs the question on where such occasional 
and often unpredictable censure places the freedom to participate on Facebook, especially since 
the platform is inherently self-regulating.  Some of the online content managers interviewed at 
NTV are supportive of some level of regulation of online platforms.  
I think there are people who misuse social media. We have so many pseudo accounts 
purporting to be NTV Uganda and they post content attacking ministers, attacking 
businessmen and these people come in complaining. Some think of taking us to court but 
the content is not ours. If the regulation is to such kinds of people who post fake news that 
is okay. But not to gag free speech (Respondent E, 19 April 2018). 
In conclusion, it is important to note that indeed television media and institutions of government 
interfere with the public sphere, but this interference has not proven to be capable of completely 
dismantling the sphere‘s discursive nature. 
A more recent interference on the part of government in Uganda has been the introduction of a 
social media tax. This tax, as discussed in chapter two, has been implemented despite 
contestation from citizens who have decried the limitations to freedom of expression that come 
with it. This is similar to arguments in Britain and elsewhere in Europe when taxation was 
contested in an effort to safeguard the unlimited formation of public opinion on pertinent issues 
(Lee, 1976: 22). In addition, efforts to shut down Facebook and other social media for the case of 
Uganda have proven futile. This is coupled with the fact that the Facebook platform is largely 
unmoderated, even when followers are posting off the page of a media house. Several incidences 
of use of social media reveal that Facebook can be used to bring about change. Uganda is no 
exception, given the high levels of engagement. The researcher is nonetheless cognisant of the 
uneven access to the Internet in Uganda (Kalinaki, 2016), which in itself hampers the ability for 
online engagement (Mitchelstein and Boczkowski, 2009: 575). Nonetheless, as Internet 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: Synthesis of thought 
 
Introduction 
This study set out to investigate how Facebook followers engaged with news content off the page 
of a local television station, NTV.  The study investigates the use of Facebook as a public sphere 
in Uganda. The study is premised on the increasing stifling of public communication spaces by 
the government of Uganda, contrary to provisions of the 1995 constitution that guarantee 
freedom of speech and expression. With the hindsight of closure of radio talk shows in the 
country, the study investigates how citizens who have taken to Facebook as an alternative space 
for commentary on the country‘s political discourse use the platform. On this platform, a struggle 
for control of the political discourse is seen amongst the netizens/citizens, the media and the state. 
Whereas the platform indeed avails an alternative space for debating the country‘s political 
discourse, the government of Uganda shuts down Facebook and the entire Internet at the height 
of the 2016 presidential polls. 
The study therefore sought an understanding of the nature of engagement by followers of the 
NTV Facebook page. NTV is one of the television stations seen to be critical of the state. And 
Facebook is the most popular social media site in Uganda.  
The study set out with the following objectives: 
1. To determine how Nation Television used Facebook in engaging followers on the 
political discourse during Uganda‘s 2016 elections. 
2. To examine the nature of engagement on Facebook as a public sphere. 
3. To establish the ways in which television media and institutions of government interfere 
with public participation on Facebook. 
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Contextualising the study 
Freedom of speech and expression in Uganda 
It can be argued that freedom of speech and expression in Uganda has frequently been a struggle 
and a concern of ordinary citizens. Right from the time of the colonial administration to the 
present media regulation under the NRM government, both the media and the population it serves 
have had to contend with and challenge several attempts sometimes unsuccessfully at denying 
them the inherent right to freedom of speech and expression. As seen earlier, these factions 
(media and citizens) have over the years registered some significant successes in this struggle. Up 
to the time of Uganda‘s independence in 1962, repression under colonial rule was contested 
through the alternative publication of indigenous and often nationalist-inclined newspapers. 
Whereas some of these newspapers were banned or failed to sustain production owing to the fines 
imposed on them, and other direct and indirect obstacles, this did not stop other titles from 
emerging. 
But even after independence, this struggle continued as the first governments attempted to turn 
the media into a conduit for their government propaganda. For example, this was seen under the 
government of Presidents Amin and both Obote governments (Tabaire, 2007). Such attempts 
were sometimes successful. For example, when in the 1970s the only television station in 
Uganda, Uganda Television, and the only radio station, Radio Uganda, were widely regarded as 
mainly presenting the voice of government (Chibita and Fourie, 2007). It can be argued that this 
repression has never stopped even if the NRM government was initially understood to be more 
accommodative of the Ugandan press (Tabaire, 2007). The fact that media freedom has continued 
to be stifled to the extent of generating self-censorship (Sekeba, 2017) is in itself evidence of 
such continued repression.  
The regulatory framework in Uganda has been designed in a way that limits press freedoms. For 
example, section 7 of the 2013 UCC Act gives powers to the Minister to ―give policy guidelines 
to the Commission [Uganda Communications Commission] regarding the performance of its 
functions. The Act further compels the Commission to comply with such policy guidelines. It can 
be argued that when at the height of the 2016 elections, the then Information Minister Hon. Jim 
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Muhwezi together with officials from UCC summoned editors from NTV to explain their 
editorial policies in relation to particular stories, they (Minister and UCC) had the backing of 
these regulatory provisions. But as explained by one of the editors (see chapter seven), the 
television station was saved by the fact that they had endeavoured to balanced the coverage and 
investigation of promises by all top contenders in the presidential race. This repression has now 
been extended to social media by way of occasional shutdowns and taxation. With the repression 
of the media comes ipso facto the repression of citizens as well. It can be concluded therefore that 
the struggle for freedom of speech and expression by both the media and citizens in Uganda 
continues. 
Facebook and mass media 
Facebook has made mass media more interactional by allowing traditional media to extend into 
the online sphere. In this sphere, mass media is able to solicit views and ideas both for news and 
about news and other current affairs. Whereas this extension of the newsroom and sharing of 
information is true for mass media, it is also true for other entities operating in the public sphere. 
These include the Facebook followers and the state, who are now not necessarily reliant on mass 
media for their information needs. Facebook has made it possible for these other entities to 
produce and share news from their perspective, often times ahead of traditional media. The 
traditional position of mass media as the sole bearer of facts on events and other issues is now 
therefore challenged.   
The news and subsequent ensuing discourses on Facebook are now not necessarily confined to 
the presentation and framing by the media. The implication of this is that the interactive nature of 
Facebook arguably has the potential to change the mass media logic of traditional media from 
one of disseminating information, to one that continuously allows engagement as well. This is 
especially so if mass media continue to have presence on Facebook and other social media 
platforms.  But such engagement can only take place if mass media allow themselves to be more 
responsive to the online audience.  
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The theoretical approach 
This study is premised on the increasing use of Facebook by citizens, the media and government 
in Uganda. The study chose the country‘s 2016 presidential elections to examine how these three 
factions interact on Facebook.  
The study therefore situates itself in the theory of the public sphere by Jurgen Habermas (1989), 
reborn in contemporary times through social media such as Facebook. Whereas Habermas sounds 
the demise of this theory with the onset of mass media, other scholars argue for its rebirth in the 
burgeoning social media platforms. Social media is looked at as a limitless platform connecting 
societies across the world. The vast reach and diverse options to enable engagement in forms 
such as videos, photos, text and other graphic representations on social media have translated into 
an unprecedented source of power to citizens, governments and organisations, enabling them to 
communicate beyond borders (Cheung, Chiu and Lee, 2011).  
The forcefulness with which Facebook as the leading social media platform is used in political 
discourse therefore implies that the public sphere is not only alive, but is almost limitless in 
connecting communities. These communities keep abreast with political developments not only 
in their respective countries but in the wider web of various communities connected online. With 
this hindsight, the study analyses Facebook at the height of the aforementioned elections, during 
which period social media and the Internet were shut down in Uganda for a while. From this 
perspective, the study attempts to build on theorising of the public sphere from an African 
context, to fill a gap in literature (Caldwell, 2017: 121). 
The study further employs the agenda setting theory by McCombs and Shaw (1972) to make 
meaning of the choice of traditional media in joining the online public sphere. Traditional media 
is known for its ability to set the agenda for public discourse. And as McCombs and Shaw (1972) 
put it, the media do not tell people what to think but do tell them what to think about. This study 
therefore interrogates whether the traditional media has carried with it its agenda-setting role, in 
order to influence the political discourse happening online. The study concludes with an 
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inclination towards the demise of traditional media‘s agenda setting role in the context of social 
media. 
The methodological approach: synthesis of Habermas and Foucault 
The study is qualitative in nature and premises in the interpretivist philosophy to understand the 
behaviour of Facebook followers. Consequently, the research assumes a subjective position in 
studying Facebook. Qualitative research is said to have the ability to transform the world and 
make it visible through interpretive, material practices (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 3). The study 
employs online ethnography (netnography) and in-depth interviews to enable detailed gathering 
of information on the political discourse on Facebook. Data is analysed through a combination of 
discourse analysis and thematic analysis. The discourse analysis situates the study in political 
communication and discusses discourse as it relates to the enactment of power by powerful 
groups in society, and how such power is discursively resisted by the less powerful.  
By looking at Facebook as a public sphere and by discussing how the entities meeting in this 
public sphere interact, this thesis has brought two theorists- Habermas and Foucault together. 
And as argued later in the section, this thesis finds commonality in their thoughts as applied to 
the context of Uganda. The two theorists are said to have disregarded each other‘s works at 
different points of their writing. For example, Nancy Love (1989: 270), explains how Habermas 
argued that Foucault was anti-modern, due to the latter‘s rejection of views on modernity such as 
the assertion that man was likely to be erased, similar to a face drawn in the sand. Habermas 
further castigated Foucault for belonging to a group of young conservatives, which according to 
Holub (1985: 242) is evidence that his works were not to be well received at least in Germany 
unlike France and the United States of America. Holub (1985) further notes that part of this 
criticism owes to the fact that some of Foucault‘s writings were seen to be obscure and 
intentionally evasive. This, nonetheless, is not to say that the gaps in some of Foucault‘s works 
tantamount to an overall rejection of his contribution towards politics and scholarship (Holub, 
1985: 242). 
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This thesis is more concerned with the views of both Habermas and Foucault on discourse as it 
applies to humanity. From the point of view of the public sphere, discourse or conversation takes 
place in the public sphere and as observed by Habermas (1989), such conversation is underpinned 
by rationality. Holub (1985: 246) observes that this concern for rationality is a point of similarity 
in both the works of Habermas and Foucault. He argues that the fact that both of them write 
during the same historical period, denoted by the holocaust and failures of socialism, could 
explain the similarity. But on the notion of discourse, Holub (1985: 247) argues that the views of 
Habermas and Foucault are divergent. Habermas understands discourse as a meta-linguistic 
interaction and talks of the consensus of free subjects who apply language in reaching agreement. 
Habermas consequently envisions a realm in which power is detached from debates. In this 
realm, participants enter on equal terms and put aside personal interests. In this postulation, 
Habermas idealises discourse. On the other hand, Foucault presents the argument that power is 
resident in discourse and that it is implicated in all knowledge. 
But the findings of this research present a different scenario in relation to the arguments of 
Habermas and Foucault. This thesis seeks to draw a correlation between Habermas and Foucault 
on discourse and power. I argue that there is a possibility of common thought in what each of 
them is saying. Here is how: Habermas‘ notion of the public sphere and discourse, also as argued 
above by Holub (1985), allows for subjects to interact freely and on equal terms. This therefore 
implies that any attempts at using discourse to exert power in this realm of debate disrupts its 
discursive nature. If Foucault argues for power as a discursive relationship and that no one should 
be seen to wield it over another person or group of people (McHoul and Grace, 1993: 21), then it 
can be argued that Foucault and Habermas are saying the same thing. Foucault is against the 
extremes of power that allow official discourse to over assert itself(McHoul and Grace, 1993: 
21), while Habermas is arguably in support of equality in discourse in the public sphere. From 
this perspective, both of them are advocating for free speech and rational debate, unhampered by 
a show of power or might, or as seen in this thesis unhampered by an attempt by the state and the 
media to have control of the public sphere of rational debate. It can be concluded therefore that 
Foucault and Habermas‘ ideas on discourse and power, interpreted as ideas on the discursive 
nature on the public sphere of Facebook in Uganda, are valid and similar. Foucault and Habermas 
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therefore thrive in Uganda‘s context and there is hardly any lost opportunity for synthesis of 
thought by both. 
Findings of the study and their implications 
From ekimeeza to FaceBimeeza: An invigorated public sphere in Uganda 
In establishing how the Facebook followers engaged on the platform, the study revealed that 
these followers engaged in a rational manner while debating the news content. In this rationality, 
the followers use Facebook as a public sphere in which they hold government accountable by 
resisting oppression of political opponents, as reported in the news. In what the study terms as 
‗resistance‘, this construct is seen in the following dimensions: contesting media framing of 
issues, demand for better governance, rejection of interference in the public sphere, and 
resistance by sharing experiences of better practice from elsewhere. The followers of the page are 
seen to support one another, as they speak almost in unison against the aforementioned 
oppressive actions of the state.  
In the election period, most of the stories that attracted a high number of comments on Facebook 
and were consequently analysed for this study, showed opposition presidential candidates in a 
constrained electoral environment ahead of the polls. The Facebook followers therefore 
demanded explanations from the state and its machinery. The debate surrounding the Facebook 
discussion is rational and centres on a demand for good governance. This debate is not just a 
demonstration of voters supporting their preferred candidates and therefore using Facebook to 
discredit the state. Rather, these followers present their own account of events. In addition, the 
resistance and contestation of media framing of issues manifests throughout the period of 
elections as per the stories selected. Below is a list of stories selected for analysis:  
 January 1, 2016: Mbabazi expresses concerns over being shadowed by unknown men. 
Mbabazi fears that the men could be harbouring a sinister plot to harm him 
 January 3, 2016: Police deploy to block Besigye's school visits. Besigye tricked police 
who were trailing him and sneaked to a dam where animals share water with locals 
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 January 5, 2016: EC says the recent ban on visits to hospitals and places of worship for 
presidential candidates was not based on any law but on concern for privacy of patients 
and worshippers 
 January 6, 2016: Rugunda warns Besigye against defiance campaign. The premier also 
defended the role of crime preventers, saying they are critical in reinforcing the police that 
is thin on the ground 
 February 14, 2016: Debate panelist Shaka Ssali barred from asking president questions. 
For him to appear at the second debate, a government spokesperson has revealed that 
some conditions had to be met 
 February 18, 2016: ED UCC, Godfrey Mutabazi says Mobile Money and social media 
were shut down because there was information that people were using these to bribe 
voters 
 February 19, 2016: Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have been arrested in Najjanakumbi 
 February 20, 2016: Kiggundu: The commission declares candidate Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni as the elected President of Uganda this 20 February 2016  
This thesis therefore posits that in Uganda, Facebook is a true public sphere, where rational 
debate takes place. Facebook followers are seen to successfully safeguard this public sphere from 
manipulation by both the media and the state. The media‘s manipulation is seen in attempting to 
be the sole bearer of topics for discussion, while that of the state is seen through the closure of 
Facebook. In both instances, Facebook followers manage to overcome this manipulation and 
regain control of the Facebook public sphere, where they continue to debate the country‘s 
political discourse. The study contests the assertion by Javuru (2013: 372) that online discussions 
in Uganda are not based on rationality. The study further draws a correlation between the defunct 
radio talk shows popularly known as ebimeeza, with engagement on Facebook.  
Considering that the prior equivalent of a public sphere that manifested in these radio talk shows 
was clamped down by the state in 2009, this thesis argues that citizens have now found its 
replacement on Facebook. Facebook is arguably Uganda‘s new online ekimeeza (singular) or 
ebimeeza (plural). Whereas the state described Facebook as a place for lugambo (gossip) 
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(Kimuyu 2018), the Facebook discussions as per this thesis are not of gossip or cheap talk. The 
empirical evidence in this study has demonstrated that Facebook is far from the alleged descriptor 
as a place for lugambo. It is ekimeeza for rational debate. 
On the Facebook ebimeeza, herein coined as FaceBimeeza, the citizens/followers are at liberty to 
exercise their freedom of speech and expression, as provided for in the country‘s 1995 
constitution. This is done oblivious of the well-known state surveillance of online activity, so 
much that citizens dare call the person of the president to task. Unlike the clamped down radio 
ebimeeza, the FaceBimeeza avail an unlimited space and allows for more creativity in expression 
of views. Such creativity, as argued by Cheung, Chiu and Lee (2011: 1340), can take on various 
forms such as text, audio, video or other graphic representations.  
It can be argued therefore that the Facebook ebimeeza (FaceBimeeza) are much more 
empowering to those who engage. This argument is cognisant of the fact that some comments 
posted on Facebook and deemed inappropriate can be pulled down or deleted by the television 
station. The station justifies such deletions as targeted at hate speech and vulgar language, but not 
reasoned arguments. The study was unable to analyse some of the deleted comments for a proper 
understanding of the structuring of their content, since they were already deleted and no record 
was available. Nonetheless, traditionally, the public sphere has been known to be a space for 
rational debate, not hate speech or vulgarities. In addition, Facebook, just like other social media 
platforms, is self-regulating. It can therefore be argued that the deletion of some of the alleged 
inappropriate Facebook comments by NTV does not take away the overall constructive 
engagement seen on the platform. In addition, the online content managers at NTV explained that 
the platform was in most cases left unmoderated, partly as a result of insufficient staffing levels 
to monitor all posts and also to allow the followers to debate freely.     
Furthermore, the Facebook followers were seen to comment on the news content at any time of 
the day and in subsequent days, long after a story is posted. This is evidence that unlike the 
physical ebimeeza that required participants to be present in the public houses where these 
ebimeeza were hosted, or to listen and call-in with their comments (Nassanga, 2008; Brisset-
Foucault, 2013), the online version is not time bound. By implication, Facebook can therefore be 
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harnessed to allow for almost unrestricted feedback between the state and citizens of Uganda. 
This feedback is unrestricted in the sense that the study is cognisant of limitations in access to the 
Internet across the country. Political conversation on interactive technologies allows for citizens‘ 
opinions and perspectives to be represented. Such technologies can therefore be harnessed to 
create a strong democracy, bringing citizens together for discussion and deliberation on 
community and policy matters (Stromer-Galley, 2017: 837). 
Traditional media on Facebook: Implications for agenda setting 
This study has posited that traditional media of television operates in fear of being overtaken by 
Facebook. Indeed, the confession of one of the editors at NTV that Facebook is a threat, says it 
best: ―Our biggest threat every time we have a meeting is that Facebook is our biggest 
competition. It is not the mobile phone, it is Facebook because Facebook can go any platform. It 
is on the computer, it is on the tablet and it is on the phone,‖ (Respondent B, 17 April 2018). 
Consequently, television has deliberately joined Facebook to extend its newsroom and attempt to 
influence the online agenda of the country‘s political discourse. On Facebook, television is 
desirous of retaining control as the initiator of topics for national discourse - similar to its agenda 
setting role in the offline mode.  
However, this is not possible as the political discourse on Facebook remains in the hands of 
Facebook followers. These followers express their freedom of speech in debating the topics 
introduced by the media and debating other topics of choice. The study therefore agrees with 
McCombs (2005) on the argument that traditional media‘s agenda setting role faces demise in the 
online environment. Uganda‘s Facebook public sphere has neutralised television‘s agenda setting 
role. This has been demonstrated by Facebook followers‘ ability to take charge of the political 
discourse, conclusively discussing issues from their experiences.   
In addition, the concept of truth as presented by the media is now contested. The truth and 
accuracy as reflected in news stories, as often guided by ethos of journalism, now has to contend 
with another truth and presentation via issues raised by Facebook followers. This implies that 
media is no longer the sole bearer of the true account of events. In discussing the notion of truth, 
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Foucault observes that truth is produced by allowing several contestations of phenomenon, and 
that such truth has effects on power. Societies therefore shape what is agreeable to them as truth 
and what type of discourse is permissible (Gordon, 1980: 131-132): 
Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish between true and false statements, the means by which 
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. Truth is centred 
on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to 
constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic 
production as for political power); it is an object under diverse forms of immense 
diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information 
whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding  certain strict 
limitations); It is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of 
a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, 
it is an issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‗ideological‘ struggles) 
McHouland Grace (1993: 19) agree with Foucault that there are multiple truths. They add that of 
importance is to understand which of these truths takes precedent at any one time. In the setting 
of social media, a combination of reports from traditional media and online submissions from 
ordinary people are crucial in projecting a more reflective impression of events (Barnes, 2012). 
This argument is not oblivious of the fact that social media has been used and continues to be 
used to circulate falsehoods. It is rather a presentation of empirical evidence of a true account of 
events for the case of Uganda‘s 2016 election period.  
Control in the public sphere: A failed attempt to curb political discourse 
Whereas Facebook is a free platform for all its congregants, the study discovered that followers 
of Facebook in Uganda still have to contend with two levels of regulation or control. One of these 
levels is by the media house and the second by the state. Whereas the above section has shown 
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followers overpowering the media in influencing the agenda, the media arguably retains control 
over their posts since it can choose to delete these posts or ban/block particular followers from 
the page. But as seen in the non-responsive nature of television, coupled with the overwhelming 
number of posts, Facebook followers retained control of the discourse on Facebook over the 
media. Television staff members were unable to monitor each and every post during the 2016 
elections. The overwhelming number of posts was therefore further confirmation that regulation 
of Facebook is in contrast with its inherent nature as a public sphere. The public sphere is meant 
to be a place of unrestricted entry, exit and participation. Indeed, even attempts by the state to 
regulate this space by way of shutting down social media were futile as people used virtual 
private networks to bypass the blockade. It is based on these two premises: i) the ability to 
overcome the media and ii) the ability to circumvent control by the state,  that this study confirms 
that Facebook is more in the hands of ordinary citizens and is a public sphere.  
In Habermas‘ narrative (1989), the intervention of the state and the media is said to have led to 
the disintegration of the public sphere. In contrast with today‘s Facebook public sphere, this 
study argues that the intervention of the state and the media is unlikely to cause disruption of the 
public sphere. This could partly be because, as noted by Eriksson et al. (2009), the Internet is not 
entirely in the control of any institution. Institutions are only able to control certain aspects of the 
Internet. Social media as a public sphere will by implication hopefully continue to thrive in 
Uganda. 
Contribution to the body of knowledge 
The theory of the public sphere 
This study has contributed to theorising of the public sphere in the context of Uganda by 
examining the activities of the state, the media and Facebook followers. These entities are seen to 
be in conflict over control of the public sphere, as each of them struggles to control discourse. 
The Facebook followers emerge ‗victorious‘ in controlling this discursive space.  
The study has established that similar to the public sphere of the feudal middle ages, Facebook 
has provided a space for rational debate by Ugandans. These citizens congregate in this sphere as 
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equals and debate issues from their experiences. It is from this perspective that the study has 
linked Facebook to the clamped down radio talk shows and coined a new term, Facebook 
ekimeeza or Facebook ebimeeza.  These online ebimeeza allow citizens to exercise their freedom 
of speech and expression as constitutionally provided for. And as such, the Facebook followers 
are seen to be protective of this public sphere. This protectiveness gets to its peak when followers 
bypass the government shut down of social media platforms and use Facebook to scorn the state 
for its failed attempt.   
The Facebook public sphere is in addition not limiting to Ugandans only. Comments on the NTV 
Facebook page were noticed from other followers from neighbouring countries such as Kenya. 
The Facebook public sphere is therefore inclusive beyond borders. In addition, this all-inclusive 
Facebook public sphere is accommodative of both men and women. The gender difference does 
not arise to weigh-in on submissions. The Facebook followers debate purely based on merit. 
The agenda setting theory 
In relation to the agenda setting theory, the study brings forth the argument that the agenda 
setting role of the media conflicts with the interactive nature of Facebook. This is especially so 
owing to presence of various agendas from the state and netizens, which conflict with that of 
traditional media. The study has established that in this conflict of agendas and by extension a 
power struggle over who controls the political discourse, the Facebook followers retain an upper 
hand. Consequently, traditional media‘s agenda setting role is threatened in the online public 
sphere. As pointed out by Roese (2018: 315) users of Facebook and other social media produce 
and share content amongst themselves, consequently bypassing the media‘s agenda setting 
function. In addition, issues of concern come from several places and not just the media. Such 
places, as argued by Erbring et al. (1980) include personal experiences and conditions in the real 
world.   
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Methodology 
Methodologically, the study has presented a combination of netnography and in-depth interviews 
in analysing the posts on a traditional media‘s Facebook page. The particular steps of how this 
online ethnography was conducted were helpful in understanding the nature of engagement on 
Facebook in Uganda. Explanations on how the study handled the big data synonymous with 
enquiry on social media were availed. The discursive analysis has combined the works of 
Foucault and Habermas in relation to discourse and power in the public realm. 
Confines of the study 
It should be noted that whereas the elections in Uganda are called presidential and parliamentary 
elections, this study focuses only on the presidential aspect of these elections. The reason for not 
tackling the parliamentary election is that it has to be judged on a different set of criteria. There 
are hundreds of candidates, each with individual circumstances. Such a study would produce an 
umbrella conclusion. But by prioritising the presidential aspect of the elections, the study is much 
more focused and can more clearly discern the impact of the political discourse on Facebook as a 
public sphere and how the agenda-setting role of the media was orchestrated. The elections 
attracted eight presidential aspirants, most of whom took their campaign to social media.  
In addition, whereas there are several social media platforms used in Uganda, this study 
concentrates on the use of the Facebook platform of NTV for the period of the 2016 elections. 
This is justified by the fact that Facebook is the most popularly used platform in the country. In 
relation to this focus is the fact that the study investigates NTV, a television station seen to be 
critical of the state. It is possible that the Facebook followers of this station could be more 
orientated towards a critical approach to the state and its machinery. By implication, the 
overwhelming resistance in the nature of engagement can perhaps be linked to this orientation. A 
separate study, focusing on a Facebook page of the government owned broadcaster may produce 
different results. Nonetheless, the rationality seen on the Facebook page of NTV would arguably 
exonerate this study, given the fact that the submissions from followers come off as well 
 194 
reasoned and are diverse in nature. And of course, being a political matter, it might also be 
argued that enemies as well as sympathisers are attracted to such Facebook sites. 
Areas for further research in the sphere 
Whereas this study has highlighted how the government of Uganda directed telecommunication 
companies to effect the Internet shut down at the height of the 2016 elections, a proper analysis 
of how these companies control activity on social media in general minus government directives 
requires a follow up investigation. These companies, such as MTN, Airtel and Uganda Telecom 
compete in selling Internet and data services (Ndiwalana and Tusubira, 2012). It would be 
instructive to research how this competition affects Internet users in Uganda. 
Another interesting study in the wider sphere would be a comparison of the issue agendas as seen 
off traditional media and those seen off the pages of social media influencers. It would be 
revealing to interrogate the reciprocity between these two agenda to know if the media agenda is 
picked up and replicated by Facebook/social media followers to influence debate elsewhere. This 
kind of study would likely have ramifications for the ripple effect of the agenda setting role of the 
media in the online space. It would conceptualise and debate the argument and assertion that the 
media‘s agenda setting role faces demise. 
Whereas this thesis has focused specifically on television, a succeeding study could be 
undertaken to compare how other traditional media of print and radio interact with their online 
audiences across the official social media platforms. 
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Appendix C: Collection of stories and comments for analysis 
This appendix shows the overall nature of engagement on the NTV Facebook page across the 
eight stories and 240 comments chosen for analysis. Two streams of engagement with varying 
dimensions are demonstrated by this data set. One of these streams is rational debate on 
Facebook, demonstrated under the dimension of i) Acceptance of news content and ii) Resistance 
of news content. The second stream of engagement shows Facebook followers in dialogue. This 
dialogue is demonstrated as i) Followers in agreement and ii) followers in disagreement, with one 
another.  
Nature of engagement: Rational debate of media content 
Story 1: 
January 1, 2016: Mbabazi expresses concerns over being shadowed by unknown men. 
Mbabazi fears that the men could be harbouring a sinister plot to harm him 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. Mbabazi should know that more is still to come and he will soon understand the true 
meaning of being a member of opposition in Uganda. When he was enjoying the comfort 
of his long time friend, Dr. Besigye was sprayed, his finger was shot. 
2. I can't sympathize with Mbabazi, he has caused a lot of pain and suffering to people and 
those supporting him are doing it purely for selfish reasons. Why didn't he stand firm on 
his feet while in government and say no to injustice and oppression? When Besigye was 
nearly killed where was Mbabazi? Mwesige Besigye,!!!!! he is a straight, clean and 
focused man that is firm and stands for justice and equal rights. And by the way, who is 
Mbabazi? M7 has successfully dealt with more powerful, influential  
3. I want to hear that Col Besigye is in gd conditions. others like him, i don‘t care. it‘s his 
turn, let him suffer 
4. He said police was working within the law the day his (KB) car was smashed and sprayed 
with pepper in eyes at Mulago. 
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5. Some of us in kasangati ve faced more than knives and bars with besigye so that man 
jpam should stop crying like a baby 
6. Mbabazi should live NTV and other media channels Churches, Mosques, and Ekidieli 
(Uganda Ferry) alone let him do his campaign in peace not threatening Uganda people 
7. thats what him mbabazi sowed and now is the time to reap 
8. Sorry JPAM, your yet to see more, and imagine wat Besigye has been going thru. 
9. In fact for i hv one word ! Besigye is a true pipo's president Ugandans please vote DR 
besigye come 18feb 2016 
10. The US aspiring president promises to imprison museveni and Mugabe if elected in the 
US. Washington DC, US business mogul Donald 
Trump has put Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Ugandan President , on notice, 
vowing to deal with them ruthlessly when he ascends to Presidency. Speaking while 
addressing war veterans in Washington, Trump warned other likeminded dictators who 
want to die in power, that their time is up and it‘s just a matter of time before they face 
justice. ―I want to reiterate here before America‘s greatest heroes that I will not 
condone any dictatorial tendencies exhibited by dictators around the world especially the 
two old men from Zimbabwe and Uganda‖ Mugabe and Museveni must be put on notice 
that their days are numbered and that I am going to arrest them and lock them in prison. If 
the past American administrations have failed to stop these two despots, I will personally 
do it‖ Mugabe and Museveni have given the world enough troubles and it‘s about time 
someone puts to an end all these madness for peace to prevail‖ Sid Trump who seemed 
unapologetic. If Obama fears them, I will never fear them. If Clinton and Bush feared 
them, If the Pope kneels before them, I will never be reduced to that level. I will never be 
cowed. I promise to clean all the political mess around the world and promote 
international justice‖ Added Trump arrogantly. 
11. We know dat m7 z under tensions frm mbabazi and kizza dat z y hz trying to creat fears 
on us. Bt let mi asure Ugandans dat, failure brings madness and stress well trying to arrest 
situation so dat z de current status of m7 and hz gov't. I wsh him bad luck and pray to God 
to restore change in dz ctry Uganda. Amen 
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12. Let him give us way # team ✌, nobody will sympyiz with u Mbabazi...leave politics to 
film star Col; Besigye. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story 
 
Story 2: 
January 3, 2016  Police deploy to block Besigye's school visits. Besigye tricked police who 
were trailing him and sneaked to a dam where animals share water with locals.  
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. Why can't sevo also visit these schools.... Of course he would be ashamed of himself, tax 
payers drinking water with animals mbu steady progress 
2. this man is giving Ec headache ...am expecting Ec to issue a statement no more visting 
water sources ...hahah uganda zaabu 
3. It's really unfair to the people of Nankasongola to share that dirty water with animals. 
Billions of shillings have been lost through corruption which could help them get clean 
water. 
4. KIGUNDU $ KAYAIHURA doesn't know their work. EC stood up and warn candidates 
not to go to church. I think he has no right to stop someone from praising GOD. and 
kayaira stop misusing taxpayers money, whats wrong if BESINGYE visits hospitals or 
schools? shame on you 
5. Mr kayihura, this is just a humble request. Please stop wasting taxpayers money in 
meaningless deployments. Think before u issue or follow that silly order. Deploy our men 
where there is value for money and time spent. 
6. if they have done a lot in 30 years of there rule as NRM, why don't they a shame Dr.Kiiza 
for always telling lies to ugandans? why deploying heavy Police force? It means they 
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have done nothing in 30 years and indeed they have rotten health centres ad schools. 
Shame on Museveni. 
7. Campaign of defiance, NRM is underdog here. handsup surrender to Uganda 
Magufuli."KIIZA BESIGYE". 
8. I petty Uganda police. How wd I know that pipo share water with cattle if they had not 
blocked him? 
9. They r d vry pipo who always scream mbu NRM pakalast....Nw Museveni wil reach dea 
nd mek empty promises....mbu he wil supply tap water in al dea houses .... let them drink 
promises 
10. Besigye is a rapist, Amama I will give you a try. 
11. Police men without lank they can't control col kiiza besigye fast of all there primitive. 
12. The police officers should be fired, how could Besigye sneak out of them? 
13. Animals have single suit and nothing is hidden of them. NRM government is like those 
animals with single suit. Now the keys are in the hands of Ugandans to open the house of 
freedom am enjoying the last kicks of a dying horse... bye bye Museveni 
14. What besigye is doing is good let the ec allow the man to contiue so that p'ple can see the 
weakneses of Museveni 
15. Being doctor is not for everyone ..that s why other s have no qualifications. ..Ugandans 
unless embrace change as the only constant in life. .but if they don't Ugandans will 
continue suffering. 
16. #voteDrkizzabesigye 2016 to mark the end of dictatorship in Uganda  
17. the truth of the matter js, Museveni, Besigye and Mbabazi are just power hungry no 
leadershipki 
18. No rtreat no surrender #DR KB our presdo come feb the choice of People In Arua&west 
Nile 
19. It is in Uganda where it is a crime for someone to contest as a president even when was 
nominated by the National electrole commission 
20. Next time police should guard water resources 
21. People died at beaches where was police to protect them 
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22. Ntv also, don't say Dr. BESIGYE sneaked, the Dr went majestically to the pond in the 
name of a dam. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 




January 5, 2016 EC says the recent ban on visits to hospitals and places of worship for 
presidential candidates was not based on any law but on concern for privacy of patients and 
worshippers. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. EC supports M7. have the patients &the worshipers complained that besigye should 
not go to them? EC must watch out. 
2. the few hospitals and schools Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye has visited people have 
welcomed him with great Joy and he has be prayed for in the churches so can the EC 
give examples of who complained? 
3. The Ec is neither religious nor health affiliated. So Kigundu stop confusions but pray 
to God to remove the incompetence in you. For you are partisan according to your 
statement. 
4. My qtn 2 de Ec, have de church, hospitals, shls etc raised complains about political 
leader visting such place? f nt, then y stop them 4rm visting such places?? 
5. Thank you EC for being concerned about our privacy but why don't you worry about 
the privacy and safety of our votes and let the Medical teams and the Religious teams 
worry about patients and Sick people.  
6. There were some people who wanted to see Jesus and they decided to build a tower to 
heaven BT time came and they started talking un cordinatedly and they failed. 
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Something we are seeing here. They are all in the same government BT talk 
differently. Why implement something that is out of law yet m7 himself doesn't 
respect it? He went to many prayer places at the new year eve BT could Besigye be 
allowed to do such? Dictators. 
7. implying that if your a presidential candidate... you should never fall sick... neither 
should you pray till campaigns are done 
8. What a shame! Taremwa always arrogantly says the EC follows only the law to the 
dot. The very reason defiance is inevitable. 
9. Undue influence & unconsciouness lead to an unnecessary justification of stupid 
decisions. This is so clear, some people have dark intentions & don't want 2 be 
exposed or to expose their wickedness & treahcious acts. Sincerely if hospitals are in 
good conditions, why would people prevent someone from accessing them, Christ 
Jesus said "whatever is hidden shall come out & whatever is done in the dark shall be 
brought to light". 
10. But proper politics is about issues inculding provision of services for the electorate. 
The more reason the contestants are free to visit these facilities like schools, hospitals, 
rehabilitation centers etc to view how satisfactorily they have been managed in order 
to design a work plan in case any of them win. Its good politics to allow freedom to all 
candidates in these places. Even for the incumbent what we know many officials 
along the line of service provision have just been fleecing govt money from the 
ministries down to the district while giving the executive false reports about what they 
ve done on ground. Therefore exposing the rot will help the incumbent to strengthen 
the managemnt team to ensure good service provision. That is my view as a 
management analyst. 
11. The EC works under of M7. The law in Uganda is M7. 
12. What will the Ec do if the candidates fail to observe the ban since there is no law. Let 
these pipo think before they act 
13. mr kigundu one day you will stand alone before ugandans to explain these whim-
based pronnouncements. now there is no law but a pronnouncement was made by the 
EC, a body you head. you are legally cooked! 
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14. But the politicians are also visiting the hospitals out of concern for their poor states. 
Stop unlawfulness. Do your work to avoid finding yourself in hell 
15. I really support EC because it driving us where want to show the public want it means 
to get even 1% from NRM stage managed election. and they will take us where we 
want them to reach 
16. Hospitals, schools etc are in bad conditions becoz these greedy officials have 
insurance policies non of them goes there becoz they have collected wealth through 
corruption. Now they prevent Besigye from exposing them. U find a Ugandan 
chanting NRM wen he can't pay bills of a cheapest private clinic yet those he is 
supporting fly out their kids to deliver from 1st world countries. 
17. These candidates are members of different religious sects and therefore have to seek 
providence from their God. I have no problem seeing a candidate in a worship place. 
Salvation is for all! 
18. Then why waste time using the word "ban" when you have no authority. When you 
ban you anticipate breach. What was ECs plan in case of breach since you have no 
law to back your case in court? Criminal, constitutional, human rights? #justridiculous 
19. who complained to the EC???????? Patients or worshipers. 
20. Patients and worshippers are not complaining. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 
1. It is not like they refused the politicians to visit the facilities, it is the timing that is 
hypocritical. For a man like Amama who is partially responsible for the current state of 
the hospitals to visit them for vote purposes is pure mockery. As for Besigye, he should 
have visited the hospitals in normal times not campaigning period. 
2. This time EC is right here. Hospitals are not for campaigns. You trumatise those patients 
more by exposing them on TVs and social media. I think politicians would still gain 
popularity by donating to the hospitals other than visiting just to gain cheap popularity. 
3. Kale Kaihura & kiggundu r protecting their jobs by accepting m7 order, anyway they 
know that no law aveils on candidates visit to hospitals or schools, so they see that when 
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they part away 4rm m7 vos orders there fired, nd u pple well know employment is a 
problem, so lets blem m7 nd his supportes thats all 
 
Story 4 
January 6, 2016: Rugunda warns Besigye against defiance campaign. The premier also 
defended the role of crime preventers, saying they are critical in reinforcing the police that 
is thin on the ground. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. But if you feel people still love your regime, why continue panicking with wanting to 
police the whole country like a cafew has been declared. I have seen popular 
governments like the one of tanzania where the president moves with a thin security 
as compared to Mr. rugundas that moves with mambos, police and ultimately now 
crime preventers. Anyway go cast your votes coz I Personally, i retired from voting in 
2006 and will return to voting when the RULE OF LAW too returns which at the 
moment is dead. 
2. SHEM ON YOU! old for nothing man; mbabazi used to talk like you do and as per 
now, he is being locked outside radio stations. u seems to be learned but u cant tell 
your boss that he is a dictator. having been in politics for long, you never learnt from 
history and as per now you cant read the timing. an educated being serving in a 
dictatorial government! 
3. Your warning besigye about defiance u think it's the first time is hearing that this 
goverment u waste slot of time on non lmpotant issues that's why u have failed to do 
what your supposed to all the time besigye I thought is a presidential candidate to like 
president m7 and that's one of his ways is going to see that he wins and becomes 
president of republic of Uganda well we know most of you people in the NRM you 
fear to here that but truth this man m7 this time is going to go defiance is going to 
work 
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4. Do they think the poorly motivated police is happy with this government. they are 
about to regret why they trained some of them. Don't be surprised to see this crime 
preventers being the source of violence against the government leading to a violent 
change. 
5. Rugunda is saying all these because of bulky amount of money given to him by his 
President Museven So Rugunda should watch out. 
6. Defiance, weBesigye we defy Rugunda warning our president, p10 is well working, 
we hold power no more intimidation 
7. Why are you afraid of the defiance campaign? Besigye is threatening these boys with 
mere words. It's fear that has seized them. WesigyeBesigye 
8. Rugunda worked with all the regimes of uganda and now he is warning kizza besigye? 
His ends will brings disaster to his children. 
9. Let Rugunda enjoy his money than being a puppet though that's what he was 
employed to be...Touch Besigye, incite violence..... We are tired of this regime that 
has murdered and impoverished Ugandans for their stay in 
power...#BesigyeIsOurPresidentElect, #WesigeBesigye, #LondaBesigye 
10. Vote Besigye as he is everything this country needs 
11. Besigye just coined a word, and has not acted, and defiance is very legal. Even merely 
participating in an election is defiance. The problem is that they fear the consequence 
of what they want to do (rig) and want to blame it on Besigye. 
12. i like difiance in relation to territorial behaviour among animals with in their 
territorries. so whowever is threatened by a mere word difiance should look for 
greener pastures else where because we are heading to ''a survival for the featest 
slogan'' i love the way the man talks about difiance 
13. Pse Ndugu Rugunda dont allow these people to spoil your name by Joining hate 
campaign against Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye you have been neutral all along and I think 
you should stay that way even after the collapse of this regime come feb 
14. Resistance nd defiance who is worse than the other. What does nrm resisting against? 
So if known, then kb is defying rightly. Hmmm rugunda take care of ur grands the 
being used to tarnish ur dignity mzee 
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15. Please ndugu Rugunda.can we know what the movement is resisting even when in 
power. Let us stop defining concepts in our own way esp.conceots not originated by 
us. I will suggest the Govt should stop wasting time on non issues. Just ask Besigye or 
FDC what they are defying. Such rwckle# actions and utterances may cause problems 
and we regret later. Uganda or Africa is bigger than all of us. Let us be peaceful come 
18th Feb. All this will go but let us avoid giving a reason for a looser to drug on way 
after claiming I was cheated. 
16. I hear defiance, some where people are give money to shun and defy opposition 
rallies, the big question who is defying who? 
17. NRM should leave besigye alone this is the sign of panic you are trying to tell us that 
your time is up why don't you come up and defend what Besigye says that you think is 
not true instead of scaring him and his supporters. We know you currently control 
everything do what you are supposed to do and let him do what he is supposed to do 
Besigye knows the law and he can't do anything out of it. You are just attracting our 
attention that he is really the next president of this beautiful peaceful green wealthy 
populated nation and a dream nation for many people around the world to live in. 
18. kifefe knows the medicine not the law pse its amama who knows law but its not on his 
side ensi nzibu mawe! i cant believe what he is going thru 
19. If Besigye has committed any crime, He should be brought to book under the laws of 
the republic of Uganda but not to decampaign him on allegations. No one is above the 
law he should be prosecuted if found guilty. 
20. All the public wants to know. Is 
-Under which Law do crime preventers come into existence.? 
-With the current deployment of UPF and UPDF why do we need such groups 
-how can the opposition trust a group of young men, that have been evidently seen 
dressed in NRM T-shirts in KOlolo 




Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story 
 
Story 5 
February 14, 2016: Debate panelist Shaka Ssali barred from asking president questions. 
For him to appear at the second debate, a government spokesperson has revealed that some 
conditions had to be met. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. If they can give conditions for just a debate I wonder how many such conditions have 
been given to EC's Kigundu! mbu for de sake of peace M7 Must win. 
2. That is a sign of dictatorship 
3. Is it safe to say that all other candidates were playing on levelled ground at the 
debate? He is used to having his way, he cdnt even do this one thing for Ugandans 
without pulling any strings and he expects us to still vote for a leader who dreads 
anything transparent and fair? Vote Besigye 
4. For people who know Shaka, it was evident he was threatened. That's one guy who 
will put you in a corner. Feel sorry for ma country Uganda 
5. Hahahha the first debate thy Claimed Allan was sent by M7 to grill Kizza now thy are 
coming up with stories mbu Shaka was barred...... These will be the same stories when 
mzee reclaims power 
6. Organisers failed the debate though they won the first. M7 who arrogantly said the 
debate was 4the school children bowed to them by accepting to attend this time. I 




Acceptance of news content 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story 
 
Story 6 
February 18, 2016: ED UCC, Godfrey Mutabazi says Mobile Money and social media were 
shut down because there was information that people were using these to bribe voters.  
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. These guys should upgrade their thinking. UCC never created Internet so it can never 
limit or block its accessibility 
2. How comes other countries can vote without blocking the social media and yet it's 
peaceful? 
If it's a peaceful free and fare elections as you claim and yet everyone knows that they 
can only cast one vote why do you bring out all militants and police fully armed?  
WE NEED CHANGE FOR UGANDA TO DEVELOP. 
3. Please tell them they are under qualified for the job because as you can see we 
managed to access them sites! 
4. Nonsense! @Using social media and mobile money to bribe voters. Really? Where 
were u when NRM was dishing out money in Mukono town to bribe voters? 
5. They did this in favour of one candidate who has brobed every one..but just look in a 
month. ,pple will be crying of commodities going up...soon a kilo of sugar will go to 
nine thousands to pull back the money they have spend in their campaign. therez no 
such thing mbu uganda decides #M7_decides 
6. Now UCC stop fooling around its Sevo that ordered you to shut down now your here 
saying Electoral Commission I wonder even What more are you hiding coz the whole 
world Knows Sevo rigged the votes 
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7. And time will come you celebrate Democratic martyrs like besigye as if you truly 
supported democracy when today you are the ones occult rating suppression of 
Ugandan peace. Vote and steal in this error is a bypass to literate democracy, Mark 
you change is inevitable 
8. They should have shut down even sms services, because I received a msge from the 
President M7 campaign team at 8.00 am advising me to vote Mr. M7 
9. Its so suprising! I cant tell who is fulling ugandans! Electoral commission have just 
said that they are not responsible for interferance in social media access that theirs is 
to arrange elections and yet ucc is just posting that they are waiting for 
communication from electoral commission on either to switch on social media 
networks. WHO IS FOOLING WHO? 
10. They want to ban us from access to information so that they can easily manipulate the 
out come of the results. Is there any who has bribed more than them? The möney they 
have been sending 2 villages? Access 2 information is a fundermental human right 
according 2 international standards. 
11. There are no ballots in opposition strongholds, be fair as we transition from H.EM7 to 
our DR.BESIGYE 
12. The government has failed to disperse voting material in time at the polling stations 
but can manage to cut off and sensor the media because it can!!! If this isn't an out 
right abuse of power and violation of people's freedoms I don't know what it is then. 
People who are still voting need to notice this and vote to change the situation in our 
country. This abuse of power should stop. #votethedictatorout 
13. I am watching you right now but Mutabazi of a man could not see in his thinking that 
if some one falls sick at a time of this nature they are not entitled to medical care 
given that government hospitals are poorly facilitated. I hate that kind of thinking 
from a grown up man of his nature 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story. 
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Story 7 
February 19, 2016: Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have been arrested in Najjanakumbi 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. this is serious 
2. Even in the Bible when Jesus entered into the Temple and found Isralites have 
changed it a market, he did not prayed for them he used violence to bring normance. 
So Ugandans if u want democracy be ready to shed blood. 
3. I am continually shocked at what Museveni does. I have a theory that Museveni has 
got sexual feelings for Besigye. Besigye turned him down. And since then, Museveni 
has made his life hell. That is the only thing makes sense to me. Surely, nobody can 
be that corrupt that they would make a mockery of democracy on this scale, 
otherwise? Or can they? 
4. There's no peace without democracy for Uganda. first things first, no one wants 
violence but change is needed so For God And My County,we do it the usual way. 
The African way of changing power. Democracy for peace at any 
cost. #ugandadecides #M7mustgo 
5. liberators always turn out tyrants but anyway lets fight 
6. It's clearly understood that yesterday Besigye received a tip off about ballots 
politicking and stuffing at a one residence in Naguru and the man reaching the 
location himself just got arrested by NRM police! NRM police never allowed anyone 
to find out 
7. If the whole district of kiruhura can't reach 700people where do they come from in 
one polling station? 
8. kiruhura registered voters 84,234 
9. I like ur arguement based on figures not speculations 
10. Yesterday we didn't receive updates about the other place were rigging of elections 
was going on but on case of besigye doing his own tally is arrested 
11. yes...we need. the Naguru nrm safe house updates 
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12. I almost gave the same response, I don't need to add!!!. Did the police search that area 
anyway!!? 
13. the president has already rigged the elections but its like all Tv platforms are afraid of 
him.none of them are talking about it.But they are quick to put anything on Besigye 
up...#UgandaDidntDecide 
 
Acceptance of news content 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story 
 
Story 8 
February 20, 2016 Kiggundu: The commission declares candidate Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
as the elected President of Uganda this 20/Feb/2016  
Comments under the dimension of ‗Resistance of news content‘ 
1. God S Not Fair 
2. kigundu decided da ghost elected president not pples elected 
3. they should just put back our swt social media 
4. am not voting is Museveni contests for presidency in 2021 coz its wastage of time 
while voting 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Acceptance of news content‘ 
No acceptance of news content was registered for this story 
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Nature of engagement: Facebook followers in dialogue 
Story 1: 
January 1, 2016: Mbabazi expresses concerns over being shadowed by unknown men. 
Mbabazi fears that the men could be harbouring a sinister plot to harm him. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. Great view 
2. And Mbabazi never condemned the above, he even geared the formulation of POMA 
to suffocate opposition rallies; now it's his turn to feel it. 
3. great  
wise ugandans still exist 
4. trespassers are termed deadly and dangerous, if not so in your compound...gues alice it 
right on whatever drink ue enjoying.lols... 
5. hahahaha he thought that things were easy with Besigye. let him see the true colours 
6. Naye, is this not paranoia on his part? Many a time he has speculated, feared 
imaginary arrests of his person, preached imminent danger and threats to his safety 
and its all now beginning to sound like a comic strip and thread 
7. if you want to see and feel the pinch which ugandans go through, then u leave the 
dinner table of NRM 
8. I'm waiting for kayihura to arrest him or put 20 million as bounty to whoever gets him 
very sad for our country 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
1. We are keeping a very close eye on Yoweri Museveni. God help him if any harm 
comes to Amama Mbabazi. For so long M7 has got away with murder, this time it will 
be him poking the behind of a leopard as he infamously said 
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2. How about Amama Mbabazi, you mean for him he hasn't gone away with some 
murders or you think the public forgot about the boyfriend to the daughter who was 
killed in cold blood at the kololo residence. Again why should you try to cut the hand 
that fed you, after stealing from the government now you want to protect whatever 
you stole..SHAME 
3. What have you been drinking? Boyfriend to the daughter? Is that what M7 has been 
telling you? 
4. Mbabazi stop fooling ugandanz.u ve been in this fake govt enjoying now its when u 
ve seen the harrasement. Besigye in 2011 was beaten to death [sic}. ddnt you watch it 
on NTV and keep quiet. Am tired of your lies to win peoples sympathy 
5. its not fooling if you watched NTV @ 9:00 there was a man in suit carrying naked 
knife at Hon JPAM rally! 
6. Why should people who want to harm you walk with you hundreds of kilometers for 
several days if they need to harm you. Which type of armour are you wearing that 
makes them fail to harm you in a day or hours? Those statements aimed at evoking 
sympathy have been used by many and have not reaped from them. They have 
become mere clitches and unpopular songs heard and tired! 
7. Sam... Mafias can trail their victim even for years.... Watching and waiting to make 
the victims.. Death look natural 
8. Bob, mafias don't leave trails. And it takes a mafia to trap a mafia. So that means you 
agree with the theory that the complainer is a senior mafia. Everyone has cried foul 
because of his mafia activities and the last one was his long time confidant M7. The 
senior mafia does not need to cry foul, he should quietly enjoy the music whose tune 
&piper he called. Have ever heard Carlos the Jaco pleading? 
9. Was just letting you know about their business 
10. Mafias don't spill beans naawe. He is either giving up or appealing to sympathy. 
JPAM is not a KB type to cry foul. His network is as intricate as a Samurai fighter 
that when you fail, you conduct a self destruction using your own sword, not to cry 





January 3, 2016  Police deploy to block Besigye's school visits. Besigye tricked police who were 
trailing him and sneaked to a dam where animals share water with locals.  
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. wait tomoro 
2. YOU ARE RIGHT 
3. What besigye is doing is good let the ec allow the man to contiue so that p'ple can see 
the weakneses of museveni 
4. Brother MUHUMUZA, please come down, you already have the keys, just go and 
vote Ugandan Magufuli "Kiiza Besigye". 
5. hahaa Ndugu Okot am just watching the space 
6. Let's vote Col Besigye for a new Uganda because he know de kind of leaving we are 
going through 
7. Vote Dr Kiiza Besigye for social transformation and liberation 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
Followers did not disagree with each other on this story. 
 
Story 3 
January 5, 2016 EC says the recent ban on visits to hospitals and places of worship for 
presidential candidates was not based on any law but on concern for privacy of patients and 
worshippers. 
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Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. Patient Kayiguta complained 
2. kayiguta? 
3. Tell them 
4. They are jokers as usual, they think de law doesn't exist bse de big man appointed 
them he will dump them soon after using them and he will charge them with treason 
for rape of de constitution 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
1. KB is only allowed to move freely during campaign period otherwise he is always 
confined by Police at his Kasangati home" and not allowed to visit his businesses in 
town or even his home village of Rukungiri. 
2. is that true? How comes I see Besigye going to America, why don't they deny him 
access to the airport? #Ndeda, program yovr self to reason with ideas that differ from 
yours. 
3. U have a point 
 
Story 4 
January 6, 2016: Rugunda warns Besigye against defiance campaign. The premier also 
defended the role of crime preventers, saying they are critical in reinforcing the police that 
is thin on the ground. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. M bro never give up, Dats a loop hole for Diz pple t forge votes, vote for d candidate 
u want! Den we see wat nxt 
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2. A person who doesn't is the worst person coz it means he has definitely supported bt 
un knowingly. Votes are counted one by one. Now what wil they count if not voted 
for.swt rebuke that arrogant motive coz u wil not support the change bt support the 
existing one. Thanks 
3. Hw Much Is He(Rugunda) Earning?#Asiku 
4. Do have evidency 
5. Mat Madrid, know that what timothy is nailing is true. Just relux and accept it. 
6. #MAT Madrid as per the footage from the 09:00pm bulletin on NTV ,NBS, what 
transpired in the Kololo acceptance event after the Namboole Nominations of 
Candidate. 
7. If you are not ready to fight or die for something.!!! Then you are living for nothing!!! 
This time round we need power back to us.!! We need to have a say.! our rights 
respected and equal dispense of resources.!! We are ready to confront intimidation, 
planned brutality name it.!!! We gonna defend our country against crooks enough is 
enough.!! Change is coming.!!!defiance may this time become a necessary 
evil.!!#wesige Besigye. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
1. which govt is collapsing in feb? 
2. If you're on zero Facebook you can't understand 
3. I wonder what u'll do if he doesn‘t win! 
 
Story 5 
February 14, 2016: Debate panelist Shaka Ssali barred from asking president questions. 
For him to appear at the second debate, a government spokesperson has revealed that some 
conditions had to be met. 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
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1. Edward,,,,,,NTV, Ofondo and others are talking about unfavourable conditions given 
in whats to be a free and fair election. so u ar malinformed here 
2. As Ugandans wat have we done about the electoral commission of the nation being 
conditioned by one single man and his fake heartless advisors 
3. Dude ....... That true 
4. U r right. I can imagine how he instructs kigundu. Now I believe M7 rigs votes. 
5. Briliant Brain 
6. u r right 
7. Great man 
8. I said it too. The debate was so skewed. Talking abt foreign policy where the 
incumbent has the advantage of experience over the others. Anyway let's vote KB.We 
are tired of this nonsense. 
9. the right position for kiiza is challenger not a president so lets keep him in the 
opposition 
10. #Kugonza, How about we make him (Mr Besigye) president to challenge our 
country's problems since M7 is just a president not a challenger 
11. wesige Besigye.kb all the way 
12. Yeah. even at one time the presenter was reminded that it's candidate Museveni..not 
President Museveni 
13. Mbu once a president always a president but it won't help him 
14. I suppose what we had was presidental candidates' debates, lol. 
15. Ofwono said it himself. U mean u don't watch news? Be informed. 
16. Tell him 
17. Propaganda 
18. lets face reality here.shaka did not ask m7 any question apart from the last phase. 
19. M7 survived that way the Shaka was going to eat him... Heheee 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
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1. Are u saying Ugandans dont vote for m7? Shaka is biased, some of u have never 
listened to his programs bse u are not informed 
2. Opio ssebo,who told u we dont watch his programs, dont ashame da easterners....is 
there any government without critics....... 
3. Opio Edward please don't use derogatory statements while replying to my comment! 
Thank you 
4. wasting your time to vote & we knw M7 has already rigged 
5. M7 wasn't a President at the time of the debate, which President was again there? I me 
I only saw Presidential candidates! 
 
Story 6 
February 18, 2016: ED UCC, Godfrey Mutabazi says Mobile Money and social media were 
shut down because there was information that people were using these to bribe voters.  
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. Thanx 
2. Have you seen them???????? 
3. Bro, a u born today ?? This is how Uganda has been for 30yrs 
4. M7 regime knows too well that it is losing and therefore want to prevent access to 
infor by all means to ensure Ugandans don't get to know the truth. Yes, Besigye is 
winning but M7 will be sworn in. 
5. This is how they've been fooling ugandans 
6. We are accessing everything to the maximum,"Orbot","tunnel bear" and 
www.proxysite.com are all helping us to access social media.#basembye 
7. Can someone help how to do it? 
8. can what's app work? 
9. Yes 
10. download secure vpn now 
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11. tru dat man one ug one pple 
12. Dats right victor u have talked a point, wat we need is change 1oo% 
13. yah gal, i can acess mine and actually surprised tht they were blockd 
14. Cathy you hit it head on and i like your boldness. 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
1. they were right to close the social media, coz some of you dont know how to use it! 
2. First write correct grammar before replying on my comment #UPE 
3. what do u mean, violet? 
 
Story 7 
February 19, 2016: Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have been arrested in Najjanakumbi 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. As long as Kiggundu is chairman EC, and Museveni stands, no other person will win 
even if the election is organised in Heaven and Jesus, Angel michael and Gabriel 
stand against Museveni. 
2. That is not true, Jesus would extinguish M7 with a snap of a finger. But he is giving 
M7 enough rope to hang himself. 
3. Cool down plz 
4. so true 
5. Praying for Uganda. 
6. Thanks am also on my knees 
7. even cows voted 
8. 700people?...Is there any district in uganda that has a popn of less than 700? 
9. the quotation was for a polling station not a district 
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10. Uganda at this point we only need God. ...coz as ugandans m 7 has turned us into 
fools. .u vote but he is still declared president. .u protest tear gas is fired. .now we 
should just hand over this Nation to God and God Will hear our plea. ...poor 
ugandans...ooh my fellow citizens we have a heavy buggage to carry on our backs but 
for the next five years pipo still putting on yellow continue but ull enjoy ur yellow. 
..five years more we shal see..the youth should just go dig in The Village. .othawise 
no job. .....upe. ..high taxes. ..bad roads. ..oh my God We need you daddy in Heaven 
11. Following this exercise from Kenya. May peace reign in Uganda even as you go 
through this tough time. Love you all. 
12. now I'm here at kibuye round moving to da scene! 
13. Our president though its mob intimidation we still gotta love for you 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
1. That's ridiculous. If Museveni allows Besigye to be constantly assaulted, then he will 
have to deal with being insulted. 
2. Ugandans don't loose hope! The dictator fighting for a fifith term claims he went to 
the bush to fight coz of vote rigging does he hav remember this? Ugandans don't let 
Dr. Besigye down!  
3. He is uganda's Liberator 
4. Besigye is aliberator? no i don't think if so he shld be wiz plan B to liberate ugandans 
we a tired of dat man m7 
 
Story 8 
February 20, 2016 Kiggundu: The commission declares candidate Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
as the elected President of Uganda this 20/Feb/2016  
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Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in agreement‘ 
1. every ugandans believes with me that col.Dr. kizza Besigye is the people's elected 








9. Amen, may kigundu b judged 
10. AMEN!!! 









20. everything shall pass away, but the word of our God remains forever.is only God who 
knows the heart of man and will give gudgements according to the deeds. God is the 
answer and will wipe every tears of his chosen people. amen 
21. AMEN Simon God is looking 
22. Amen 
 
Comments under the dimension of ‗Followers in disagreement‘ 
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1. waaaaaaa which people? may be minority 
2. you have a big problem the people's president is Col Dr kizza Besigye that's all 
rigging imagine the support we had 
3. unless u pray from bat valley coz they love to kill pipo 
4. haha, Just accept that Majority of Ugandans hav spoken let's respect their opinion, 



















Appendix G: Interview guide for journalists 
Preamble: 
My name is Marion Olga Alina, a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu Natal in South 
Africa. I thank you for accepting to take part in this study which seeks to understand how Nation 
Television uses Facebook to enhance citizen participation in current affairs. I hope to tap into 
your experience and involvement in the February 2016 elections as a Journalist at Nation 
Television Uganda, for purposes of this research. 
You have a right to confidentiality and anonymity. Therefore, you are allowed not to answer all 
questions and you are can take a break or leave the interview at any time. Please note that the 
interview will be tape recorded for future reference and to ensure that you are not misquoted. You 
will be required to sign an informed consent form as proof of acceptance. Thank you.  
Interview  
1. What is your name? 
……………………………………………………………. 
2. How long have you worked at NTV Uganda? 
……………………………………………………………. 
3. Briefly describe the kind of stories you covered during the 2016 elections in Uganda. 
……………………………………………………………. 
4.  Were some of these stories posted on the official NTV Facebook page? 
……………………………………………………………. 
5. If yes, which of these stories attracted high participation by citizens on Facebook? 
  …………………………………………………………………………. 
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6. Did you engage the participants on Facebook to provide additional 
information/clarification on the stories you covered? 
……………………………………………………………. 
7. Do you think social media is an independent platform for expression of views? 
……………………………………………………………. 






Thank you  
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Appendix H: Interview guide for editors 
 
Preamble: 
My name is Marion Olga Alina, a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu Natal in South 
Africa. I thank you for accepting to take part in this study which seeks to understand how Nation 
Television uses Facebook to enhance citizen participation in current affairs. I hope to tap into 
your experience and involvement in the February 2016 elections as an Editor at Nation 
Television Uganda, for purposes of this research. 
You have a right to confidentiality and anonymity. Therefore, you are allowed not to answer all 
questions and you are can take a break or leave the interview at any time. Please note that the 
interview will be tape recorded for future reference and to ensure that you are not misquoted. You 
will be required to sign an informed consent form as proof of acceptance. Thank you.  
Interview  
1. What is your name? 
……………………………………………………………  
2. How long have you worked at NTV? 
…………………………………………………………… 
3.  What type of stories on the 2016 elections did you assign journalists to cover? 
…………………………………………………………… 
4. Which of these stories were posted on the official NTV Facebook page? 
…………………………………………………………… 
5. What informs your choice to post/not to post certain stories? 
…………………………………………………… 
6.  How did you engage citizens on Facebook? 
…………………………………………………………… 
7. How do you treat posts generated by the citizens on Facebook?  
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…………………………………………………………… 
8.  Do you think social media is an independent platform for expression of views? 
……………………………………………………………. 
9.  Explain your answer in question 7 above.  

















Appendix J: Interview guide for online content managers 
Preamble: 
My name is Marion Olga Alina, a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu Natal in South 
Africa. I thank you for accepting to take part in this study which seeks to understand how Nation 
Television uses Facebook to enhance citizen participation in current affairs. I hope to tap into 
your experience and involvement in the February 2016 elections as an online content manager 
at Nation Television Uganda, for purposes of this research. 
You have a right to confidentiality and anonymity. Therefore, you are allowed not to answer all 
questions and you are can take a break or leave the interview at any time. Please note that the 
interview will be tape recorded for future reference and to ensure that you are not misquoted. You 
will be required to sign an informed consent form as proof of acceptance. Thank you.  
Interview  
1. What is your name? 
………………………………………………… 
2. How long have you managed online content at NTV? 
………………………………………………….. 
3. What social media platforms do you manage at NTV? 
     ……………………………………………. 
4. What is your experience in managing the different platforms? 
……………………………………………………….. 
5. Regarding Facebook, what informs your decision to maintain or censor certain 
comments? 
…………………………………………………………… 
6. Do you have regular fans who post? 
……………………………………………………. 
7. What is your view on the use of social media in Uganda?  
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………………………………………………… 
8. How would you describe the use of social media during the 2016 elections? 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
9. Would you say there is need to regulate social media use in Uganda? 
          ………………………………………………… 
10. What is your biggest challenge as an online content manager? 
................................................................ 
11. What are the demographics of your respondents? 
